DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 482 777 FL 027 945

AUTHOR	Liddicoat, Anthony J., Ed.; Muller, Karis, Ed.
TITLE	Perspectives on Europe: Language Issues and Language Planning in Europe.
INSTITUTION	Language Australia, Melbourne (Victoria).
ISBN	ISBN-1-876768-57-6
PUB DATE	2002-00-00
NOTE	153p.; Support provided by the National Europe Centre (Australia).
AVAILABLE FROM	Language Australia Ltd., The National Languages and Literacy Institute of Australia, GPO Box 372F, Melbourne, Victoria 3001, Australia. Tel: 03 9612 2600; Fax: 03 9612 2601; e-mail: aris@languageaustralia.com.au; Web site: http://aris.com.au/.
PUB TYPE	Collected Works - General (020)
EDRS PRICE	EDRS Price MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS
DESCRIPTORS	Democracy; Elementary Secondary Education; English (Second Language); Foreign Countries; French; German; Higher Education; Language Minorities; *Language Planning; Political Issues; Scholarly Writing; Second Language Learning; Sociolinguistics
IDENTIFIERS	Croatia; *Europe; France; Germany; Language Policy; National Identity

ABSTRACT

This collection of papers includes the following: "Language Issues and Language Planning in Europe" (Anthony J. Liddicoat and Karis Muller); "Language and National Identity" (Peter M. Hill); "Language Planning, Linguistic Diversity and Democracy in Europe" (Anthony J. Liddicoat); "Language Competition in European Community Institutions" (Karis Muller); "French Monopoly of the Linguistic Marketplace: A Regional Perspective" (Nicole George); "Jack Lang and Minority Languages: A Radical Change in French Linguistic Policies or More of the Same?" (Henri Jeanjean); "The Problem of English as the Lingua Franca of Scholarly Writing from a German Perspective" (Winifried Theilmann); "Croatia's Independence and the Language Politics of the 1990s" (Maja Mikula); "Doing it Our Way: Language Politics in the Clash between Istrian Regionalism and Croatian Nationalism" (Dean Vuletic); "Language and Politics in the Republika Srpska" (Andjelija Dragosavljevic). (Papers contain references.) (SM)

Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made
from the original document.

ED 482 777

PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPE

language issues and language planning in Europe

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)
☐ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.
● Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE AND
DISSEMINATE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE,
AND IN ELECTRONIC MEDIA FOR ERIC
COLLECTION SUBSCRIBERS ONLY,
HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
D. Tout
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES
INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)
2A

2

Editors
Anthony J Liddicoat and Karis Muller

FL027945

Perspectives on Europe:
language issues and language planning in Europe

Edited by Anthony J Liddicoat and Karis Muller

LANGUAGE AUSTRALIA

National
Europe
Centre
Australia

Perspectives on Europe: language issues and language planning in Europe

Edited by Anthony J. Liddicoat and Karis Muller

National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publications Data
Perspectives on Europe: language issues and language planning in Europe

Bibliography.
ISBN: 1 876768 57 6

1. Language and Languages — Europe. 2. Language planning — Europe. 3. Language policy — Europe. I. Liddicoat, Anthony. II. Muller, K. (Karis). III. Language Australia.

306.4494

Cover design: Gabrielle Markus
Typesetting and layout: Peter Sannwald
Editing: Nicole Hayes

Published by Language Australia Ltd.

First published in 2002.

© 2002 Language Australia Ltd.

This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission from the publisher.

Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction and rights should be addressed to:

Language Australia Ltd.
The National Languages and Literacy Institute of Australia
GPO Box 372F
Melbourne VIC 3001

Contents

Acknowledgements iv

Language issues and language planning in Europe 1
Anthony J Liddicoat and Karis Muller

Language and national identity 11
Peter M Hill

Language planning, linguistic diversity and democracy in Europe 21
Anthony J Liddicoat

Language competition in European Community institutions 41
Karis Muller

French monopoly of the linguistic marketplace: a regional perspective 61
Nicole George

Jack Lang and minority languages: a radical change in French linguistic policies or more of the same? 81
Henri Jeanjean

The problem of English as the *lingua franca* of scholarly writing from a German perspective 95
Winfried Thielmann

Croatia's independence and the language politics of the 1990s 109
Maja Mikula

Doing it our way: language politics in the clash between Istrian regionalism and Croatian nationalism 125
Dean Vuletić

Language and politics in the Republika Srpska 141
Andjelija Dragosavljević

Acknowledgements

The editors would like to acknowledge the National Europe Centre at the Australian National University and the European Community, as represented by the Commission of the European Communities, for their financial support towards the production of this publication and for assistance in organising the workshop on *Language Policies and Issues: A Celebration of the European Year of Languages* on which the volume is based.

Language issues and language planning in Europe

Anthony J Liddicoat, Griffith University

and

Karis Muller, Australian National University

Overview

Issues of language have always been important in Europe, and political decision making about language has been a feature of the development of the European nation-state. It was long a commonplace of European political thinking that a single state required a single language giving rise to the idea of a single *national language* as a symbol of the nation (Garvin 1993). The national language has typically been defended both within and outside Europe for both instrumental reasons, relating to the facilitation of communication within the nation, and for sentimental reasons of national and cultural identity and the authentification of the nation as a political entity (Cooper 1989). So strong was the association of nation and language that, in the nineteenth century, a single official language in each nation-state had become the European norm. However, even in the nineteenth century there were a few states which had more than one official language: Switzerland, the dual monarchy of Austro-Hungary, and later, Belgium. In all European nation-states, however, the single national language overlay complex patterns of multilingualism and extensive dialect continua. These 'other languages of Europe' were treated variously in different times and countries, ranging from indifference and neglect, to outright hostility and proscription. Regardless of the official treatment of these languages, however, the common nationalist assumption in most countries was that multilingualism within the nation-state was problematic for the existence and coherence of that state. Norway is a notable exception to this trend, selecting two quite similar Norwegian standards, Bokmål (Riksmål) and Nynorsk (Landsmaal), as official languages as a way of consolidating national identity in a situation in which divisions existed over which variant better reflected Norwegian identity and aspirations (Haugen 1966).

At the same time, the collection of European nation-states was a multilingual entity, in which instrumental issues of international communication played a part. The linguistic situation in Europe has typically included a supranational vehicular language, initially Latin, and later French, and to a lesser extent, German in Eastern Europe, which has held a central place in the diplomatic relations of Europe.

The 'one nation — one language' idea has always been at least potentially problematic in Europe as European nations have never been monolingual and, even while this monolingual ideal was being strongly entrenched in official contexts, the 'other languages of Europe' were already beginning to try to (re)claim a place within their respective societies. The post-World War II period has also seen the resurgence of regional identities and their associated languages, although it must be noted that the seeds of this movement could be found in nineteenth century romanticism with its valuing of local traditions. European Romanticism, with its deep interest in those cultures 'kept aside by history' (Sánchez 1992) and its active encouragement of literary and intellectual activities in those languages, led to the growth of a number of linguistically-oriented movements, such as the Occitan *Felibrige*, the Catalan *Renaixença*, or the Galician *Rexurdimento*, and institutions such as the Frisian *Selskip foar Fryske Taal- en Skriftekenisse*, which provided increasingly effective bases for the promotion of regional languages, and which contested the 'one nation — one language' ideal. This resurgence began as a grass-roots movements within the various ethno-linguistic communities, often manifesting as a linguistic and literary movement. However, the post-World War II period saw a considerable expansion of the political role of such groups, leading to consideration of minority language issues at governmental and supranational levels.

The post-World War II movement towards federalism and European co-operation also introduced a new multilingual dimension into the language situation in Europe. The language issue was made especially relevant with the founding of the European Community in 1957 and the decision to include the official languages of the various member states as co-equal official languages. The origins of this movement can be seen as a continuation of sentimental attachments to national languages, but the impact has in many ways challenged the underlying concept of the equality of the state and its national language. This decision created an officially multilingual organisation which fused official national languages with supranational communication, and established a precedent for expanding the scope of that multilingualism as the European community developed and changed.

Languages issues have become increasingly important in supranational bodies in Europe, especially for the European Union and the Council of Europe. Both bodies take as their starting point a realisation that post-World War II Europe needed to establish a greater level of unity and co-operation than had existed previously, and to engage with the cultural and social complexity of the continent. The evolution of these bodies has been characterised by an evolution in the ways in which Europeans have viewed languages leading to an increased valuing of linguistic diversity as a manifestation of Europe's unique cultural heritage. At the same time, this evolution has proved a challenge for Europe, as the roles of official, regional and immigrant languages have been reconsidered and, increasingly, the symbolic attachments which exist between languages and their speakers have been at the forefront of Europeans' approaches to linguistic diversity, regardless of their particular stance to diversity *per se*.

The work of the European Union and the Council of Europe has come to focus on plurilingualism as a European norm, and both bodies have instituted programs related to languages, both in education and in the wider community. The most recent of these programs was to give a special focus to language issues through the designation of 2001 as the 'European Year of Languages'.

The decision to designate 2001 as the European Year of Languages was taken by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in January 1999, and the Education Council of the European Union formally agreed at its meeting on 8 June 2000, to participate in the project. The European Year of Languages was intended to celebrate the linguistic diversity of Europe and to highlight the importance of language learning in the context of increasingly important multilingualism and multiculturalism. The European Year of Languages resulted from a perception in both the Council of Europe and the European Union of the importance of language skills for active participation in European democratic processes, as well as for employment and mobility in Europe.

The European Year of Languages represents an affirmation of Europe's changed understanding of linguistic diversity as an economic, social and cultural resource to be cultivated rather than as a problem to be overcome. For contemporary Europe, plurilingualism has become a goal, not only for the region and its institutions, but more importantly for individuals as well, and knowledge of several languages has been recognised as a core criterion for the development of European identities and notions of European citizenship.

The official Year of Languages used websites, printed materials, exhibitions, competitions and the media and provided financial help to many thousands of projects, many of them small and locally based. The languages to be promoted were not only the official languages of the European Union or even of the Council of Europe, but included also minority and regional languages.

Language issues: Europe versus the nation-state

Within the European Union especially, which is a single market with much of it now having a single currency, worker mobility is essential. That only about one per cent of Europeans travel to other countries in the European Union to work is due to language barriers. Thus, in addition to the general cultural and social benefits to be gained from learning languages, in the European Union there are economic factors as well.

The promotion of language learning in Europe also has a geopolitical significance (cf. Bohn 2000). The European Union is a major power bloc, in most respects equal to the United States. The affirmation of a European identity and its independence from US political and social domination has its linguistic counterpart; namely, there is officially little inclination to rely on English alone as the means of communication, despite the increasing dominance of English as *lingua franca* in some parts of Europe.

Nevertheless, in Europe, as elsewhere, the implications of national and supranational language policies raise fundamental questions: the role of languages in a globalised world (Kramsch 1994), the future of national and minority languages when English has become the main international language, and how far speakers of other languages should or can resist the spread of English. Would language convergence, that is, the instilling of one or perhaps a select few languages into all the citizens of the European Union — or even the entire area covered by the Council of Europe — help create a feeling of loyalty to that nebulous entity, Europe? Or, rather, would it alienate many who might fear the relegation of their languages and cultures to folklore status?

This volume

The papers in this volume take as their starting point a conference held in late 2001 at the Australian National University, which was organised by the School of Language Studies and in part funded by the National Europe Centre and the Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia. The conference focussed on the emerging language issues in Europe at the close of the European Year of Languages, as seen from the perspective of Australian scholars working on the languages of Europe. The papers in this volume span a range of language issues from the regional to the national, and examine the ways in which these issues are played out in language planning and language policy.

Peter M Hill examines the place of language in European views of national identity. He argues that for Europeans, language is not simply a means of communication, but also a central element of national identity. That is, language is powerfully symbolic. In this paper, Hill sets forth an issue which will be taken up in one way or another by the other chapters in this book. The language issues which confront Europe are not practical, but symbolic, and the close association between language and identity is a core factor in any language planning and language policy work currently being undertaken in Europe. Hill makes the point that languages, especially national languages, are not 'natural' entities, but rather are socially constructed. What counts as a language, or as the same language or a different language, is therefore not the result of an objective assessment of linguistic similarity or difference, but rather, it is subjective, arbitrary, and open to be contested. Language planning can therefore be concerned with establishing a linguistic variety as an autonomous language, and in so doing, distancing it from other languages on subjective criteria, thereby establishing linguistic boundaries which can reinforce or blur national, cultural and other boundaries in order to achieve political and social goals.

Anthony J Liddicoat's chapter deals with language planning work at the level of Europe. He examines language planning directions in the work of both the European Union and the Council of Europe and argues that, in spite of similar rhetoric, the language planning goals and principles of the two organisations are often quite different. He argues that each body has its own goals and priorities in language planning. In particular, the Council of Europe focuses primarily on the cultural dimension of languages, and links this with ideas of diversity, cultural democracy, and democratic citizenship. The ideas lead to a focus in the work of the Council of Europe on the smaller languages of Europe, especially regional or minority languages. The focus is therefore on languages as symbols of European identity and elements of European heritage. The language policies of the European Union, however, focus on the political and economic goals of integration and individual mobility, goals which rely on the learning and use of official European Union languages. The European Union therefore focuses on language as a tool of communication. In both cases, the emphasis is on plurilingualism, although involving different languages and different social purposes for plurilingualism.

Karis Muller examines the complexities involved in the European Union's official multilingualism. She acknowledges that the high level of multilingualism fundamental to the European Union produces problems in terms of cost and complexity. Europe's multilingualism is most obvious in the immense size of the translating and interpreting services required by a system which uses eleven languages, and requires documents to be translated into all these languages on a regular basis. The complexity and cost of this enterprise faces the potential for massive expansion, as new member states are admitted to the Union. However, the focus of the chapter is less on these obvious problems, and more on the de facto domination of the European Union by a very small subset of the official languages, in particular, English. Muller argues that, while simplification of the language services of the European union may appear to be either necessary or desirable, such simplification is also problematic. Europe's multilingualism is based on principles of linguistic democracy, and these principles themselves enshrine the equality of all member states. The domination of one (or more) languages over the others is therefore a symbolic domination of some member states over others. In fact, Muller argues that Europe is a two-level system which has split into a group of inner and outer members, with the languages of the most powerful naturally at the 'core' and at the level of working languages at least; the other languages having only peripheral roles. Membership of the core is contested on the basis of the inclusion and exclusion of languages from particular events, and this inclusion or exclusion becomes the issue around which many symbolically important battles come to be fought. Muller proposes some potential solutions to the problem of European multilingualism, but concludes by recognising that, because of the symbolic power attached to language use in Europe, any resolution of the complexity of the European Union's language issues is difficult.

The remaining papers discuss language policy and language planning issues in individual countries.

The papers by Nicole George and Henri Jeanjean examine recent developments in the treatment of minority languages in France. France is a particularly important focus for the study of language issues in Europe, as it is in France where the linguistic consequences of the language planning of the European Union are most acutely felt. In many ways, the situation in France represents an acute response to the emerging issues of national and regional identity in Europe, and the potential for conflict at the level of language between the language planning goals of the nation-state and those of the European Union.

George uses a case study of Breton and Occitan language use utilising the metaphor of a linguistic marketplace. For George, the deterioration in rates of local language use can be seen as the consequence of a linguistic market where important socialising institutions, such as the media and the school, have raised the French language's profit of distinction and diminished the perceived value of the local and minority languages. She argues that the evolution of a language market, in which everything except the dominant language has been marginalised, is the result of state legislation, which has helped shape social practices, and has severely compromised the linguistic capital of France's indigenous languages. She traces the reduced status of the regional and minority languages of France to the state's unwillingness to foster linguistic diversity. The language policies of the French state are challenged by regional activists who look to governments to create an environment that will allow for a revitalisation of these languages, focussing their attention upon the notion of equality between the cultures of France. The protection of France's indigenous languages, however, strikes at the heart of the republican ideology, which focuses upon the *unicité* of *le peuple français* as the cornerstone of the nation — a unity which has language as a core value for national identity.

Jeanjean takes up this same theme in his examination of the place of bilingual minority language schools within the education system, and the complexities of integrating such schools in the light of the identification of French as the language of the republic in the French constitution. The difficulties of the integration go far beyond administrative considerations relating to the introduction of a new model of education. The inclusion of such schools in the national education system has become nothing less than a challenge to the core values which define the French nation and French identity. The battle then is a symbolic one in which issues of language become issues of identity, both for those who speak minority languages and for those who do not. In fact, for Jeanjean the issue is made more complex, in that, it goes beyond relations between the centre and the regions within France, and is linked to the place of France within Europe. He presents a picture of French identity encoded in the 'one nation — one language' ideal, simultaneously challenged from within by regional minorities, and without by Europe's promotion of regional languages as a part of Europe's cultural heritage. This dual challenge is a factor in the development of a new cleavage in French politics, between the *souverainistes,* who champion France's national prerogatives, and the Europeanists, who seek France's greater integration into Europe, which cuts across the old cleavage of left and right. Issues of language and regional identity, therefore, become polyvalent problems in which multiple sets of identities are in conflict.

Thielmann pursues the issue of linguistic diversity from a very different perspective. He argues that the increasing presence of English in academic contexts throughout Europe is potentially problematic for scientific thinking. Thielmann's view is that uninformed use of English as a foreign scientific language has led to problems for scientific expression and a resulting lack of clarity in much scientific writing, and, at the same time, he sees the prevalence of English as the scientific *lingua franca* as preventing the linguistic expansion of the scientific varieties of European languages, with the possible result that these languages will no longer have the linguistic resources in which to conduct and disseminate research. This loss is more than a loss of a linguistic register, but is also the loss of the culturally-based conceptual system which is encoded in any particular scientific idiom. For Thielmann, therefore, the argument that a scientific *lingua franca* promotes the communication of ideas across linguistic and national boundaries is problematic, in that, it risks the development of a 'scientific linguistic monoculture'. The preservation of scientific languages should therefore be a part of the preservation of Europe's linguistic and cultural heritage.

The final three papers deal with the linguistic situation in the nations emerging from the former Yugoslavia. The former Yugoslavia is another focus area for language issues in Europe. Here the core question is the linguistic expression of new identities as new nation-states emerge.

Mikula examines the language planning process in Croatia where work is being undertaken to establish and maintain the distinctiveness of the Croatian language, both as a marker of its separation from the official 'Serbo-Croatian' of the former Yugoslavia, and as and a way of enhancing the autonomy of Croatian from the other South Slav languages. She traces the movement from language as a marker of unity among the South Slavs, to language as a marker of separation between the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. Nineteenth century language planning was nationalistic in its scope, in that, it sought to use language to develop a sense of common identity between linguistically similar, but culturally separate groups, by attempting to bring the Croatian and the Serbian languages closer together. In the post-Yugoslav period, however, this linguistic unity has been challenged, and the desire to mark a distinctive, independent local identity in Croatia has influenced the nature of Croatian language planning. Croatians' concerns over Serbian political dominance in the former Yugoslavia were linked to perceptions of linguistic hegemony and, by way of reaction, to a desire to preserve Croatian in its purest possible form. Language planning, therefore, emphasised the orthographic, lexical and syntactical differences between Croatian and Serbian. Archaic forms and words were resurrected, and neologisms devised to replace the shared words and expressions. Mikula argues that the practical concerns of communication were subordinated to the symbolic concerns of identity and separation, and that this had a negative effect on the vitality of the language and its communicative functions within Croatian society itself.

Vuletić also writes about the linguistic situation in Croatia, but concentrates on the linguistic correlates of the emergence of a strong regional identity for Italian speakers in Istria at the same time that a strong nationalist identity for Croatian was being promoted for Croatia as a whole. He examines the resulting conflict between regionalists and nationalists as it was played out in language policy, particularly in policies of multilingualism. While the regionalists pursued official bilingualism at the county level and in schooling, the nationalists used their control of the national government to hamper such measures. For the regionalists, Istrian identity was multifaceted and encoded linguistically and culturally through both Italian and Croatian. For the nationalists, however, the 'one nation — one language' ideal was central, and Croatian identity was a singular identity tied to the Croatian language, and was undermined by the multicultural, multiethnic and multilingual approach of the regionalists. Vuletić examines the emergence of complex identities as an expression of one's place within a nation-state and the passage of language as a marker of identity, from the cultural sphere into the realm of politics. In the case of Istria, one can see in microcosm a key debate which typifies language issues in contemporary Europe — the tension between linguistic uniformity and diversity, and the re-evaluation of the 'one nation — one language' view of national identity.

Dragosavljević completes this study of the former Yugoslavia by examining language planning in the Bosnian Serb area known as the Republika Srpska. Here she examines an attempt to reform the pronunciation and spelling norms of the official language of the Bosnians Serbs. The attempts to replace the Ijekavian variant with Ekavian, and Latin script with Cyrillic, are centrally issues of national identity. The language plan sought to bring the official language of Bosnia's Serbs closer to that of the Serbs of Serbia, and to separate Bosnian Serbs from other Bosnians linguistically. The successful substitution of Latin script by Cyrillic stemmed from the effectiveness of Cyrillic as a marker of Serbian identity through its attachment to other identity markers, such as religion. In the same way, the failure of the substitution of Ijekavian by Ekavian also results from issues of identity. Here the change was felt to undermine the Serbian identity of Bosnian Serbs by separating their native variant from Serbian identity, and attaching it too closely to non-Serbian identities. In this case, Ekavian did not become a valid marker of identity because it was not directly attached to other elements of that identity, but rather, located Serbian identity to Serbia itself, rather than among people who culturally and ethnically identified as Serbs, but who lived outside Serbia.

The picture which emerges from these studies is one of complexity and even contradiction with forces such as nationalism and internationalism, regionalism and localism, diversity and uniformity characterising European work in language policy and language planning. The first papers deal with general features of the language situation in Europe.

Expanding the view

Some of these questions are more relevant in Europe than they are in Australia. However, the papers in this volume do explore issues that are equally important to us in Australia. For example, should language policy insist on the compulsory learning of foreign languages at school? What criteria should dictate the choice of languages taught? Should resources be devoted to regional or minority languages rather than to dominant languages? Can concepts or arguments be successfully translated? And what of different writing conventions, different codes of politeness? These require more than simple translation or interpreting. More broadly, the answers to such questions raise issues that are as important for us as they are to Europeans, such as, what sort of a society we are or wish to become, attitudes to neighbouring states, and to migrants. Both the European Union and Australia are diverse and multicultural. Australia differs from the European Union in having only one official language, so that not only are the economic incentives different, but also, in Europe, there is a perceived need to ensure linguistic equality to counter suspicions of first and second class Europeans.

What is obvious in Europe is a degree of activism in favour of languages at many levels. Governments are for the most part committed to establishing some form of plurilingualism through language education, and see plurilingualism as a central resource for the modern world. Language is seen as a way of developing transportable skills which can be used beyond one's own national boundaries and, often more importantly, as a way of developing intercultural and communicative skills on which the modern world will depend. This view contrasts with Australia, where there is quite a high level of linguistic complacency manifested through a perception that one language, the language of the majority of the population, is sufficient in and of itself for future needs. This is seen most strongly in the naïve assumption that 'everyone speaks English'. In Europe, where language borders are frequent and where communication and travel across some borders can be a daily occurrence, plurilingualism is seen as both natural and necessary. In Australia, where using more than one English is not a part of everyday life for many people, plurilingualism has come to be seen as an exotic luxury. Australia, in spite of official multiculturalism, still adheres to the principle of 'one nation — one language', and many Australians see language only as a communicative tool rather than also as a symbol and marker of identity. What Europe shows is that it is necessary to engage actively with language as a symbol, because there can be no possibility of not engaging with it. Attempts to ignore the symbolic role of language are tantamount to rejections of the symbolism involved, and as international communication increases, such rejections, whether tacit or explicit, inevitably produce new problems for communication across national barriers.

References

Bohn, HI 2000 'Os aspectos 'politicos' de uma politica de ensino de linguas e literaturas estrangeiras', *Linguagem e Ensino*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp 117–138.

Cooper, RL 1989, *Language planning and social change*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Garvin, PL 1993, 'A conceptual framework for the study of language standardisation', *International Journal of The Sociology of Language*, vol. 100/101, pp 37–54.

Haugen, E 1966, *Language conflict and language planning: the case of Modern Norwegian*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Kramsch, C 1994, 'Foreign languages for a global age', *ADFL Bulletin*, vol. 25, no. 1, pp 5–12.

Sánchez, A 1992, 'Política de difusión del español', *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, vol. 95, pp 51–69.

Language and national identity

Peter M Hill, The Australian National University

and University of Hamburg

Introduction

Language is an eminently political issue in most countries of Europe and Central Asia. It is well-known that France has adopted legislation in order to defend the position of the French language. Most of the newly independent states in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and in Central Asia have consciously followed this lead and passed a 'language law' or a 'law for the defence of the national language'. This is not political romanticism. Threats to linguistic autonomy are a threat to national cohesion.

I should like to begin with a quotation from George Schöpflin:

> ... reasonable people should not really care about low-level difficulties like whether a village has monolingual or bilingual street signs. ... does it really matter if an ethno-linguistic minority is obliged to learn the language of the majority — everybody has to learn the language of the state, do they not? ... this level of argument misses the underlying dynamics of language, ethnicity and power (Schöpflin 2000, p 116)

Language is part of one's national identity, hence the French rightly see the advance of English as a threat to their national identity. (The Swiss are perhaps the exception that confirms the rule.) In Spain under the fascists, Franco suppressed not only regional autonomy, but also regional languages as the essential element of regional identity. At the other end of Europe, the Bosnian Serbs tried to force their people to change the basis of their standard language, so that it would sound more like the standard language spoken in Belgrade, and less like that spoken by their Croatian and Muslim neighbours in Bosnia (see Dragosavljević in this volume). For years the Bulgarian and Macedonian governments were unable to sign bilateral treaties because the Bulgarian government would not accept the term 'Macedonian language', and the Macedonian government would not accept a treaty without this explicit reference to their official language.

For Anglo-Saxons it is difficult to comprehend that language could be anything but a means of communication, and yet in the modern world, language has become a marker of nationality ('the innermost sanctum of ethnicity' Schöpflin 2000, p 116). In relation to the South-Slavonic languages, van Wijk wrote (1956, p 98): '*En effet, la langue est un des* *critères les plus importants de la nationalité*' ['In effect, language is one of the most important criteria for nationality']; and according to Magner:

> A native speaker of English rarely considers language an essential characteristic of his nationality ... On the other hand, each of the 1,342,000 native speakers of Macedonian knows that the Macedonian language is fundamental to his national identity ... (Magner 1988, pp 108-109).

Similar remarks have been made about the Estonian nation and the Estonian language:

> there is something about the identity of a small country and a small nation that distinguishes it from big nations. I mean the knowledge that it is small. And thus its duty to protect its language, culture and lifestyle is much more imperative than that of big nations (Meri 2001).

President Meri continued:

> A human being is mortal. And therefore the thought that he may be the last representative of his nation, his language, his lifestyle, habits, values, history and all his generations so far, is unbearable for him. A human being only lives within his culture, is born into it and leaves it with the knowledge that with his life's work, he has added to its immortality. (Meri 2001)

This was not, however, so in the pre-national era:

> ... since the thirteenth century, we [were] under the crown of the Holy Roman Empire and Denmark, and spoke(n) Estonian at home and German in the city. The language was a marker of social, not ethnic origin.' (Meri 2001)

Lithuanian has been described as 'the most important feature of the identity of the Lithuanian nation', and Jews were accused of being anti-Lithuanian because most refused to learn the 'national language':

> *Das im 19. Jh. keimende litauische Nationalbewußtsein hat Juden mehr und mehr von der Gesellschaft ausgeschlossen. Der Antisemitismus erreichte nach der Staatsgründung 1918 einen ersten Höhepunkt. Die schwierige Sprache, das wichtigste Merkmal der Identität der litauischen Nation, beherrschten nur wenige Juden. Die meisten blieben bei ihrem Jiddisch.* (Kasperowitsch 2001, pp 44)[1]

The language was one of the instruments of fighting assimilation in the Baltic states during the Soviet era: '*In den Jahren der Okkupation dienten Sprache und Literatur als Mittel, nationalen Widerstand aufrechtzuerhalten*'. ['In the years of occupation language and literature served as a means of maintaining national resistance'.] (von Lucius 2001, p 43)

> The Georgian language, ... has great symbolic significance for Georgians. Its history is closely tied to the Georgian Orthodox church which gives it an almost sacred character. By the nineteenth century it was synonymous with Georgian national uniqueness and Georgian intellectuals used it as a symbol of resistance to Russian dominance. (Jones 1995, p 535)

> The [Armenian] language's historical association with the national church and the Armenian intelligentsia's history of linguistic reform and struggle in the nineteenth century, raised Armenian into a fundamental part of their identity. (Jones 1995, p 536)

> Language politics is the politics of threatened identity. The 'titular' group, after which the 'homeland' is called, justifies the exclusionary nature of the policy (one state language where **two** languages compete) on the grounds that its language is under threat of extinction. Since, in these cases, the titular group defines its identity primarily in terms of its distinct language, this amounts to saying that the survival of the group itself is at stake. (Arel 1995, p 597)

The present Ukrainian president, Leonid Kuèma, had to learn Ukrainian for the sake of his political career in independent Ukraine. Russian was perfectly adequate for communicating with the electorate, but many would not have accepted his Ukrainian credentials had he continued to use only Russian in public. Similarly, Juan José Ibarretxe, now the premier (*Lehendakari*) of the Basque province in Spain, had to learn Basque:

> *Geduld und Zähigkeit hat er bewiesen, als er im Alter von mehr als 40 Jahren noch die baskische Sprache erlernte. Für die Nationalisten ist die Kenntnis des nur von einem Viertel der Bevölkerung verstandenen Baskischen Voraussetzung für die Übernahme des Amtes des Regierungschefs* (Haubrich 2001, p 16)[2]

Three quarters of Basques speak only Spanish, so the possibility 'of losing their identity to a greater Spanish whole is always present' (Schöpflin 2000, 59). In Ireland, a similarly small proportion of the population knows Irish. For the sake of national identity, many Irish words are used in English-language texts to designate public institutions, e.g. the Prime Minister is called the *Taoiseach*[3], the police force are referred to as *gardai*, and so on.

Clearly, members of small nations are more likely to regard language as part of their national identity than are members of large nations, or members of nations that share their language with other nations. Nonetheless, variants can also be seen as distinguishing members of one nation from members of another nation with whom they share their language. In Austria, certain words are peculiarly Austrian, e.g. *Paradeiser* for the standard German expression *Tomaten* 'tomatoes'. When Austrians avoid an expression such as *Paradeiser* in favour of the standard German expression *Tomaten,* they may be accused by their co-nationals of 'cultural cringe'.

Languages acquire a different character if spoken by different national communities, hence the different national Englishes. The same is true of French in France and Wallonia. 'The cultural aspects of language show that, over time, the different experiences of two communities speaking the same language philologically differentiates their language as well, as words begin to acquire different meanings, carry different emotional charges and evoke different responses. From this perspective, Serbian and Croatian were culturally different languages and culture ... has a central role in the definition of nationhood' (Schöpflin 2000, p 333). Language is the principal means of cultural reproduction, of preserving the ethnic group. Language has an affective quality. It creates a group whose members feel that they understand and can trust one another (cf. Schöpflin 2000, p 43).

Language as a national or ethnic integrator

The effectiveness of language as a national or ethnic integrator is confirmed by the frequency with which it 'figures in policies intended to frustrate, or conversely to foster, ethnic identification and cultural development' (Glaser and Possony 1979, p 126).

Already in 1916, Buck noted that language had come to replace the notion of common descent in the popular imagination:

> Recorded descent is at best restricted to a few families. It is the linguistic descent which is really demonstrable, and which is instinctively felt as evidence of national descent (Buck 1916, pp 46–47).

The Bulgarian 'national revival' is considered to have begun with the *Slavo-Bulgarian History* by the Hilendar monk Paisii. The key passage in his manuscript history of 1762 is the following:

> 'O you senseless and foolish people! Why are you ashamed to call yourself Bulgars and why do you not read and speak your own language? (cf. Stavrianos 2000, p 370).[4]

More than a century later Ioannis Psykharis summoned Greeks to the defence of demotic Greek with the battle cry:

> Language and fatherland are identical. To fight for one's fatherland or one's language, the fight is one and the same. (Here cited after Magner 1988, p 109.)

Magner calls it 'the struggle of a people to achieve nationhood and a distinctive linguistic identification', and, quoting Einar Haugen, he adds: '... each political unit has seen it as a vital part of its national policy to cultivate and strengthen its national language ... When Norway was liberated from Denmark and Sweden, it bent its best efforts to the development of a [distinctively] Norwegian language ...' (Magner 1988, p 109; cf. also Hill 1987).

Moreover, just as nationalists are keen to postulate a pedigree of at least one thousand and preferably of over 5,000 years for their nation,[5] a national language is also perceived to be better if it can be traced back for a thousand years or more. Thus, for Macedonian nationalists it is important to point out that Macedonian has a history of over a thousand years, dating back to the Old Church Slavonic language codified by Saints Cyril and Methodius in the ninth century.

> Greek demographic continuity was brutally interrupted in the late sixth to eighth centuries AD by massive influxes of Avar, Slav and, later, Albanian immigrants ... modern Greeks could hardly count as being of ancient Greek descent, even if this could never be ruled out ... (Smith 1991, p 29).

What made up for the clearly unprovable assertion of descent from the ancient Greeks was the fact that a few of these people spoke an idiom that was — at least if one subscribes to the mainstream 19th-century theories of historical-comparative linguistics — clearly descended from ancient Greek. Roger Just writes: 'the population of mainland Greece ... from village to village, might be found speaking Albanian, Slavic, or Vlach (romance) as well as or instead of Greek and whose customs and habits might seem to bear as much if not more relation to those of the other peoples of the Balkans and indeed of Anatolia as they did to what were fondly imagined to be those of Periclean Athens' (1989, p 85). What unified disparate ethnic groups into the modern Greek nation — in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries — was the Greek language and the concomitant cultural values.

Thus, in the case of the modern Greeks, language performed a two-fold role: firstly, it served to support the initial claim to the ancient Greek heritage; secondly, the creation of a modern Greek standard language in the course of the 19th century and its imposition on the disparate national groups within the Greek state was a kind of cement to hold together these disparate ethnic groups in one — 'Hellene' — nation.

Similarly, in the eighteenth century, the Rumanians 'discovered' that they were descended from the Ancient Romans. In 1778 Samuil Micu-Klein put forward this thesis in his *Brevis historica notitia originis et progressus nationis Daco-Romanae*. He followed this up with a Rumanian grammar (with his co-author Gheorghe Sincai) designed to emphasise the Latin character of the language (cf. Sterbling 1993; Hösch 1988.). The language was, in fact, the only apparent proof of this thesis, which was central to affirming the legitimacy of the Rumanian nation in its struggle with the 'established' German and Hungarian nations in Transylvania by 'proving' that the Rumanians were in fact 'more ancient' than either.

Today language is seen as the quintessential marker of nationality, and exceptions simply confirm the rule. To quote Buck again:

> ... the Irish nationality is obviously not restricted to the small fraction which still speaks Irish. At the same time the effort of the Gaelic League to revive interest in the Irish tongue is a notable phase of the national revival. It was an Irishman who once said with feeling: 'A people without a language of its own is only half a nation' ...
>
> For of all the institutions which mark a common nationality, language is the one of which a people is most conscious and to which it is most fanatically attached. It is the one conspicuous banner of nationality, to be defended against encroachment, as it is the first object of attack on the part of a power aiming to crush out a distinction of nationality among its subject peoples. (Buck 1916, pp 48-49)

The language is an imagined community

The nation is a social construct. The first to articulate this view quite clearly was apparently Ernest Renan in his celebrated public lecture at the Sorbonne on 11 March 1882 '*Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*':

> *Une nation est donc une grande solidarité, constitué par le sentiment des sacrifices qu'on a faits et de ceux qu'on est disposé à faire encore. Elle suppose un passé; elle se résume pourtant dans le présent par un fait tangible: le consentement, le désir clairement exprimé de continuer la vie commune. L'existence d'une nation est «pardonnez-moi cette métaphore» un plébiscite de tous les jours ...* (Renan 1947, p 904; cf. also Kamenka ed. 1975, p 12)[6]

or as Max Weber put it:

> *Gemeinsame politische Schicksale, d.h. in erster Linie gemeinsame Kämpfe auf Leben und Tod knüpfen Erinnerungsgemeinschaften, welche oft stärker wirken als Bande der Kultur-, Sprach- oder Abstammungsgemeinschaft* (Weber 1969, p 658)[7]

At the same time the people of today imagine that they are the same as people of long-gone times, their 'forebears', whose relationship to them is imagined to be genetic, which is unproven and unprovable (cf. Reiter 1984, pp 375–376).

The phrase 'imagined community' was apparently coined by Anderson (1991, p 6). If the nation is a social construct, so is a national language when it is conceived of as an entity. As Reiter has pointed out (1984, p 325-329), an individual language (*natürliche Einzelsprache*), as an entity, is a figment of the imagination, a hypostasisation or reification, or, to use Benedict Anderson's phrase again, 'an imagined community'. Reiter (1984, p 374) calls both nation and national language '*imaginäre Größen ersten Grades*'. (Cf. also *Kleine Enzyklopädie* 1983, p 382: '*Die Sprache ... ist ... eine Abstraktion im Sprecherbewußtsein und nicht zuletzt des Linguisten*'. ' ['A language ... is ... an abstraction in the mind of the speaker and not least of all in that of the linguist'] Cf. also Anderson 1991; Kautsky 1908)[8]

The borders between languages are as arbitrary as political borders. Josef Dobrovský (1753-1829), the 'father' of Slavonic studies, considered Bulgarian to be part of Serbian.[9] Today no one disputes the autonomy of Bulgarian but the Macedonian language, like the Macedonian nation, is a matter of contention in some quarters. In a celebrated passage, Anderson spoke of the '*interplay* between fatality, technology, and capitalism. In pre-print Europe, and, of course, elsewhere in the world, the diversity of spoken languages ... was immense; so immense, indeed, that had print-capitalism sought to exploit each potential oral vernacular market, it would have remained a capitalism of petty proportions. But these varied idiolects were capable of being assembled, within definite limits, into print-languages far fewer in number' (Anderson 1991, p 43).

The codification of a standard language (in Anderson's terminology 'print language') is an essential part of nation building:

> Without such a language, an ethnic group could not claim equal status among nations. Modernisation necessitated the elaboration and acceptance of a modern language by the population. Rural dialects had restricted political vocabularies and were not equipped to deal with the requirements of modernity. Similarly, they lacked the cognitive capacity that the command of a high cultural standard conferred. The acquisition of a new language and a new way of life added up to an assimilation through the acquisition of a new identity (Schöpflin 2000, p 21; cf. also Gellner 1964; 1983; Fishman 1974).

And for rural Frenchmen or Italians, for example, this meant acquiring 'a new language or at any rate a fairly remote variant of their rural speech' (Schöpflin 2000, p 21).

Heinz Kloss (1967) coined the terms *Abstandsprache* and *Ausbausprache*. Abstand-languages are speech varieties that are so far apart that they are clearly different. Thus, Serbian and Albanian or German and Hungarian are clearly different, and there is no possibility of mutual comprehension. They are clearly different languages. On the other hand, Norwegian and Swedish, Macedonian and Bulgarian or Czech and Slovak are mutually so similar that comprehension is usually easy across borders. Nevertheless, these speech varieties are also considered to be different languages. These are *Ausbau*-languages, that is, languages based on very similar speech varieties that have been codified as different standards for historical and political reasons.[10]

In the case of *Abstand*-languages, consciousness of difference is inevitable. In the case of *Ausbau*-languages the consciousness of difference from 'them' and the sense of community with 'us' is created. These two things are achieved through the codification of a standard language: firstly, people have to be convinced that they are speaking 'the same language' as other groups of people within the borders of their state; secondly, people have to be convinced that they are speaking a different language from the people across the border. Thus, the people living east of the Dutch-German border have to be convinced that they are speaking the same language — German — as the people in Bavaria, even though mutual comprehension is all but impossible if people speak their own dialects. Secondly, these people have to be convinced that their neighbours across the border, who in fact use the same dialect in their homes, actually speak 'a different language'. An essential part of nation-building is creating boundaries (cf. Barth 1969; Garvin and Mathiot 1956; Garvin 1993).

Conclusion

For Anglo-Saxons it is difficult to comprehend that language could be anything but a means of communication, and yet in many parts of Europe (and Asia) language — constructed or imagined as the national language — is an essential element of national identity. Oppressive régimes have often sought to suppress the languages of restive minorities. The national language was one of the instruments of fighting assimilation in the Baltic states during the Soviet era. The Georgian language became synonymous with Georgian national uniqueness and Georgian intellectuals used it as a symbol of resistance to Russian dominance. Contemporary politicians such as Leonid Kuéma in Ukraine or Juan José Ibarretxe in the Basque province of Spain have had to learn their respective 'national language' for the sake of their political career. The codification of a standard language is an essential part of nation building. Even where a nation (such as the Austrians or the Irish) share their official language with another state, certain linguistic peculiarities are defended as national diacritic marks. Nations often equate threats to their linguistic autonomy with the potential loss of economic or political autonomy. Language is thus an eminently political issue.

Notes

1. 'Nineteenth-century embryonic Lithuanian national consciousness led to the increasing social marginalisation of Jews. Antisemitism reached an initial climax after independence in 1918. Few Jews could speak the difficult language, the most important characteristic of Lithuanian national identity. Most Jews stuck to Yiddish.'
2. 'He demonstrated patience and tenacity by learning the Basque language when he was over 40 years old. Nationalists consider that knowing Basque, which only a quarter of the population understand, is a prerequisite for assuming the office of Head of Government.'
3. 'The head of the Government, or Prime Minister, shall be called, and is in this Constitution referred to as, the *Taoiseach*' — *Constitution of Ireland* [English] 1937 Art. 28, Section 5.
4. I should explain here that educated Bulgarians of this period preferred to read and write other languages, such as Greek. In fact, they had little choice, since Bulgarian had not been codified or standardised.
5. 'Nationalist doctrine ... decrees that just as nations exist, so nations by definition must have a past. The spread of nationalist doctrine in Europe has therefore evoked a voluminous literature, historical in its form but apologetic in its substance, which claims to show the rise in remote times, the steady progress and development of this or that nation' (Kedourie 1971, p 36)
6. 'A nation is thus a grand solidarity, constituted by the sentiment of the sacrifices that people have made and of those that they are prepared to make in the future. The nation presupposes a past; but it can be summed up in the present by a tangible fact: the consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue to live together. The existence of a nation is (if you will excuse this metaphor) an everyday plebiscite.'
7. 'A common political destiny, that is, first and foremost, the life-and-death struggle of the group, creates a community of memory, which is often more powerful than the bonds of a common culture, language or descent.'
8. I would like to thank Rick Kuhn for drawing my attention to this remarkable review article.
9. *Institutiones linguae dialecti veteris* (Vienna 1822); cited in Reiter 1984, pp 327–328 (Footnote)
10. Nevertheless, opinions vary in these and many other cases.

References

Anderson, B 1991, Imagined communities. *Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism,* Verso, London.

Arel, D 1995, 'Language politics in independent Ukraine: towards one or two state languages?' in *Nationalities Papers,* vol. 23, no. 3, pp 597–622.

Barth, F (ed.) 1969, *Ethnic groups and boundaries*. Universitetsforlaget, Bergen.

Buck, CD 1916, 'Language and the sentiment of nationality', *The American Political Science Review* X. 44–69

Fishman, JA 1974, 'Language modernization and planning in comparison with other types of national modernization and planning', in JA Fishman (ed.) *Readings in the sociology of language*, pp 79–102, de Gruyter, The Hague.

Garvin, PL and Mathiot, M 1956, 'The urbanization of the Guaraní language', in A.F.W. Wallace (ed.) *Men and cultures. Selected papers of the Fifth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences*, pp 783–790, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia.

Garvin, PL 1993, 'A conceptual framework for the study of language standardization', *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, vol. 100–101, pp 37–54.

Gellner, E 1964, *Thought and change*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London.

Gellner, E 1983, *Nations and nationalism*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Glaser, K and Possony, ST 1979, *Victims of politics: the state of human rights*, Columbia University Press, New York.

Haubrich, W 2001, Erfüllungsgehilfe, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 15 May 2001, p.16

Hill, PM 1987, 'The political significance of the Macedonian Standard Language', in *Australian Slavonic and East European Studies*, vol.1, no.1, pp 53–60.

Hobsbawm, EJ 1990, *Nations and nationalism since 1780. Programme, myth, reality.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Hösch, E 1988, *Geschichte der Balkanländer*. Beck, Munich.

Jones, SJ 1995, 'The Georgian language state program and its implications', *Nationalities Papers* vol. 23, no. 3, pp 535–548

Just, R 1989, 'Triumph of the ethnos', in E Tonkin, M McDonald, Manyon and M Chapman (eds), *History and ethnicity*, pp 71–88, Routledge, London.

Kamenka, E (ed.) 1975, *Nationalism: the nature and evolution of an idea*. ANU, Canberra.

Kasperowitsch, M 2001, 'Doppeltes Opfer, halbierte Erinnerung. Der Antisemitismus in Litauen spielt seit jeher eine unglückselige Rolle im Prozeß der nationalen Selbstfindung', in *Frankfufter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 July 2001, p 44.

Kautsky, K 1908, 'Nationalität und Internationalität', in *Die Neue Zeit Ergänzungsheft*, No. 1, pp 1–36.

Kedourie, E (ed.) 1971, *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London.

Kloss, H 1967, 'Abstand-languages and Ausbau-languages', in *Anthropological Linguistics* vol. 9, no. 7, pp 29–41.

Kloss, H 1978, *Die Entwicklung neuer germanischer Kultursprachen seit 1800*, 2nd edn, Schwann, Düsseldorf.

Le Page, RB and Tabouret-Keller, A 1985, *Acts of identity.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Lucius, R von, 2001, 'Doppelbödige Schwermut. Litauen soll ein Partnerland der Frankfurter Buchmesse werden' in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 17 July 2001, p.43.

Magner, TF 1988, 'Language and nationality in the Balkans. The case of Yugoslavia' in *Geolinguistics, vol.* 14, pp 108–124.

Meri, L 2001, The president of the Republic of Estonia at the symposium 'New Balance of Power' of the University of St. Gallen, Zurich, 19 May 2001 [www.president.ee/eng/e_speeches.html].

Reiter, N 1984, *Gruppe, Sprache,* Nation, Harrassowitz, Berlin.

Renan, E 1947, *Oeuvres completes,* vol 1, Calmann-Levy, Paris.

Schöpflin, G 2000, *Nations — identity — power: the new politics of Europe.* Hurst, London.

Smith, AD 1991, *National identity.* Penguin, London.

Stavrianos, LS 2000, The Balkans since 1453. Hurst, London.

Sterbling, A 1993, 'Überlegungen zum 'Wiedererwachen der Geschichte', in *Südosteuropa,* vol. 42, no. 3-4, pp 219–243.

Weber, Max 1969, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie* (Edited by J Winckelmann), Halbband, Cologne.

Wijk, N van 1956, *Les langues slaves. De l'unité à la pluralité.* Mouton, 's-Gravenhage.

Language planning, linguistic diversity and democracy in Europe

Anthony J Liddicoat

Griffith University

Introduction

Europe has seen dramatic economic, political, cultural and social changes in recent decades as the result of a movement away from a 'geographic Europe' of multiple nation states to a 'political Europe' expressed as a supra-national polity. The expansion of political and economic integration, the free movement of people across national boundaries, the development of supranational institutions and policies are all indicative of the sorts of changes Europe is currently experiencing. The emergence of Europe as an integrating political entity has occurred at the same time as a contrary trend towards a re-assertion of local, ethnic and regional interests and identities, which in some areas have led to the fragmentation of earlier nation states. At the same time, Europe is becoming increasingly aware of a need to interact with the wider (non-European) world in the context of globalisation. The language planning context in Europe, then, can be seen as an attempt to engage with three, potentially competing, goals:

- language planning for dealing with internal linguistic minorities;
- language planning for integrating Europe;
- language planning for globalisation.

Political Europe, both through the European Union and the Council of Europe, has sought to engage with both the supra-national and with the local, regional and ethnic in framing language planning. These engagements are expressed both through language-in-education planning and through status planning, although the focus and goals and possibilities of each organisation are different.

The broader context for language planning also lies in the three core social objectives which underlie much of the planning work being undertaken in Europe:

- democratic citizenship: moving concepts of citizenship beyond legal and formal rights and responsibilities to deal with relationships among individuals, groups and institutions;
- cultural democracy: valuing of 'local' cultures and encouraging active participation in cultural life;

- diversity: recognising and valuing cultural pluralism.

These principles too are realised in different ways and with different emphases in the language planning of the European Union and the Council of Europe. The intersection of language planning goals with other social objectives provides a complex set of relationships which guide language planning decision making. This complex set of relationships will be explored below through a consideration of the types of language planning activities undertaken by the European Union and the Council of Europe, and through a discussion of how the concepts of pluralism, interculturalism, and language rights are manifested in these activities.

The scope of European language planning

At the European level, language planning work focuses on both status planning and language-in-education planning, and this is true of the language planning work of both the European Union and the Council of Europe. However, the foci of these language policy activities are different within the two organisations.

Language planning in the European Union

The status planning work of the European Union focuses on determining the official and working languages of the Union. This emphasis has been relevant from the very beginnings of the move to a federal Europe. While an explicit language plan was not formulated in the early stages of development, a practice of linguistic pluralism was established as early as the Treaty of Rome, which was 'drawn up in a single original in the different languages, all texts being equally authentic' (Holz 1979:8). The norm established, therefore, was one of linguistic diversity, without privilege for any language. This was ratified by Regulation No. 1 of the EEC which established a principle of plurilingualism in the official and working languages of the Community — at the time Dutch, French, German and Italian (Holz 1979, Leitner 1991). While this regulation was plurilingual, it was a plurilingualism of a particular type. Regulation No. 1 established a plurilingual norm based on the official languages of the member states, excluding minority languages without official status in member states from official status within the EEC.[1] The EEC's language plan was then a supra-national ratification of national language plans. When new members states were added, the principle of accepting the official languages of member states as official languages of the EEC was adhered to, and the official languages of new member states, as nominated by these states, were added to the official and working languages list.[2] These arrangements, which were also included in the Maastricht Treaty (European Union 1992, Article 53), have become the norm for the European Union, and are envisaged to continue as the norm when the Union expands. The language plan of the European Union is then one of broad multilingualism with linguistic representation for all member states. However, the situation is more complex. This broad multilingualism exists at the statutory level in the language plan (c.f. Cooper 1989), but not at the level of working official language, where the range of languages is more restricted in some domains (c.f. Muller this volume).

Language-in-education planning has increasingly been seen as an important pre-requisite for further development of a European identity (Nelde 2001). Language teaching and learning has been a focus of work in both the European Union and the Council of Europe. Language learning has been seen as central to processes of developing the economic goals of increased integration and co-operation, and also for developing the social goals of tolerance and understanding. The question of language-in-education planning can be seen from two perspectives:

1. the plan for promoting language learning, and
2. the choice of languages to be promoted.

Much of the language-in-education planning work in Europe has focussed on the first perspective and has been operationalised through large-scale programs such as *Lingua* and *Erasmus*. However, such activities, while they do not specifically address questions of which languages to teach, tend to have built into them the basic notion that the target languages are the official languages of the member states. As such, specifically language-in-education planning issues about promoting language learning and status planning issues are intimately linked. However, the agencies for planning these two activities are quite different. Language-in-education planning proper is promoted through supra-national European institutions, while status planning decision making remains within the domain of the nation state.

Language-in-education planning for Europe has primarily focussed on integrating Europe, with questions of globalisation and localisation being placed in the background. As such, while the rhetoric of globalisation may acknowledge that non-European languages are important for Europe, the language-in-education planning of Europe allows little space for such learning, and privileges the learning of European official languages over non-European official languages such as Japanese, Chinese, Arabic, etc. In a similar way, local, non-official languages are included in language-in-education planning sporadically and usually only for those who identify with those languages. The European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages (EBLUL), which, although jointly funded with the Council of Europe, represents the European Union's primary focus on minority languages, does not focus on the dissemination of these languages, but rather on documentation, consultancy and publishing, although it has played an advocacy role on behalf of minority languages within European Union institutions.

The basic language-in-education planning goal articulated by the European Union is the acquisition of three European Union languages (European Commission 1995). Language-in-education planning, therefore, reflects the integrating agenda of political Europe and the development of European democratic citizenship more strongly than it does either globalisation or local, ethnic and regional issues. This is not, however, to argue that the language issues of a supra-national Europe on the one hand, and global or local interests on the other, are mutually exclusive. There is an obvious relationship between (European) world languages such as English, French and Spanish and the development of a globalist perspective. Equally, there is scope for the development of local issues where an official language of one member state is a minority language in another, as with the case of Finnish in Sweden, German in France, etc. However, such local or global results would appear to be a by-product of language-in-education planning rather than a core goal.

Language policy in the Council of Europe

The language policy of the Council of Europe has also addressed the two dimensions of status planning and language-in-education planning, but with different emphases from those of the European Union.

The status planning work of the Council of Europe can be seen in two types of activities:

1. the selection of official and working languages, and
2. the establishment of functions for other languages.

The Council of Europe's official languages are English and French, but the Parliamentary Assembly also uses German, Italian and Russian as working languages (Council of Europe 1992c Rule 26). Other languages may be interpreted in meetings and during debates, under certain conditions (Council of Europe 1992c, Rules 27 and 28). As such, the Council of Europe has avoided the complexities associated with the multiple official languages found in the European Union (see Muller this volume). The Council of Europe has also produced language planning work outlining the possible functions for regional and minority languages through the *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages* (Council of Europe 1992a). In particular, the charter, in Article 10, outlines options for the use of regional or minority languages in dealings with the administration in both writing or speaking, the publication of official documents, and in place-names. As such, the Council of Europe has articulated a potential role for languages other than the official languages of member nations in the administrative life of member states, primarily using a principle of strict territoriality (cf Truchot 1991). That is, language functions are specified for those territories in which the language is traditionally spoken. This is a much more radical approach to regional or minority languages than has been taken in European Union language planning,[3] and one which brings the language planning of the Council of Europe into potential conflict with the language plans of individual member states. In many cases, the allocation of language functions within an individual members state is enshrined in statutory documents of the particular state, in many cases in the constitutions of these states, and the diversity and democratic citizenship concerns of the charter must be balanced against centralising/unifying concerns within member states. The potential conflict has been solved within the charter by allocating to member states themselves the determination of which languages will be supported and what support will be given.

In its language-in-education planning, the Council of Europe focuses on the teaching and learning of a range of European languages and on interculturality through language teaching. The language-in-education policy of the Council of Europe is explicitly linked to the charter, and contains provisions for the teaching and learning of regional or minority languages. In the guidelines for educational use of these languages (Article 8), the charter appears to assume that these languages will be learned by their current users and the provisions are all for regional or minority languages as first languages, whether as media of instruction or as subjects within the curriculum. The teaching and learning of regional or minority languages is, however, one area in which the charter departs from its strict principles of territoriality and allows for the programs in the languages where the number of speakers of the language 'justifies' it (Article 8, para 2). This is a concession to the impact of internal migration on the distribution of regional or minority languages (Council of Europe 1992b). While Article 8 is written as if it applies primarily or even solely to the teaching of regional or minority languages to existing speakers, Article 7 states as an objective:

> The provision of facilities enabling non-speakers of regional or minority languages living in an area where it is used to learn it if they so desire. (Council of Europe 1992a Article 7, 1g)

Article 7 implies that Article 8 could apply to new learning of these languages, but also states that such new learning should be limited to existing territories and should not be included in the relaxation of the principle of strict territoriality found in Article 8, 2. Language maintenance projects are therefore countenanced wherever a sizable community is found, while language revitalisation projects are possible only where communities continue to live in the territory traditionally associated with the language. As such, language revitalisation is not provided as an option for groups who have migrated out of their traditional areas. At the same time, the *Explanatory Report* (Council of Europe 1992c) to the charter seems to imply that new learning of regional or minority languages is not seen as primarily a revival of a language which may be in the process of language obsolescence or language death, but rather for the more general diffusion of the language among the population of the region in order that:

> This spirit of receptiveness to several languages should not be confined to the speakers of regional or minority languages. In order to facilitate communication between language groups, the parties are called upon, in territories where a regional or minority language exists, to provide facilities for persons who are not native speakers of the language to learn it if they so desire. (Council of Europe 1992b, 65)

The omission of any reference to language revitalisation or to symbolic attachment of individuals or groups to a heritage language may seem striking in the context of new learning of these languages. However, such an omission is entirely within the spirit of the charter as a document concerned with the preservation of languages as cultural artefacts rather than language maintenance by linguistic minorities (Council of Europe 1992b, 11). The phrasing of Article 7,1g is impersonal and makes no connection between languages and their 'traditional speakers'. In this, there is an anomaly: the charter is designed to protect regional or minority languages as a part of Europe's cultural heritage, but it is not designed to protect these languages as a part of the cultural heritage of any specific group of Europeans, resulting in an image of regional or minority languages as autonomous entities in some way isolated from their speakers. The preservation of regional or minority languages is a matter of preserving Europe's diversity, not of promoting cultural democracy *per se*.

The language-in-education policy of the Council of Europe is not exclusively about regional or minority languages, but also provides for the wider learning of the official languages of the various member states. The general emphasis of the Council of Europe's policy is on the place of languages as a means of developing tolerance and co-operation. The language-in-education policies of the Council of Europe do not indicate explicitly what languages should be taught in Europe. The chief concern here is, however, for the diversification of the languages on offer in European education systems, and in particular, for the promotion of lesser-taught languages and their defence against the languages of larger and economically more important polities. The diversity of focus can be seen in the range of languages for which the Council of Europe has developed 'threshold level descriptions': Catalan, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, French, Galician, German, Greek, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Norwegian, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Swedish and Welsh. Of these languages, only one, Welsh, does not have official status at either national or regional level within a member state. The remainder include the dominant languages of Europe as well as a range of less widely taught official languages.

The official languages of Europe also feature significantly in the charter, where the concern is that the provisions for regional or minority languages not threaten the status and use of the official languages of the countries in which these languages are spoken. The charter makes explicit mention of the teaching and learning of official languages by speakers of regional or minority languages (Council of Europe 1992a Article 8, 1). This again acknowledges the potential tension between the charter and individual nation's language plans.

Some key concepts in European language planning

Within the context of European language planning, three key concepts seem to play a pivotal role in the discourse about languages in the documents of both the European Union and the Council of Europe. These terms — pluralism, interculturalism and language rights — however, are used in different ways and with different associations.

Pluralism

In the European Union's language policies, pluralism is focussed at the level of the European political entity, and the emphasis is on the relationship between the member states. The desire for pluralism within the European Union is the result of an almost contradictory set of principles. It is essentially based on traditional conceptions of linguistic nationalism and notions of the identity of language, nation and state (Coulmas 1991). As such, the desire for pluralism at the European Union level grows out of a desire to maintain and support the official languages which exist within Europe, and to protect the various national languages from incursions from the official languages of other members states, most notably English. The pluralism of the European Union, therefore, is a device for the protection of the official languages of nation states rather than a fundamental commitment to ideals of multilingualism, and pluralism within states is little emphasised (Nelde 2001). In some rare cases, calls have been made to extend European Union language planning provisions beyond the official languages of the European Union or its members states. This was done for Catalan in 1990, when the European Parliament resolved to call on:

> … the Council, comprised of representatives of the Member States, and the Commission to take whatever steps are necessary to achieve the following objectives:
>
> the publication in Catalan of the Community's treaties and basics texts;

> the use of Catalan for disseminating public information concerning the European institutions in all the media;
>
> the inclusion of Catalan in the programmes set up by the Commission for learning European languages;
>
> the use of Catalan by the Commission's offices in its written and oral dealings with the public in the Autonomous communities in question; … (European Parliament 1990)

This provision is, however, unusual and is limited to provisions for Catalan only in a limited number of domains and is restricted to the use of Catalan in officially Catalan-speaking Spain, and does not extend to other Catalan-speaking areas within Europe.

The focus, then, is on the European Union as a multilingual institution, and the efforts of pluralism are most readily obvious in the linguistic work of the various organs of the European Union (see Muller, this volume, for details). Pluralism is therefore represented through the designation of multiple official and working languages for the European Union, the range of languages permitted for use in official capacities, translation of documents into the official languages of the European Union, and through language-in-education policy. It is, in fact, in the latter that the notion of pluralism is most widely used. In the educational context, pluralism emphasises the acquisition of additional European Union languages by current speakers of European Union languages. As such, the focus in European Union language-in-education policy is primarily on the official languages of Europe, although other languages are not explicitly excluded.

While the various European Union language education programs usually do not mention which languages are targeted, beyond a classification as ‘European’ languages, the context usually refers to inter-European co-operation and is framed, therefore, primarily in terms of the official languages of the European partners (Baetens-Beardsmore 1993, Extra and Gorter 2001). This can be seen explicitly in the provisions for Comenius Language Assistantships, which are aimed at teachers of the official languages of the European Union (along with Irish and Letzeburgesch, which have official status in their respective countries, but not in the European Union). Similar provisions are seen in vocational education in the Leonardo da Vinci program, in which languages are tied very explicitly to individual mobility within professions and to the development of a European identity.

In the language policy work of the Council of Europe, there is a different emphasis given to pluralism. The Council of Europe’s work is based on pluralism as the maintenance of the diverse cultural heritage of Europe and, therefore, pluralism is expressed primarily in terms of the continued existence of threatened, non-official languages rather than in the co-existence of the languages of nation states and an ecological perspective of the maintenance of diversity (Liddicoat and Bryant 2001, Mühlhäusler 2001). This does not mean that the official languages of individual nations are removed from the concept of pluralism, but rather, that the concept of pluralism is expanded beyond a multiplicity of official languages, and is an ideology supporting a richer language ecology in which diversity is available at multiple levels. Hence, consideration is given to the pluralism of Europe as a whole, but there is also pluralism within nation states. It is in this context that pluralism within the language planning of the Council of Europe most differs from that of the European Union. The language planning of the Council of Europe envisages pluralism as the natural state of individual nations, and assumes that the co-existence of official and regional or minority languages within a single nation state is fundamental to the Council of Europe's conceptualisation of democratic citizenship (Audigier 1998).

Pluralism in the Council of Europe, therefore, takes the form of recognition, maintenance and use of regional or minority languages, and emphasises pluralism not only in terms of the continued existence of these languages, but also in terms of developing bilingualism among speakers of these languages. That is, there is an expressed norm that speakers of regional or minority languages will maintain their languages, while at the same time becoming speakers and users of the official language(s) of their own state, and also of the official languages of other states.

The differing values placed on pluralism in the language policies of the European Union and the Council of Europe point to a tension in language policy in Europe. The active support of pluralism means confronting the roles of the various languages of Europe: what is the legitimate function for a particular language in a pluralist and plurilingual society? Moreover, pluralism, especially with support for regional and minority languages, calls into question the privileged position of the official languages of the European nations (Coulmas 1991). If all of the official languages of the European Union are equal, and if the regional and minority languages have value alongside these languages in the work of the Council of Europe, then why is the position of official languages different from those of other languages, and on what basis do these languages claim their privileges? This question is not problematic in a context where the myth of the identity of language, nation and state persists. In this case, a language is privileged as the unique vehicle capable of providing unity and symbolising national identity. However, when this myth is weakened, the situation becomes much less easy to defend. Questioning of the privileged status of the official languages of Europe can already be seen in the aspirations of the Catalans to have their language included as an official language of the European Union (cf. Muller, this volume).

Interculturalism

In European Union language policy, interculturalism implies interactions between the nation states of the Union, and is framed in terms of the need for intercultural skills to facilitate economic freedom and freedom in the movement of citizens of the European Union within the European Union. Interculturalism in this context implies communicative adjustments between equals speaking equally valued languages and having equally valued cultures. Interculturalism is seen as a necessary component of free movement of people and goods across Europe. Freedom of movement, in turn, involves developing a cultural identity and practices of communication which respect and acknowledge the cultural positions of participants in communication. At the same time, acceptance of differences is central to the ways in which communication takes place between Europeans in all contexts: economic, social and cultural. An integrated, borderless Europe implies the ability to negotiate cultural differences both on the part of those who move into a new linguistic and cultural environment, and on the part of those who already live within that environment.

Interculturalism, therefore, has become a goal of language education, and the addition of a language to one's communicative repertoire has become equated with the development of interculturalism. The equality of starting positions within such an intercultural exchange provides for interculturalism as a two-way process of communicative adjustment in which each participant moves beyond his/her own cultural boundaries. The educative aim is, therefore, that Europeans will be able to establish and negotiate intercultural identities in their interactions with other Europeans, developing a cultural space which is intermediate between their first culture and that of their interlocutors (cf Crozet, Liddicoat and Lo Bianco 1999, Liddicoat, Crozet and Lo Bianco 1999).

In the Council of Europe's language policy, interculturalism is strongly attached to interaction between majorities and minorities, together with recognition of interactions between various majorities. In this case, interculturalism is less strongly linked to considerations of the free movement of goods and people across borders, and more linked to notions of cultural co-operation and social membership. Interculturalism is tied very strongly to the development of regional and minority languages (c.f. the use of the terms 'intercultural' and 'interculturalism' in the *Explanatory Report* (Council of Europe 1992b, 79-89) in its discussion of the educational provisions of Article 8), and the maintenance of these languages is presented as an objective which can only be achieved within the context of interculturalism. In this case, the interculturalism envisaged appears to be a one-way accommodation between the minority and the majority, rather than an accommodation from the majority to the minority. For example, in the *Explanatory Report* to the charter, the following observation is made in relation to Article 8 concerning the teaching of minority or regional languages:

> The phrase 'and without prejudice to the teaching of the official language(s) of the state' is intended to avert the possibility of interpreting the provisions of Article 8, paragraph 1 … as excluding the language(s) spoken by the majority. Such a tendency to form linguistic ghettos would be contrary to the principles of interculturalism and multilingualism. (Council of Europe 1992b 80)

Here, monolingualism in a regional or minority language is negatively characterised as ghettoisation and lack of knowledge of an official language is seen as contrary to interculturalism. However, no such charge of ghettoisation is made against monolingual speakers of official languages, nor of those who fail to learn the regional or minority language of the area in which they live. At most, learning of regional or minority languages by non-speakers is to be enabled 'if they so desire' (Article 7, 1g), and not under the imperative of interculturality. Ghettoisation is therefore viewed as the result of an exclusive attachment to a minority language and culture, and not of an exclusive attachment to a majority language and culture.

This unidirectional accommodation, minority to majority, appears, at least in part, to derive from the emphasis on the Council of Europe's language policy work on languages as the fundamental object of planning, rather than on the speakers of the languages. Therefore, while the majority is expected to tolerate and support regional or minority languages, there is no expectation that members of the majority should learn or use these languages, or know very much about the cultures and practices of their speakers. Such learning is not centrally necessary to the charter's goal of maintaining Europe's cultural diversity and linguistic heritage. As such, interculturalism becomes a bridge between a group that continues to maintain a non-dominant language and the majority group within the nation state, and a vehicle for integrating minorities into national cultures.

Language rights

The rights of the various languages in Europe are a matter of concern for European language policy, although the nature and the foundations of these rights differ within the context of the European Union and the Council of Europe.

In European Union language policy, language rights are centrally formulated as the rights of the official languages of the European Union: equality among national languages (De Witte 1991). Within this context, a central consideration has been the protection of the smaller official languages of the Union from the larger languages, and most particularly from English. This primarily takes the form of stressing the complete equality of the various official languages of the European Union. This can be seen, for example, in the following resolutions of the European Parliament:

> [The European Parliament] Reaffirms that all of the Union's official languages must be used on a strictly equal basis, wherever necessary, for all meetings of the European Parliament, whether they are used actively or passively, orally or in writing. (European Parliament 1994, No. 2)
>
> [The European Parliament] Reaffirms its commitment to the equality of the official languages and the working languages of all the countries of the Union, which is a cornerstone of the concepts of a European Union, of its philosophy and of the political equality of its Member States, and asserts that the different languages are one of the characteristics of European civilization and culture and an important aspect of Europe's diversity and cultural wealth. (European Parliament 1995, No 1)

The resolutions demonstrate strongly the European Union's commitment to linguistic equality as a feature of diversity, and the defence of diversity as central to the European ideal.

The European Union has also recognised a right for individuals to use their own language in dealings with the European Parliament where that language is not an official language of the European Union, but is an official language in their own region:

> Rules of Procedure should recognize the right of citizens to send their petitions to the Committee on Petitions and the Ombudsman in their own language provided that it is an official language in their territory. (European Parliament 1994, No. 5)

At the same time, certain language rights exist for individuals within the European Union. These rights seem to be based on two fundamental social rights: the right to free movement of persons, and the right of establishment for European Union nationals in any European Union country (c.f. Tabouret-Keller 1991). In a union in which national borders still equate strongly with linguistic borders, rights of movement and establishment inevitably have linguistic correlates. The European Union response, which continues earlier European Community policy, has been to frame a right of freedom from discrimination on the basis of one's (European) language. That is, no European Union member state may discriminate against the citizens of any other European Union member state because they are speakers of the language of the other member state. This is a negative right: the right not to be discriminated against, and does not equate with protection of an individual's or group's mother tongue (De Witte 1991). This can be seen clearly in Directive 486/77 of the European Community (c.f. Tabouret-Keller 1991) which provides for the education of internal European migrants. The Directive identifies two language rights:

1. the right to be educated in the language of the host country;
2. the right to continue to maintain and use the L1 in the host country.

The Directive gives a positive right of ensured education in the language of the host country, and in so doing, implies an educationally and socially privileged position for the language of the host country in its own territory over other official languages of the European Union and, even more, over non-official languages. It also provides a negative right, the right to personal freedom of choice to maintain and use a language other than that of the host country. This right is not one that must be supported by direct action by the host country, so long as the right is not impeded. In effect, a positive right of protection or support is quite difficult to achieve within Europe as such a right would run counter to the language statutes of some member countries which enshrine a privileged and/or unique position for the official language of the nation (c.f. Jeanjean this volume, George this volume).

In 2001, the situation for language rights in the European Union was further addressed by Article 22 of the *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union*: 'The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity' (European Union 2000) Again, this right is formulated as a negative right; respecting diversity implies an eschewing of discrimination rather than the positive commitment to maintaining and fostering that diversity. As such, the provisions of the *Charter of Fundamental Rights* are a continuation of the perspectives on language rights which had existed before the establishment of the European Union. At the same time, the brevity of the statement makes it open to speakers of non-European languages in ways that earlier European approaches to language rights did not.

In the language planning of the Council of Europe, the concept of rights is based primarily on the *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* (Council of Europe 1950). While the Convention explicitly addresses language rights only in a limited range of contexts (primarily in the legal situations covered by Articles 5 and 6), it provides a basis for a negative right of non-discrimination on the basis of language in Article 14. This provides that the enjoyment of the rights outlined in the Convention may not be limited by discrimination on the basis of language (among other qualifications) (Tabouret-Keller 1991). Gardner-Chloros and Gardiner (1986), however, have argued that this article provides particularly strong protection for language rights because it makes language a basis for all other rights, especially those related to freedom of expression and education, and as such has the force of a positive right, not just freedom from discrimination.

In the *European Charter for Minority or Regional Languages*, the Council of Europe potentially develops language rights further, and goes beyond simple prevention of discrimination, and proposes protection of languages. In the context of language rights, however, the charter is anomalous, as it does not deal with the protection of rights of individuals, but rather with the languages themselves as entities in some way independent of their speakers.

> The charter sets out to protect and promote regional or minorities languages, not linguistic minorities. … The charter does not establish any individual or collective rights for the speakers of regional or minority languages. Nevertheless, the obligations off the parties with regard to the status of these languages and the domestic legislation which will have to be introduced in compliance with the charter will have an obvious effect on the situation of the communities concerned and their individual members. (Council of Europe 1992a:10)

The reluctance to declare the provisions of the charter as individual or collective rights is interesting in comparison with the preamble to the charter itself which declares that:

> The right to use a regional or minority language in private and public life is an inalienable right conforming to the principles embodied in the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and according to the spirit of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. (Council of Europe 1992a)

As such, the nature of the language rights which underlie the Council of Europe's work in language policy are somewhat uncertain. This uncertainty seems to be the result of the tensions which exist between the Council of Europe's macro-level language policy and the language policies of individual states within the Council of Europe: to assert too strongly the provisions of the charter as language rights would undermine the language specific provisions of language legislation, granting a privileged status of particular languages within members states.

Further expressions of language rights can be found in other Council of Europe documents. The *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* (Council of Europe 1995) provides negative rights for language, preventing discrimination on the basis of language (Article 6), permitting free use of a minority language (Articles 9-11), the right to maintain a language as a marker of identity (Article 5) and provision to foster 'knowledge' of the language through education (Article 12). Again, the rights proposed are framed primarily as negative rights, although Article 12 does acknowledge a role for states in providing education for national minorities.

As such, although there are references to language rights in Council of Europe documents, the majority of rights are the negative rights of freedom from discrimination, rather than positive rights of maintenance, use and learning of languages which are not privileged by official status within a particular nation-state. Moreover, where positive rights are potentially expressed in the charter for minority or regional languages, the Council of Europe is at pains to ensure that these are not precedents for granting individual or group language rights.

Commonalities in language planning in the European Union and the Council of Europe

The discussion so far has highlighted differences in focus and emphasis in the language policies of the European Union and the Council of Europe. The following section will examine some areas where the two sets of language policies have common foci.

The most obvious commonality between the language policies of the European Union and the Council of Europe is that they focus on European languages only. Whether the emphasis is to develop a sense of identity, to foster mobility, to promote tolerance and co-operation, or to protect cultural heritage, the context in which this is done is always European. This means that European language planning has very little to do with immigrant languages, especially immigrant languages of non-European origin, and a strict division is made between indigenous and immigrant languages (Haberland 1991). Such languages are, for example, explicitly excluded from the *Charter for Regional or Minority Languages* (Article 1a), and therefore, 'minority language' in this context means minority language of European origin. The *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* also disqualifies immigrant minorities from its protection as they are not 'national minorities'. Nonetheless, the provisions of the *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* can be seen as applying to immigrants, and provides protection from discrimination on the basis of language and certain rights in legal contexts. Specific recognition of immigrant languages is found in the *European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers*, which provides that:

> The Contracting Parties concerned shall take actions by common accord to arrange, so far as practicable, for the migrant worker's children, special courses for the teaching of the migrant worker's mother tongue, to facilitate, *inter alia*, their return to their State of origin. (Council of Europe 1977, Article 15)

This article is significant for the fact that it sees the teaching of immigrant languages as desirable for the return of immigrants to their place of origin, rather than for considerations of interculturality or integration within Europe, or general principles of cultural democracy and democratic citizenship. Moreover, it is clear from these documents that non-traditional, non-European diversity is not linked to the valuing of diversity, which is central to European language planning.

A related issue can be seen in the treatment of 'peripheral Europe': those possessions of Europe which are included in member states, but which are not covered by European Union and/or Council of Europe policies (cf. Hall 1995, Muller 1999). This creates potential differences or irregularities in the treatment of territories with different statuses. European Union language policies do not apply to some territories of member states, such as the Faeroe Islands or the Channel Islands, which lie in Europe but outside the European Union, whereas they do apply to territories such as the Netherlands Antilles or the French *Départments d'Outre Mer* (DOM), which lie outside Europe, but are within the European Union. Similarly, Council of Europe language policies, such as the *Charter for Regional or Minority Languages*, can potentially apply to territories such as the Faeroe Islands[4] or the Channel Islands, which are considered part of Europe's heritage, but do not apply to the languages of European territories such as the French DOM and the *Territoires d'Outre Mer* (TOM), which are not part of this heritage. As such, the policies of both bodies privilege a notion of 'core Europe' over one of 'peripheral Europe'. Some initial responses to the charter in France in fact proposed that the languages of the DOM and TOM (along with immigrant languages) should be included within the charter provisions adopted for France. However, such an approach could not be sustained in the face of the language of the charter itself, and its insistence on minority languages with traditional European associations (Wright 2000).

In a further restriction of language planning provisions, the language planning of both bodies ignores 'dialects'. In the context of the European Union with its emphasis on official languages, this is unsurprising,[5] but given the regional or minority languages focus of the Council of Europe, this creates a greater problem. As the charter excludes from consideration dialects of the official language (Article 1), the designation of a particular variety as a dialect has important implications, both practically and symbolically. A language is valued and supported, a dialect, is not. At the same time, the charter does not define what is or is not a dialect, and the designation is left to each member state. As the decision about the status of a particular variety is made on a state-by-state basis without reference to any objective criteria, the designation given to a particular variety has become a political issue, and members of linguistic minorities have lobbied governments to have their variety declared a language. The declaration is not trivial. As Winsa (2000) notes, the designation of Tornedal Finnish in Sweden as a language — *Meänkieli* — has meant that the variety is now supported and funded as part of Sweden's commitment to the charter, which would not have been the case if the variety had been declared a dialect of Finnish. In the latter case, the same region could have received support for the promotion of standard Finnish, but not for the language and cultural heritage specific to the Torne Valley. The political nature of the process has also led to anomalies as different states classify similar varieties differently. For example, Norman French in the Channel Islands is a 'language' while Norman French in France is a 'dialect'.[6]

The anomalies found in European language planning practice point to a particular problem in European language planning in general. At the macro-level, language policies, whether they are European Union policies or Council of Europe policies, are templates for language planning in member states, and are implemented differently in different states. There is then a tension between the objectives and purposes of macro-level planning and the objectives and purposes of member states' language planning. This can create anomalous effects in the ways in which languages are treated within Europe, or it can create problems for the implementation of macro-level planning in member states where macro-level planning objectives may be in conflict with national laws. This has been very much the French experience in implementing the *Charter for Regional or Minority Languages* in France, where the provisions relating to the use of languages in education and administration appear to conflict with the French constitution's declaration of French as the official language of the Republic (Wright 2000).

Conclusions

Language planning in Europe is complex, as planning happens at a range of levels, from the breadth of the Council of Europe, to the reduced scope of the European Union, to individual nation states. Each of these levels has its own goals and priorities. The Council of Europe focuses primarily on the cultural dimension of languages and links this with ideas of diversity, cultural democracy and democratic citizenship. Regional or minority languages are promoted by the Council of Europe for democratic and cultural purposes, and this leads to a focus on the lesser languages of Europe, whether they be the languages of small states or of minorities. The language policies of the European Union, however, focus on democratic citizenship in the sense of integrating of Europe and facilitating individual mobility within Europe. The European Union therefore focuses on language as a tool of communication, and the focus is placed on the official languages of the Union as the languages most suitable for achieving European Union objectives. Diversity is represented by the teaching and learning of a number of European languages, a way of promoting a sense of European identity and enabling mobility and co-operation across linguistic borders. Nation-states may embrace such language policies willingly or with reluctance, and at the same time pursue various language policies which go beyond the scope of macro-level European policies.

Both the European Union and the Council of Europe are essentially European in their focus and prioritise some form of consolidation of Europe as the core of their language policy, whether this consolidation is political or cultural. In the European Union, the focus for consolidation is at the level of national/official languages, while in the Council of Europe, it is at both national and regional or minority languages levels.

Regardless of which languages are targeted, the core ideas in language planning revolve around creating a Europe in which communication is enhanced across language boundaries. Other language planning objects, most notably globalisation, are subordinated to the ideal of consolidating Europe. In fact, in language planning, globalisation and developing a consolidated Europe are often treated as the same thing, with emphasis placed on the economic gains from European multilingualism and economic links through European Union languages with regions outside Europe, usually former colonies of European powers. As such, rhetoric on globalisation does not support the teaching of non-European languages of economic importance, such as Arabic, Chinese or Japanese, even where significant numbers of immigrants who speak these languages may be found in a particular country.

European macro-level language planning is essentially problematic. Central organisations, such as the European Union and the Council of Europe, cannot directly implement language planning because this would be seen as usurping national prerogatives (Nelde 2001). As such, macro-level language planning cannot be more than the development of frameworks for language decision-making to which national language plans conform to a greater or lesser extent depending on local political and social exigencies. Macro-level planning does seem to be reasonably effective in excluding languages, dialects, etc. from language planning attention: where there is no domestic political will to confront language issues, such exclusions provide a justification for a lack of action. The provisions determined by macro-level planning, however, are less enforceable, as considerable political will is still required to implement such language planning in any particular nation-state. This in turn leads to anomalies and inconsistencies across Europe as the same language planning documents are interpreted and implemented within different local contexts.

Notes

1. In the case of the European Court of Justice, however, special provisions were made for languages which did not have official status to be used if the appellants felt unable to express themselves in one of the official languages (Holz 1979; Leitner 1991). This demonstrates already the democratic principles which affect current European language concerns.
2. Irish, which has official status in Ireland, was, however, given the role of treaty language only and not official language, while Letzebuergesch, which became official in Luxembourg in 1983 is not an official language of the European Union.
3. Note, however, that the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages has succeeded in having the charter accepted as a part of European Union policy when in February 1994 the European Parliament adopted the Killilea Resolution on linguistic and cultural minorities, which urges the Member States to support the charter.
4. The Faeroe Islands have, however, been excluded by Denmark from charter provisions as Faeroese has official status in the Islands.
5. EBLUL, however, has granted 'language' status to northern French 'dialects' as 'Oïl languages'.
6. In a further complexity, however, EBLUL does recognise Norman as one of the 'Oïl languages' of Northern France, while ignoring Channel Islands Norman French, which is spoken in an area outside the European Union.

References

Audigier, F 1998, *Basic concepts and core competences of education for democratic citizenship: an initial consolidated report*. <DECS/CIT 98, 35> Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

Baetens Beardsmore, H 1993, *European models of bilingual education*, Multilingual Matters, Clevedon.

Cooper, RL 1989, *Language planning and social change*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Coulmas, F 1991, 'European integration and the idea of the national language', in F. Coulmas (ed.) *A language policy for the European Community: prospects and quandaries*, pp 1–44, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin.

Council of Europe 1977, *European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers*, <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Social_Cohesion/Migration/Documentation /Legal_texts/European_Convention.asp#P153_19276>.

Council of Europe, 1950, *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties /Html/005.htm>.

Council of Europe, 1992a, *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages*, <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/148.htm>.

Council of Europe, 1992b, *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages: Explanatory Report*. <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Reports /Html/148.htm>.

Council of Europe, 1992c, *Rules of Procedure of the Assembly* <http://stars.coe.fr/ta/TA99/ERES1202AD7.HTM>.

Council of Europe, 1995, *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/157.htm>.

Crozet, C, Liddicoat, AJ and Lo Bianco, J 1999, 'Intercultural competence: from language policy to language education', in J Lo Bianco, C Crozet and AJ Liddicoat (eds) *Striving for the third place: intercultural competence through language education*, pp 1–20, Language Australia, Canberra.

De Witte, B 1991, 'The impact of European Community rules on language policies of the member states', in F Coulmas (ed.) *A language policy for the European Community: psrospects and quandaries*, pp 168–177, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin.

European Commission 1995, *White paper on education and training -teaching and learning — towards the learning society* COM (95)590 <http://europa.eu.int/ en/record/white/edu9511/index.htm>.

European Commission 1995, *White paper on education and training: teaching and learning: towards the learning society* <http://europa.eu.int/comm /education/lb-en.pdf>.

European Parliament 1990, *Resolution of the European Parliament on languages in the Community and the situation of Catalan*, <http://www.troc.es/ciemen /mercator/UE16-GB.HTM>.

European Parliament 1994, *Resolution of the European Parliament on the right to use one's own language*, <http://www.troc.es/ciemen/mercator/UE17-GB.HTM>.

European Parliament 1995, *Resolution on the use of the official languages in the institutions of the European Union* <http://www.troc.es/ciemen /mercator/UE24-GB.HTM>.

European Union, 1992, *Consolidated version of the treaty of European Union*. <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eu_cons_treaty_en.pdf>.

European Union 2000, *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union* s<http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf>.

Extra, G and Gorter, D 2001, 'Comparative perspectives on regional and immigrant minority languages in multicultural Europe', in G Extra and D Gorter (eds) *The other languages of Europe, pp* 1–41, Multilingual Matters, Clevedon.

Gardiner-Chloros, PH and JP Gardiner 1986, 'The legal protection of linguistic rights and of the mother-tongue by the European institutions', *Grazer Linguistische Studien*, vol. 27, pp 45–66.

Haberland, H 1991, 'Reflections about minority languages in the European Community', in F. Coulmas (ed.), *A language policy for the European Community: prospects and quandaries*, pp 179–194, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin.

Hall, S 1995, *Nationality, migration rights and citizenship in the European Union*. Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff.

Holz, T 1979, 'Translation and terminology problems in a multilingual community', *Der Sprachmittler*, vol. 1, pp 7–21.

Liddicoat, AJ and Bryant, P 2001, 'Language planning and language ecology: a current issue in language planning', *Current Issues in Language Planning*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp 303–305.

Liddicoat, AJ, Crozet, C and Lo Bianco, J 1999, 'Striving for the third place: consequences and implications', in J Lo Bianco, C Crozet and AJ Liddicoat (eds) *Striving for the third place: intercultural competence through language education*, pp 181–188, Language Australia, Canberra.

Lietner, G 1991, Europe 1992, 'A language perspective' *Language Problems and Language Planning*, vol. 15, no. 3, pp 282–296.

Mühlhäusler, P 2001, 'Language planning and language ecology', *Current Issues in Language Planning*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp 306–367.

Muller, K 1999, 'The problems of European citizenship rights at the periphery', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 45, no. 1, pp 35–51.

Nelde, P 2001, 'Prerequisites for a new European language policy', *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, vol. 21, no. 5, pp 442–450.

Tabouret-Keller, A 1991, 'Factors of constraints and freedom in setting a language policy for the European Community: a sociolinguistic approach', in F Coulmas (ed.) *A language policy for the European Community: prospects and quandaries*, pp 45–58, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin.

Truchot, C 1991, 'Towards a language policy for the European Community' in D.F. Marshall (ed.) *Language planning: Focusschrift in honour of Joshua A. Fishman on the occasion of his 65th birthday*, vol. 3, pp 87–104, Mouton de Gruyter, The Hague.

Winsa, B 2001, 'Defining an ecological niche: the use of 'dialect' or 'language'', *Current Issues in Language Planning*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp 431–434.

Wright, S 2000, 'Jacobins, regionalists and the Council of Europe's Charter for regional and minority languages' in *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development,* vol. 21, no. 5, pp 414–423.

Language competition in European Community institutions

Karis Muller

Australian National University

Introduction

Publications (e.g. Coulmas 1991; European Commission 1999; Hagège 1992; Liikanen 1997; Loos 2000; Pym 2000; Schlossmacher 1997), Internet forums and radio talks remind Europeans that linguistic equality within the common institutions distinguishes the EU from other international organisations. But they add that democracy has a price; the, at present, eleven official languages require a huge translation and interpreting service, mostly in-house (Cunningham 2001). Public discussion of internal language policy has intensified at the prospect of the addition of perhaps a dozen more official languages as the EU expands to cover probably most of Europe.

This article focuses less on the costs and problems of official institutional multilingualism than on the *de facto* domination of three working languages, French, English and German, and increasingly among these, English. After a brief overview of official linguistic democracy and the language services, I outline the unofficial linguistic hierarchy pertaining within the main institutions of the European Union, the spread of English, and reactions to this.

Some have suggested that the best way to stem the escalating costs of translation and interpretation in an expanding EU is to decide upon a regime for working languages, and even to reduce the number of official languages. Others have suggested imposing or encouraging the use of a neutral, non-national language among the supranational functionaries of the EC, at least as a working language, and having this taught to children in the member states.

None of these ideas has been adopted. No EC presidency has been prepared to face the consequences of legalising what is a *de facto* two-level linguistic Europe, for fear of exacerbating linguistic resentments. As the commission is considering in this Year of European Languages a European Parliament request for a conference on in-house policy and practice, the article cautiously suggests ways to reduce linguistic nationalism. It concludes by conceding that while the EC institutions cannot isolate themselves from the global battle between English and French (with German contesting their hegemony within Europe), they can protect themselves to some extent. Accused of laxism today because they neglect to enforce language protection measures required by official policy, the commission and the Council might then appear both elitist and coercive.

Language policy in EC institutions

The United Nations has six official and two working languages, English and French. The Council of Europe and the OCSE use only these two as their official languages. The EEC decided, by contrast, that the official languages of member states would also be the working languages within its common institutions. This was partly because from the 1952 European Coal and Steel Community to the European Union today, the European economic and political bloc was to be based on co-operation, mutual respect, and the equality of member states, not force or rivalry. As the Treaty on European Union (1992) put it: 'The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States' (Paragraph II). The other reason was a legal one: whereas the UN for example is an intergovernmental organisation, the EU is a quasi confederation. Its legislation applies directly to the citizens and overrides national law. Therefore, these laws must be and are available to all in their own national language, as set out daily in the Official Journal of the European Union.

When supra-national organisations appeared in the 1950s, the question arose as to which languages should be used in the common institutions to draft documents, publish proceedings, or communicate on a daily basis. The European Coal and Steel Community of 1952, whose institutions later merged with those of the EEC, had six members and four official and working languages. French was a national language in three of the member states; it was the original language in which most EC texts were composed. The European Economic Community's Treaty of Rome (1957) stated only that the Council would decide the linguistic regime of the Community institutions (article 217).[1] The Council of Ministers' first Regulation stated that the six would have the same four official and working languages.

The accession of new member states has so far always added to the number of languages. The procedure is that each state nominates a language, which then becomes the official and working language of the common institutions.[2] The internal regulations of the central EC institutions state that the current eleven languages enjoy equal status, although theory and practice diverge. At the commission, the official principle of language equality remains central to the hoped for creation of a European identity, although recently some doubts have appeared (see below). Texts requiring translation into the official languages include White and Green papers, laws, press releases, the Official Journal, and pamphlets for the general public. The General Affairs Council in June 1995 reiterated that the acceptance of 'the construction of Europe' depended on access to information in the official languages of all EU citizens, and that, therefore, legally binding documents and information would always need to be translated into the official languages. To mark this affirmation of language policy, the Amsterdam Treaty (in force May 1999) had a new subparagraph added to article 8d of the TEU: 'Every citizen of the Union may write to any of the institutions or bodies (...) in one of the languages and have an answer in the same language'. The Treaty stated too (now Article 255) that 'Any citizen of the Union (…) shall have a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents,' which would mean little if the citizen could not understand them.

The translating and interpreting services

All this requires many translators, interpreters and support staff. The European Commission has the biggest translation department in the world, two thirds based in Brussels and the rest in Luxembourg.[3] The interpreters at the commission serve the Council also; the European Court of Justice and the Parliament have their own interpreting staff. The annual cost of the translating and interpreting services is 1.7 hundred million *euros*, or just over 2% of the total budget (Brehan 1999). According to the interpreting and translation services themselves, however, these take up less than 1% of the total annual budget, and cost each citizen only two euros per year (Cunningham 2001, SCIC 2000). Despite such varied figures, it is estimated that the language services amount to 40% of the cost of running the institutions (*Libération* 27 July 2001). Nearly one third of the 22,000 EC employees are interpreters, translators, revisers or administrative support staff. The commission alone has 1250 full-time translators, and if interpreters and support staff are added, this comes to about 4 000 people, or 11% to 14% of staff.

Enlargement will bring with it substantially higher costs in translation and interpreting. At least while the *acquis* has to be translated into the official languages of aspiring member states, their own relevant legislation is translated only into French or English for scrutiny by the commission (Clarke 2000). The at present ten candidate states will nonetheless add eight new languages (not ten, as Malta has agreed to use English, and Cyprus Greek).

There is consensus that all combinations of bilateral interpreting can no longer be catered for. At Council meetings, which must provide full interpreting services, the 'hub', relay or spoke system, which is used already at the European Parliament, will gradually be introduced throughout the institutions. That is, the smaller languages will be simultaneously rendered first into English, French, or German, and then consecutively into other smaller languages. As this practice becomes the norm, all interpreters will have to be competent in (usually) French or English. The translating services are already moving in that direction.

There are further cost savings planned in the translation services: about ten per cent of translators are learning an official language of a candidate country, so that they can translate out of that language into their mother language. Another change that should reduce relative costs but may increase the risk of misunderstandings, is that translators and interpreters will no longer always work only into their mother language. The planned increase in recourse to the 'relay' or 'hub' system in interpreting will, however, slow parliamentary proceedings, as speakers of minority languages will have to wait for a simultaneous translation into a 'hub' language to be consecutively translated into their own language.

The language staff employed in the EC institutions naturally downplay the costs of the extensive translating and interpreting services provided. They point out that the cost of the extra language services as the next round of candidate countries join will be offset by their contributions to the budget (Cunningham 2001), though the overall financial impact of enlargement is likely to be negative in the short term. Translators have asked for shorter, clearer texts as a further general cost saving (Cunningham 2001). This attitude has been summed up politely in the *Fight the Fog* campaign by British translators at the commission, and more succinctly by a headline in the inimitable British tabloid *The Sun*: 'Brussels spouts rot' (*The Sun* 15.5.2000). The suggestion that complicated texts be replaced by simple ones is problematic, however, as research in the area of intercultural pragmatics since the 1960s has established that there can be no universal definition of a short, clear text. All texts are culture bound and language specific in their structure and emphasis. The cultural confusion within EC organisations consequent on the use of many languages cannot therefore be eliminated in the manner these translators somewhat naively suggest (See Kaplan 1966; Seidlhofer 1995).

Despite the declared optimism of the language services, the projected increased costs of the translation and interpreting services engendered angry exchanges at the EP in July 2001. Vice President Guido Podesta had tabled a report on the cost implications for the EP of ten or so new members, assuming the retention of existing multilingual practices. He estimated that each new state would add 124 translators and interpreters. A few MEPs (from dominant language groups) suggested the implementation of distance interpreting and a restricted number of working languages, as in other EC institutions. When an English MEP suggested that the originals of texts or speeches in the other languages should be available only in English, he was shouted down by French and Spanish MEPs (*Le monde* 9 August 2001). In September, the EP voted to accept the Podesta Report. Multilingualism will be maintained, but the EP will generalise the use of two to four hub languages in interpretation within five years (*Le monde* 5 September 2001).[4]

The hierarchy of working languages in EC institutions

Within the EC institutions, a privileged group of languages has emerged, and official speakers of these fight any encroachment on their public use. At small working meetings between or within the institutions, where interpreters are not provided, French is the main language used, followed by English and German. EC meetings or conferences involving outsiders use mainly English, and interpreting is usually provided only partially, or not at all. Similarly, while Community law (the *acquis communautaire*) is translated into each candidate country's official language (a task carried out by the candidate countries themselves, with assistance from European Commission language experts), relevant national legislation from these countries is translated only into English or French.

At the European Commission, French and English are the usual working languages, that is, the languages of draft documents and in-house oral and written communication, with German coming a distant third. Incoming texts, such as submissions from member states, remain in, or are translated into, French or English, more rarely German, since commission employees are generally conversant in at least two of the three main languages. Similarly, translators at the commission are increasingly expected to translate out of French or English or both, whatever their main areas of qualification. Another recent development is that non-native translators will be asked to turn internal documents quickly into not always elegant French or English working documents (Cunningham 2001).

At the European Parliament, MEPs from a dominant language group are not always skilled in languages, since language competence is not part of the selection criteria. As MEPs make and listen to speeches in their own language, interpreters must be available. Members receive the voluminous texts they need, duly translated into the eleven languages, the night before they are to be debated; no wonder attendance at EP sessions is poor (*Le monde* 12 January, 2000). The German Vice President of the EP, Ingo Friedrichs, believes that the present system with its '*babylonische Sprachverwirrung*' cannot continue. He admits that while no MEP can be expected to express him or herself in a foreign language, in future, interpreting will be available only into the dominant languages, which he names as German, English, French, Italian and perhaps Polish. MEPs from small language communities will therefore have to be conversant with a second language from among the dominant group (Fischer 2001).[5] The EP committees on the other hand have always restricted language use; each decides on an *ad hoc* basis which to use, generally English, French and/or German.

At the Council of the European Union (formerly called the Council of Ministers), that is, the formal intergovernmental meetings of national ministers and their advisors, interpretation services are provided into all eleven languages, since decisions are made and transmitted to the European Commission. With eleven languages, over thirty interpreters are required at each meeting. The various Councils also have working groups that revise or draft working documents, known as the Committee of Permanent Representatives, or COREPER, based in Brussels. These use English, French, or German, by consensus among the members. Similarly, the informal Council meetings, at which no formal decisions are taken, also use only English and French, perhaps German too. Interpretation is not provided at these meetings.

The European Court of Justice chooses for its proceedings the one or two languages relevant for each case, but as it is based in Luxembourg, the verdict is always pronounced in French. Until 1999, the ECJ's annual report appeared in English and French only, but owing to pressure from the European Parliament, it now is rendered into all eleven languages. This adds to the burden of the 230 translation staff at the ECJ's Translation Bureau, all of whom have legal qualifications as well as the command of several languages. There are consequently delays of months or even years in publishing the proceedings. For example, a case concerning a cement cartel created over 23 000 pages of translation, and took 20 translators over a year to complete.

There is generally no language regime prescribed for secondary EC institutions, such as bureaux, foundations or consultative committees.[6] Legally, in the absence of indications to the contrary, it is assumed that the 1958 regulations apply there also, especially as in a few cases (e.g. the Committee of the Regions) there is a clause specifying that the official linguistic regime applies (Committee of the Regions 1994). The Economic and Social Committee (1995) stipulates that working and draft documents may use French, German, English or Italian, although its recommendations are published in all eleven languages. The Bureau of Single Market Harmonisation, which regulates use of the CE standards trademark, may receive applications in any official language, but uses the four above mentioned plus Spanish as working languages, and in its publications (Bureau of Single Market Harmonisation 1993). Europol, based at The Hague, uses English as its language of daily communication.

These differences have arisen because the criteria for deciding upon the working languages of the institutions have never been clarified. Since the use of all official languages is obligatory only at formal ministerial meetings, where decisions are made, the EU

Presidency decides which languages to use at informal meetings. It has become the custom to provide two or three dominant languages, plus the language of the rotating presidency if different, at lower levels, such as ambassadorial meetings, while at higher levels such as the ministerial Council meetings, up to six languages may be translated and interpreted.

French was long the main working language, as all the institutions were in French speaking areas (Brussels, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg.) EEC practice therefore increased the prestige and influence of French, at the expense of the other three languages (Schlossmacher 1997). Today too, locally hired personnel, such as cleaners and messengers, are French speaking; among functionaries also French remains the most frequent language of everyday communication within the institutions. A field study carried out in the early 1990s showed that French was being spoken twice as much as English within the corridors and meeting rooms at the commission. English was in second position, used ten times as much as German, and German five times as much as Italian. English and French native speakers were using their own languages in about half of exchanges, and Germans in about a quarter. Nearly all employees were able to speak French or English (or both) as a foreign language, whereas about 40% had learned German. The other languages were used orally only by native speakers, except for a few who had acquired Italian. French remained, then, the dominant oral medium at the commission.

At the European Parliament, English in the early '90s was heard informally slightly more often than was French. This was because unlike European public servants at the commission, MEPs cannot be obliged to learn French even though they meet in Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg; however most speak English or French. While German is used more frequently there than at the commission, it is rarely spoken by non-natives (Schlossmacher 1997).

If intra-EU demographic criteria prevailed, German would be the dominant working language, and Italian would be as much used as French or English. French and Spanish speakers argue that theirs are world languages, although the argument that colonial history has increased the usefulness of a language applies to English also; if such criteria were applied English, French and Spanish would be favoured over German or Polish. Each of the five or so dominant languages, in short, indulges in special pleading: German has the most native speakers, English is spoken by the greatest number of non- native speakers in the EU, and so on.[7]

Reactions to the spread of English

The legal principle of equal language recognition has not prevented the *de facto* domination of a few languages, especially English, from gaining ground in the EC institutions. The UK, a law abiding but unenthusiastic member state (Garton Ash 2001), has the most widely learnt language in Europe, because of the power of the US and British colonial history. The title of a BBC forum of 2002, *Should Europe speak English?* (BBC News 2001) may seem to be a case of British arrogance, particularly to the French. However, linguists now argue that English has become truly global, having diversified into several Englishes. According to this view, English is no longer the property of the US or Britain, but is now a stateless language, belonging to its European and overseas users, and hence there are no longer grounds for a simple equation between the English language and British or American cultural imperialism.

Before the UK and Ireland joined in the early 1970s, 60% of European Commission texts were written in French and 40% in German. Today, English is the first language of 45% of commission texts, French of 40% and German of 6%. These tendencies fuel fears that English may become the dominant vehicular language in the institutions, despite their francophone locations (Nay 1999). In 1995 an Italian became European Commission President, after two francophone predecessors. President Prodi speaks English better than he does French, and this has set the tone for a perceived lack of will to resist a creeping spread of 'Anglo-Saxon' usage. For example, the commission permits daily press briefings and questions, once allowed in French only, in all the languages, with translation on hand into English and French. French Commissioner Pascal Lamy has further upset his compatriots when he spoke before the WTO in Seattle in English, even though French is one of its official languages (Cassen 2000). The Belgian President of the European Monetary Institute in Frankfurt spoke at its inauguration in English; interpretation was available but only into German. The French Vice President of its successor, the European Central Bank, spoke in English before the EP's monetary committee, although interpretation was available in all eleven languages. When the twelve national bankers of 'Euroland' hold board meetings they avoid interpreters by communicating in English. Yet the French point out that English is just one of the official languages, and is spoken by only five million native speakers within the *euro* zone (i.e. in Ireland). As one Frenchman acidly commented about the UK: '*Pas mal, pour un pays qui a toujours été en marge de la construction européenne et qui n'est pas près de rejoindre l'euro.*'[8] (J. Quatremer in *Libération*, 20 September 1999).

There is pressure within the institutions to pursue a defensive as well as a global, multilingual language policy. The EP Vice President has warned that to make English the sole working language in the common institutions would seriously undermine the other languages in the EU generally (Fischer 2001). In 2001 the French and German Foreign Ministers wrote a joint letter (in both languages) to President Prodi protesting at the spread of English within the common institutions. In June 2001, a conference took place at the site of the permanent representation of France to the European Commission in Brussels (COREPER) to protest at the encroachment of English at the expense of French. Most documents, participants complained, were drafted in English; job offers often stipulated English native speakers. Conference participants even noted with dismay that French Commissioner Lamy and other Francophone functionaries such as the French Permanent Representative (Ambassador) to the EU and Lamy's Letzeburgisch *chef de cabinet* seemed resigned to English as the 'language of Europe' or the 'world Esperanto'. There were fears that if French disappeared from the commission, the other non-English languages would soon follow.

Leading the battle against English are the French. The nationalist Jacques Cheminade asserts that the British plan to make of the EU a free market vassal of the United States, a servile disseminator of the master-language (Cassen 2000; Cheminade 1999). While Cheminade may be dismissed as belonging to the band of French devotees of a world Anglo Saxon conspiracy, there has been some increase in the proportion of important posts in the European Commission held by UK nationals. The British argue that this is merely redressing an imbalance formerly in favour of French. But for many French, not just the far right Cheminade, the British are the Trojan horse of the Americans, and English is the language not only of the United States, but also of the Anglophone bloc that spies on the EU, (the Echelon network). The defence of French, or languages other than English, within EC institutions is therefore part of a global struggle for economic and cultural influence. (Métinge « La langue française en colère » 2000). The French have cited evidence of an Anglo-Saxon plot to eradicate French influence from the commission, whose president is an 'Anglomaniac' (Cassen 2000).

With respect to enlargement, the argument goes that in a *de facto* mainly monolingual bloc, the new member states will feel as dominated as most were during the Warsaw Pact days, when Russian was the language of administration. The accession of another ten or more new member states will add to the tension between the dominant languages, since all but Bulgaria have opted to negotiate in English instead of French (Forest 1998). At a meeting in March 1998 with the applicant countries, nine of the 11 foreign ministers spoke in English, including the Romanians whose country had received French aid on the strength of its willingness to join the Francophone bloc. Only the Polish and the Czech ministers spoke in French (*The Daily Telegraph*, 3 April, 1998; *The Times*, 14 April, 1998).

The French defend a limited linguistic pluralism within the EC institutions, since they judge this the best tactic to ensure the survival of French privileges. In 1994, the then French minister of European Affairs unsuccessfully suggested that the EC should have only five official and working languages, English, French, German, Spanish and Italian. In this way there would be a workable system, so that English would not appear as the only alternative to 'Babel'. Subsequently, former minister and expert on *la francophonie* J.F Deniau suggested that France's ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty be contingent on English and French being made the only official languages, as the existing system was unsustainable (*The Times*, 15 April 1998).

In early 1998 the French ambassador to the EU sent a letter to both the President of the European Commission and to the Secretary General of the Council of Ministers, denouncing the increasing prevalence of English both in the institutions and at press briefings. The letter added that the French version of Council proceedings was appearing two weeks later than the English originals, as in some commission departments English had become the main working language. Paris further informed the commission that it would block the appointment of a non-Francophone commission president (*The Daily Telegraph*, 6 March 1998).

French functionaries and MPs are now enjoined to use only French when writing to, emailing, telephoning, or faxing European or international institutions. They are forbidden to produce public documents in any other language, and must ensure that official EU texts and contracts are in French. A law of August 1994 stipulating the exclusive use of French in international organisations has since been reinforced by a 1998 Parliamentary Report. Furthermore, the French Prime Minister has declared that translations of official information on ministerial Internet sites must be into at least two languages. This is intended to prevent the spread of English as the dominant common international language.

The French argue that *la francophonie*, that is, their colonial heritage, makes their language a world player. To this end the *Agence intergouvernementale de la francophonie* has been teaching French to officials from the candidate countries, ensuring that they are aware of the importance of French in the southern hemisphere, as well as in Europe (*L'Echo*, 26 May 2000). *'La francophonie doit constituer une alternative à l'uniformisation de la planète'*[9] announced one Francophone organisation in 1999 (Assemblée parlementaire de la Francophonie 1999 :13). In early 2000, 350 'angry French speakers' held a 'métinge' at the French National Assembly. Their manifesto, couched in terms deliberately reminiscent of Karl Marx and Charles de Gaulle, denounced the 'human anglophone encephalopathy' of French business and political leaders who declined to speak French in their own country. The 'totalitarian' Prodi and Kinnock at the European Commission were leaders of a cabal bent on replacing French with English there. French lovers of freedom must stop the linguistic vanguard of the New World Order, with its insidious plans to seep English into every nook of public life. (Défense de la Langue Française 2000).

Lawyers in the US or elsewhere may successfully challenge national and EC language legislation with the argument that language protection measures conflict with the Four Freedoms of the Single European Act. Though the single language that might be called for need not be English, this would be the likely outcome of any such legal challenge (Phillipson 2001).

Recently, there has been talk of a tactical linguistic alliance with German against English, the latest avatar of the at times shaky Franco-German special relationship, since both stand to lose from the spread of English (see, for example, *Le Figaro*, 26 August 2000). The French foreign minister told a meeting of assembled German diplomats in Berlin in 2000 that their French counterparts would henceforth all have to learn German.[10] This must have struck listeners as long overdue, given that German diplomats have long had to be competent in both English and French. As we have seen, in mid 2001 the French and German foreign ministers jointly wrote to Prodi.

German speakers within the institutions have taken their cue from their more assertive French partners. The Germans, the Austrians, plus small numbers of German speaking Belgian, French, Letzeburgisch, Danish and Italian nationals, constitute the highest number of native speakers in the EU (not to mention the Swiss Germans, whose country is in a common market with the EU). German native speakers number a quarter of the population of the present fifteen. The balance of power in the EU has already shifted eastwards, and enlargement will consolidate Germany's central position.

Although a former culture minister pronounced it futile to resist the onslaught of English (*The Economist*, 24 February 2001), German politicians have denounced the flood of Americanisms invading their language (Denglisch). Germans deplore the increasing use of English at German conferences and in German publications, which can lead to serious misunderstandings, as Thielmann (this volume) points out. Germans recall that theirs was, with French, the major vehicular language from the European Coal and Steel Community until the EEC enlargement of 1973 (thus demonstrating how collective memories may differ). Determined to arrest the trend in EC institutions to omit German as a working language, the Germans made a stand when the Finns decided at the start of their EU presidency (mid 1999) to provide only English, French and Finnish interpreting at some informal ministerial meetings. The German Chancellor wrote to the Finnish Prime Minister demanding the reinstatement of German, arguing from the precedent of the previous German and Austrian presidencies. When this was denied, German officials boycotted meetings (*The Guardian*, 2 July 1999; *The Independent*, 12 July 1999; *The Times*, 27 July 1999).

Early in the Swedish presidency (January to July 2001, during the European Year of Languages), a similar quarrel arose. German officials and business people boycotted a meeting of culture officials because the Swedish hosts declined to provide German interpreting. The Swedes argued, as had the Finns before them, that informal meetings normally had simultaneous interpreting into French and English only, and that the addition of German during the presidencies of Luxembourg (1997), the UK and Austria (1998) and Germany itself (1999) created neither a legal nor a moral precedent. The Germans complained in 2001, as they had previously, that on the contrary, until the entry of the UK in 1973, German and French were always understood to be the working languages of informal meetings. Though Stockholm then agreed to provide German at some informal meetings, unlike Helsinki, it continued to provide simultaneous interpreting in only English and French at others. Consequently, Berlin sent a list of meetings to the Swedish presidency announcing that its officials would not attend unless German interpreting was provided. They added that they might nonetheless accept the absence of German if French was also omitted. This was a diplomatic manoeuvre; they knew of course that the French would never condone the sole provision of English interpreting at such meetings. While Stockholm saw this as another round of the battle for linguistic domination between German and French, the German government insisted that it was merely reminding the new Presidency of customary practice; after all, had not Portugal, in charge of EU affairs between Finland and Sweden, regularly provided services in German? (*Die Tageszeitung*, 20 February 2001; *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 2 February 2001; *The Times*, 27 July 1999).

If a few working languages were formally chosen instead of being merely tacitly permitted to dominate, middle-ranking languages would demand the equal treatment that had been until then their legal right. This has been the case even without any such formalisation. The minister president of the Flanders government, anxious not to be linguistically downgraded in the EC institutions by comparison with French, wrote to the Dutch prime minister on the eve of that country's EC presidency (second semester, 1997) to remind him that Dutch officials should not speak English at EC meetings. The Hague had not mentioned the language issue in the policy statement setting out its presidential priorities, which omission induced the Flemish government to implore Dutch speakers to use their common language at full EC meetings, formal or not. In restricted meetings, if it was agreed to add a fourth or fifth working language to the usual three, then Dutch should be one of them, the letter added. Finally, all working documents should be provided in Dutch. Failing these measures, Dutch speakers should restrict their participation at meetings *(European Voice*, 30 June 1997).

The Swedish government had translated the entire *acquis* of Community law from the English original. When the Swedish EU presidency in the first half of the European Year of Languages used its official website to debate the languages issue, all 127 messages posted were in English.[11] Nonetheless, Stockholm has commissioned a survey to investigate the spread of English in Swedish, following the precedent set by German, Italian and French governments.

The Southern Europeans, for their part, are touchy at any suggestion that the EU should be led by a rich Northern European bloc, whose dominant languages might be legally recognised as belonging to a privileged 'inner core'. Newspapers in Spain and Italy protest at the *de facto* downgrading of their national languages in the common institutions (for example, *El Pais*, 9. July 2000, *El Periodico* 7 July 2000). The Spanish point out that their language is widely spoken outside Europe, and is therefore vital for trade. They wish to see Spanish used automatically as a working language. Consequently, they have walked out of meetings at which their language was not catered for. For example, in 1998, the UK Prime Minister, whose country had the presidency at the time, arranged a conference of the fifteen plus the then eleven candidate states, at which, interpretation and translation were to be available only in the three leading languages. The Spanish declined to attend the enlargement conference unless translating and interpreting was available in Spanish. In their own view of EC history, it had always been the practice to have six languages on hand at working meetings: German, French, English, Dutch, Spanish and Italian. It was unthinkable that these six should now be reduced to three. The Italians, having been offended already by their representation on the UK presidential logo by a pizza, were furious that their language was not to be given interpretation either. When the Spanish PM rejected an offer to have an interpreter sit beside him, the UK organisers were obliged to offer simultaneous interpretation of all 22 languages represented (*The Independent*, 6 March and 12 July, 1998; *The Daily Telegraph*, 1 October 1998). The Finns therefore pointed out to the Germans a year later that if they provided German at all meetings, the Spanish and Italians would follow. In 1995 the French had proposed to reduce the number of languages used even at formal meetings to the five most widely spoken (omitting Dutch). The Spanish and Italians approved, as this would protect their own languages; on this occasion rather than the Dutch, it was the Greeks who protested.

Representatives of the seven or eight million Catalan speakers have for some years argued that theirs should be at least an EC official language, used like Irish for legal documents, such as the treaties. If the EU can sign agreements with Andorra in Catalan, why can't Catalan speakers in the EU read binding texts in their own language?[12] The European Year of Languages has prompted Jordi Pujol, President of Catalonia, to ask the Commissioner for Culture and Education, Vivianne Reding, to recognise Catalan as an official language for the purpose of the treaties and EC legislation (*El Pais* 7 March, 2001, *Avui*, 7 March, 2001; *Avui*, 8 May 2001). Neither the Catalans nor the Irish expect theirs to be working languages, any more than do the Estonians or the Hungarians, but Catalan, despite not being a national language, demands to achieve official status.

A common neutral language?

For some, language harmonisation, that is, a common second language, would ensure a true single market with mobile workers and free circulation of goods and services. Within the institutions, this would reduce costs, promote open discussion and facilitate consensus, creating a common European identity. Such challenges to the current, if imperfectly applied, multilingual language regime assume that harmonisation should apply in the linguistic, as in other policy areas. Opponents of a putative Single Language policy argue that monolingualism within a state, bloc or organisation does not guarantee peace, as the examples of Ulster, Rwanda and much of the former Yugoslavia amply demonstrate.

English speakers tend to argue for their own language as the best candidate. Non-English proponents of this theory respond that to single out any national language would put all other language speakers at a disadvantage, and would be most unlikely to bring the European project close to its citizens. They add that since English is the language of an alien bloc, as well as that of two member states, only a neutral language would be acceptable, one that is the mother language of no one.

Three such languages have been suggested in recent years: Latin (for administration and legal texts rather than oral communication); the invented pseudo language Europanto, meant initially for everyday oral communication; and Esperanto, an artificial spoken and written language whose devotees hold annual international conferences.

Latin has been heard in the EC institutions: the heir to the throne of multilingual Austria-Hungary, the MEP Otto von Habsburg, once delivered an impromptu speech in that language at the European Parliament, to the dismay of the interpreters. He declared Latin to be precise and thus admirably suited for such gatherings.[13] During their presidency of the European Union in 1999, the Finns went further, suggesting making Latin the appropriate language of administration within the EC (Fischer 2001). They took up the cause of Latin in reply to the newly assertive Germans, reinforcing their point by providing EC information on their presidency website in Latin (*conspectus rerum latinus*). They were telling the Germans and others that linguistic nationalism was not in the spirit of Europeanism.

The Finns argued the cost advantages of Latin, adding that the meaning of Latin terms would be constant. (However, arguments about the connotations of a Latin term might not disappear, since this could vary with the mother language and national culture of the reader. The same criticism can be made of Esperanto). The Finns also used historical arguments for the reintroduction of Latin. This was most Europeanist on their part, since their country was never within the Roman Empire, nor the Carolingian Empire, whose territorial extent roughly approximated to the area of the original Six, and which had used Latin as the language of culture and administration. The Finns, whose state church is Lutheran, reminded their astonished EU partners that Latin was for centuries the language of the Roman church and of the sciences until about 1800, and that in Hungary, Latin was used in the administration until the 1848 revolution. One might add that it is integral to Romanian nationalism, hence taught in all primary schools.

Despite some sympathy within the Commission for the reintroduction of Latin as the administrative language of the supranational bureaucracy (*Die Welt*, 1. April 2000), it is improbable that Latin will become once more the administrative *lingua franca*, even in an enlarged EU.

Another contender among those who feel that a united Europe needs a single language of international communication is Europanto. This is not an artificial language used by a small international elite. Its inventor, Diego Marani, an Italian translator at the EC Council, explains that Europanto is based on a simple English substratum, lacking a fixed lexicon, grammar, or pronunciation. It is an *ad hoc*, practical method of communication. Marani argues that as most Europeans have a basic knowledge of English, one needs only to accelerate deliberately the process whereby speakers from different speech communities employ an idiom mixing internationally recognised English words and well known loan words from other European languages, embedding these in simplified structures and phonetic systems taken from speakers' original languages (*The European*, 7-13 August 1997). This hybrid, Marani argues, already partially exists as 'global English'. It needs only to be encouraged; gradually it will stabilise, evolving its own dominant forms within each broad linguistic family, just as Latin evolved into the Romance languages. There might evolve for example a Germanic Europanto in Northern Europe, its English and other common lexical terms in a Germanic grammatical substratum. Similarly, a simplified Slav and Romance based Anglicised language would appear in their respective language areas. In a few decades at most, the different regional variants will have competed, and the most efficient structures and words will have prevailed, removing some or all the regional variations; a new Europe-wide language will be born. Europanto will then be the *lingua franca* of the mobile — tourists, workers or Eurocrats.[14] In this way Europanto will be a hybrid version of 'global English', the new *lingua franca*, but without neo-colonial connotations.

The author has provided amusing examples of what his creation might look like in an English cum German and French environment, assuming speakers add sprinklings of Spanish, Latin and Dutch. As Europanto is slowly evolving anyway according to Marani, the Council need make no decision to impose it, thus avoiding accusations of social engineering. Europanto does seem, however, to be something of a joke, an extrapolation from Eurojargon within the institutions on the one hand, and Pidgin English outside on the other.

The third contender is Esperanto, a genuine language with sixteen simple grammatical rules. Marani regards Esperanto as elitist, but it is also the most successful of the 19th century artificial languages. It has a simple grammar involving regular rules, a phonetic spelling system and to most Europeans is written as it sounds. Its proponents wish to make of it a neutral international language.[15] Recently, Esperantists wrote to the MEPs, proposing their language as the answer to the spread of English. They argued that Esperanto takes at most a quarter as long to learn as a natural language, that it could and should become the universal second language, and that communication would be more efficient. Furthermore, Esperanto destroyed no one's identity and was politically neutral (Fettes 1991). Esperanto speakers had also written to the European Commission in April 1995 suggesting that this language be made the sole working language in the institutions. Mme Cresson replied on behalf of the commission that Esperanto lacked the cultural and historical richness of natural languages, and could therefore not be considered (Cresson 1995). This is perhaps not convincing; EC business requires the style and vocabulary to discuss, say, regulations regarding pork, not the soulful yearnings of poetry. Another commissioner, the Italian radical Emma Bonino, disassociated herself from her French colleague's remarks. She regretted the refusal of European institutions to discuss the language problem, and rejected the idea that English should become the federal language of Europe. She detailed her contacts with Esperantists and announced her support for 'a project for a political victory of international linguistic democracy and Esperanto' (Bonino 1996). However, Esperanto has no powerful economic bloc behind it, and is therefore likely to remain confined to a few thousand international devotees. Furthermore, as with Latin or any other second language, Esperanto speakers bring to their understanding of concepts the cultural baggage acquired in their childhood.

Reflections and suggestions

Even if enlargement with its additional official languages will not increase costs, as the language services claim, it will surely provide grounds for new linguistic battles, and will further hinder discussions in the European Parliament (Gil-Robles, quoted in *Le monde de l'éducation*, February 1998). Both interpreting and translating will increasingly use 'hub' languages, generally English or French, as a middle stage when transferring from one small language into another. This saves costs but slows proceedings as well as decreasing accuracy. The fact that the interpreting and translation services are phasing out many language pairs will further entrench feelings of exclusion.

France and Germany like to regard themselves as still the power centre of the EU; the French especially feel that English, the EC latecomer and agent of the world hegemon, should not relegate previously leading languages to second place. To that end, French officials abroad are enjoined to support the cultural battle; the publicly stated aim may be multilingualism, but officials are to speak only French. To demonstrate the ability to speak English is the ultimate treachery.

The coincidence of official and working languages has always been a myth. In fact there is a two-level linguistic Europe. In the area of language policy as elsewhere, the EU has split into a group of inner and outer members, with the languages of the most powerful naturally at the 'core'. This did not perturb the French as long as their language remained the main communication language in the institutions. Now other contenders are threatening French. The question then becomes whether the EC should abandon the theoretical equivalence of official and working languages, which allows English to 'invade' because linguistic democracy is unworkable with so many languages. The difficulty will then be in deciding which should be favoured: if French, English and German, why not Spanish, Italian and later Polish? Probably the Polish will instigate the next language war.

While over half of EU citizens speak another European language well enough to hold a conversation, 80% of children in the EU now learn English as a second language. Commission recommendations that all should learn two foreign languages are meant to reduce the domination of English, just as French government websites are now enjoined for the same reason to provide trilingual versions. Accusations that the European Commission is encouraging the spread of English seem therefore unjust, although French critics point to a certain resignation to an American *fait accompli*. The increasing use of English in EC communication with the outside demonstrates that the spread of an economically powerful language is the result of individual choices. Intervention to arrest this risks being taxed as futile as well as authoritarian.

Equality of opportunity, provided for by the EC's language policy, does not prevent the rise or the decline of languages, and cannot protect the institutions from what is happening outside. If French and German were protected by a ban on English as a working language, then functionaries who are natives of the smaller languages might demand a ban on French, for example.

In early 2001, the general secretary of the transnational leftwing coalition at the Parliament, the Movement for the United States of Europe, wrote to the French EP President and to the European Commission suggesting a conference to discuss the status of languages in the EU institutions. The commission has agreed in principle. What might an outside observer suggest for the agenda?

First, each state during its rotating presidency might have its language automatically declared a working language, if it was not one already, in addition to the usual two or three languages. This is already common practice, and would need only to be written into the Treaty. Admittedly, that would undermine the principle of equal rights. Alternatively, if the Council decides that each presidency should be dual, shared between a large and a small state, then this would add minority languages twice as frequently to the list of working languages as would otherwise be the case. That would please the Greeks or the Flemish, for example. One might ask the conference to consider too why informal Council meetings as well as formal ones could not take place in Brussels, where the infrastructure is already in place, instead of in the host country, necessitating the costly hiring of local language staff. That would have the effect of reducing the need to restrict the number of working languages, though there will always be disgruntled outcasts.

A French speaking academic, Ludo van der Heyden, has suggested that the EC institutions should use the three main languages, each in a specific sphere: French for legal matters, German for banking, and English for commerce (*Les Echos*, 18 April 2000). This division says much about the cultural presuppositions of M. van der Heyden, as it would soon encounter demarcation problems. Whatever the details agreed upon, assuming no distinction between official and working languages, let us suppose that an EU of perhaps thirty members should agree that from two to five languages were written into the Treaties as the sole languages of communication, interpretation, and translation (at least of non-legal documents), or, alternatively, were confined to certain policy areas. This official abandonment of linguistic equality would save money but would further alienate citizens of other language groups. It would enshrine existing inequalities, where texts are translated into some languages later than others, or not at all, or where interpretation is not provided or is delayed by its non-hub status.

A partial answer could be to remove the advantages enjoyed by the native speakers of dominant languages. Functionaries, possibly MEPs too, would be obliged to use one of a shortlist of languages other than their native language. They would have to read documents also in the alien language of their choice. In this way French or English speakers for example would have no negotiating advantage over their colleagues from, say, Greece or Slovenia. All would be using a foreign language, which many would understand around the table. Interpreters would help out where necessary. Such a scheme would engender sympathy for others struggling similarly to express themselves, and would encourage all to improve their linguistic skills.

The idea could even be extended to European Council meetings of all sorts. Any national politician who had aspirations to become a government minister would have to be competent in at least one other main European language, as otherwise he or she could not survive in Brussels or Strasbourg. No nationalist politicians would then become ministers. Gone would be the instructions to walk out of meetings if representatives could not use their own idiom. Gone would be the orders to respond to emails or letters only if in the native language. Democracy would be served in a way that the present system has failed to ensure.

Finally, if critics protest that such a plan is both totalitarian and a recipe for misunderstandings, one might riposte that it would have the same beneficial effects as have been claimed for Latin, Esperanto or Europanto. Any of these creative solutions would defuse the resentment of once powerful language groups faced with a *de facto* linguistic inequality no longer to their advantage. Any of them would enable Europeans to meet on equal, neutral ground, would remove nationalistic posturings, and would create that elusive European identity the EU's official language policy promotes. But it would have the added advantage of obliging those implicated in Europe's future to acquire knowledge of a living culture that otherwise might have remained a mystery.

That said, any venture into linguistic centralism, that is, a firm choice of some languages above others as opposed to the present *laissez faire* that in reality lets the strongest win, would require a totalitarian resolve entirely lacking in an organisation more suited to the bickering atmosphere of last minute compromises. Such uncomfortable dilemmas explain why language policy in the EC institutions is of interest to the media, to academics and now the institutions themselves. Yet member state governments, mindful of elections at home, have continued to neglect this sensitive issue in the European Year of Languages.

Notes

1. 'The rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall (…) be determined by the council, acting unanimously.'
2. Art. 1 of Council Regulation No. 1 reads since 1995: 'The official and the working languages of the institutions of the community shall be Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish.'
3. See the Internet sites of the European Commission's interpreting and translation services, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/scic/.
4. At the EP English is the language used to translate 35.6% of documents, French 29.5% and German 11.1%.
5. I am indebted to Tamsin Sanderson of Freiburg University for notifying me of this radio talk.

6. E.g. the Economic and Social Committee, the European Environment Agency, the European Investment Bank.

7. See Languages in Europe, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/languages/lang/europeanlanguages.html

8. 'Not bad for a country which has always been on the fringe of European construction and is not close to joining the Euro.'

9. '*Francophonie* should constitute an alternative to the uniformisation of the planet.' 1

10. *Joint Interpreting and Translation Service Newsletter*, Brussels, 9 October 2000.

11. See the website: <http://www.eu2002/forum/message>

12. M Strubell of the Departement de Cultura, Generalitat de Catalunya, speaking in Brussels at the Colloquy of the European Bureau of Lesser-Used Languages, 1999. *Contact Bulletin*, vol. 15, Feb. 1999.

13. According to R Boyes in *The Times*, 27 July, 1999. No date given.

14. See also http://www.neuropeans.com/topic/europanto/what/more.php

15. See for example <http://www.esperanto.net>
<http://www.mintex.demon.co.uk/espviva/angla/eu_I1.htm>
<http://www/ifrance.com/bertin/uepos.htm>
<http://www.webcom.com/~donh/efaq.html>
Esperanto a Western Language? At
<http://www.geocities.com/c_piron/westernlanguage.html>

References

Assemblée parlementaire de la Francophonie 1999, *Rapport de l' Assemblée parlementaire de la Francophonie*, Ottawa, July 1999.

BBC News 2001, *Talking point, debates, should Europe speak English*, emailed reactions to a discussion on 30th April 2001.

Bonino, E 1996, 'Let us clearly foresee the political route' in *Esperanto*, March 1996. <http://www.best.com/~donh/Esperanto/bonino.html>.

Brehan, N 1999, 'Le coût du multilinguisme', *Le monde*, 30 November 1999.

Bureau of Single Market Harmonisation 1993, Regulation 40/94, 20 Dec. 1993, *Official Journal of the European Communities,* L11, 14 January 1994, art. 115.

Cassen, B 2000, 'La langue dollar', in *Le monde diplomatique*, May 2000.

Cheminade, J 1999, *Coup d'état britannique à Bruxelles*, <http://solidariteetprogres.online.fr/Jacques/Coupdeta.html>.

Clarke, A 2000, 'EU enlargement and its implications for the Translation Service', *Language Matters*, No. 2, September <http://europa.eu.int/comm/translation/bulletins/matters/2/feature.htm>.

Committee of the Regions 1994, 'Regulation of May 25 1994', Official Journal of the European Communities, L32 of 27 May 1994, articles 6, 22, 41.

Coulmas, F (ed) 1991, A *language policy for the European community: prospects and quandaries*, De Gruyter, Berlin/New York.

Cresson, E 1995, *France: position de l'Union européenne sur l'Espéranto*, <http://www.ifrance.com/bertin/uepos.htm>.

Crystal, D 1997, *English as a global language*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Cunningham, K 2001, *Translating for a larger Union — can we cope with more than 11 languages?* <http://europa.eu.int/comm/translation/en/eyl/speech.pdf>.

Défence de la Langue Française (2000) <http://www.langue-francaise.org/Articles_Dossiers/raison_colere.html>.

Economic and Social Committee, 1995 Regulation of 6 July 1995, *Official Journal of the European Communities* L82, 30 March 1996, articles 36 and 55.

European Commission, 1999, 'A multilingual community at work, the European Commission's translation service', European Union, Luxembourg.

Fettes, M 1991, 'Europe's Babylon: towards a single European language? Esperanto documents', *History of European Ideas*, vol. 13, No. 3, pp 201-13, 1991.

Fischer, M 2001, *Latein als Amtsprache?* Deutschland Funk Radio, 30 July 2001.

Forrest, A 1998, 'The politics of language in the EU', *European Review*, vol. 6, No. 3, p 318.

Garton Ash, T 2001 'Is Britain European?', *International Affairs*, 77,1, pp 1-13.

Hagège, C 1992, *Le souffle de la langue*, Pairs, Odile Jacob.

Kaplan, RB 1966, 'Cultural thought patterns in inter-cultural education', *Language Learning* 16, pp 1–20.

Liikanen, E 1997, 'Entretien sur la traduction', *Terminologie et Traduction*, vol. 1997.1, pp 118–24.

Loos, E 2000, 'Language choice, linguistic capital and symbolic domination in the European Union', *Language problems and language planning*, vol. 24, no. 1, pp 37–53.

Métinge 2000, « La langue française en colère », *Manifeste de la langue française en colère: les raisons de la colère*. <http://www.langue-francaise.org/Articles-Dossiers/Raison_colere.html>.

Nay, C 1999, *Valeurs actuelles*, 9–16 Oct. 1999. <http://perso.infonie.fr/goelano/1-Esperanto/HenriMASSON.htm>.

Phillipson, R 2001, 'English is taking over in Europe', *The Guardian*, 18 April, 2001.

Pym, A 2000, 'The European Union and its future languages: questions of language policies and translation theories', *Across languages and cultures*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp 1–18.

Schlossmacher, M 1997, *Die Amstsprachen in den Organen der Europaïschen Gemeinschaft*, 2nd edn, Peter Lang, Frankfurt.

SCIC (=Joint Interpreting and Conferences Service) 2000, *SCIC News*, No.1, October.

Seidlhofer, B 1995, Approaches to summarisation, discourse analysis and language education, Narr, Tübingen.

French monopoly of the linguistic marketplace: a regional perspective

Nicole George

Australian National University

Introduction

The French republican ideology of nationhood, with its continued emphasis upon the *unicité* or indivisibility of the French people as a foundational principle, has had a devastating effect upon the cultural life of the French regions. A fear of communitarism, particularism or multiculturalism — perhaps the most reviled term in the French republican vocabulary — has meant that for over 200 years demands for greater recognition of French regional cultural diversity have been far outweighed by state desires to ensure the republican project's coherence. France may have one of the most diverse linguistic profiles of all the nations in Western Europe (Laroussi and Marcellesi 1993, 85), and yet this fact has only recently been reflected in French government policy relating to language use. The policies of regional language suppression that gathered momentum over most of the last two hundred years of French history, demonstrate the power behind the Jacobin doctrine of centralisation and its influence upon French Republicanism. The idea that the French Republic's integrity must be protected from potentially divisive regional cultural influences has provided a powerful impetus for a centralist form of cultural imperialism which has seen Parisian culture and values imposed as the norm across the whole of the nation. Against this backdrop, a hierarchical conception of French cultural life has evolved which has negatively stereotyped regional cultures as unsophisticated and backward, hence of little worth.

With these ideas in mind, this paper concentrates upon the current predicament of France's local languages, and examines how they have fared in an environment where state activity has, for the most part, reinforced French as the dominant idiom. In particular I concentrate upon the situation of Breton, spoken in the northwest corner of France, and Occitan, a group of dialects spoken in France's southern regions. French government policy makes it difficult to compile a reliable portrait of regional language use for it does not produce any type of census data in this area. Therefore I begin my discussion by examining the ways in which both regionalists and republicans present information on the status of France's indigenous languages. Their conflicting perceptions of the current situation highlight the need for caution when drawing conclusions about regional language use for in many cases, their summary of the situation often appears to be somewhat skewed by broader political concerns.

My case studies of Breton and Occitan language use draw on the findings of an independent study carried out by the EU-funded Euromosaic project (Euromosaic 1996). In my discussion of these findings I will rely extensively upon the theories Pierre Bourdieu outlines in his work, *Language as symbolic power* (Bourdieu 1991). I will argue that state legislation has, to a large extent, helped shape social practices which, in turn, have severely compromised the linguistic capital of France's indigenous languages. By focussing my attention primarily upon the role of the media and the education system in Brittany and the region known as Occitanie, and discussing the changing nature of language use at the domestic level, I argue that the evolution of a language market in which everything except the dominant language, the language of authority, has been marginalised, is no mere coincidence. My contention is that the deterioration in rates of local language use can be seen as the consequence of a linguistic market where important socialising institutions, such as the media and the school, have raised the French language's profit of distinction, legitimising its position as the national language, while diminishing the perceived value of the local and minority languages. In addition, I discuss the initiatives regional and minority groups have undertaken to defend their language's competitiveness and consider these measures' relative successes, which include the creation of private regional language schools, and the development of regional language broadcasting services.

Subsequently I discuss French Republican opposition to the ratification of the Council of Europe Charter for Regional and Minority Languages and recent, albeit thwarted attempts by Jack Lang, the Parti Socialiste Education Minister, to integrate independent regional language schools into the state educational system (see also Jeanjean, this volume). While the Council of Europe Charter may have helped re-establish some notion of equality between cultures and a respect for cultural diversity, in the final event the Conseil Constitutionnel (France's highest ruling constitutional body) found that ratification of this document would be contrary to the principle of 'unicité' enshrined in the French Constitution. A similar decision made of the Conseil D'Etat at the end of 2001 in opposition to Lang's proposals for the wider integration of regional language schools demonstrates that to this day, in Republican France, any recognition of the rights of specific groups remains a contentious issue which, it is often imagined, menaces the very integrity and coherence of the nation itself.

Finding the facts

Many observers argue there is an ongoing 'conspiracy of silence' in France operating at the official level which has helped to mask the extent of the nation's 'linguistic variety' (Laroussi and Marcellesi 1993, 86). The fact that the state refuses to acknowledge the presence of regional language use in the public sphere means, for example, that no question pertaining to language use has ever appeared on a French government census form. The absence of census data makes the task of creating a French national portrait of language use a somewhat haphazard undertaking, for the simple reason that the available information is generally incomplete or inconsistent (Extra 2000, 59). Of course the ideological significance of this lack of accurate information relating to language use should not be overlooked. As Laroussi and Marcellesi point out

> the republican affirmation of linguistic unity, would be completely contradicted if there was a regular account of those citizens who fail to conform to the model.[1] (Laroussi and Marcellesi 1993, 86).

In the absence of more reliable statistics both regional and minority groups on the one hand, and those who peddle the republican line on the other, often resort to drawing some rather dubious conclusions about the current status of language use in France — based on incomplete and ambiguous information or widely inaccurate generalisations. Republican discourse on the language issue, for example, often appears insensitive to the idea that there exists a need for greater recognition of cultural diversity within the French nation, and generally seems to cast the idea that France's 'other' languages are menaced, into the realm of myth (Giordan 1999, 61). Jean Daniel, director of the weekly current affairs magazine, *Nouvel Observateur*, made these types of sentiments evident in an article he wrote in 1999 in which he claims

> diversity flourishes everywhere in our country, we make use of our regional languages at will and without any hindrance, for as much as the Republic embodies ideas of unity and indivisibility, it also accommodates itself very well to difference and plurality.[2] (Daniel 1999).

On the Republican side of the issue there is a strong desire to deny the fact that France's 'other' languages are currently under pressure.

Regional activists on the other hand, generally focus their attention upon the diminution in rates of regional and minority language use between the past and the present. However, in their attempts to implicate the state in this process, a tendency to distort the so-called 'facts' of the issue is also patently apparent. For example, in an interview quoted in Gaquin (1996), Pêr Denez, head of the Celtic Department at the Université Haute-Bretagne, when asked to comment on current levels of Breton language use, begins by quoting figures from a rather vague study concentrating on the use of Breton in church services, carried out in the early 1930s (which demonstrates a high level of Breton use in the past), and from this point attempts to estimate current levels of use. While in this particular case the speaker admits the imprecise nature of the information he presents when he states 'we can only really guess at the true predicament of the Breton language' [3] (Gaquin 1996, 127), it is nonetheless clear that any attempt to divine an understanding of the overall trends in language use in France, will run the risk of becoming bogged down in a mire of inconsistency if it is sidetracked by conclusions that have been generated out of a broader political agenda.

With these ideas in mind it is evident that first one has to establish the credentials of any type of project that addresses language use in France. This is a sensitive issue that can be hijacked easily by those pursing specific political outcomes. The data presented in the following examination of the status of Breton and Occitan, two of the indigenous languages of France, is extracted from the Euromosaic project, which is the result of a combined research effort involving Barcelona's Institut Sociolinguistica Catalana, the Brussels-based Centre de Recherche sur le Pluringuisme and Bangor's Research Center of Wales. The project addresses the social and institutional aspects of language reproduction and focuses upon the family, education and the community — three identifiable agencies playing a crucial role in this process (Euromosaic 1996). The main argument underpinning the Euromosaic project's work is that

> language is a central component of diversity and that if diversity is the cornerstone of innovative development, then attention must be given to sustaining the existing pool of diversity within the EU (Euromosaic 1996).

The value of this particular projects lies in the fact that at the very least it offers us a statistically consistent insight into the current predicament of the regional and minority languages spoken throughout France; the project's findings are disconnected from any immediate political issues, or political interest groups.

The idea of the linguistic market in which languages are in competition for the same communicative space, outlined in Bourdieu (1991), will be used as a theoretical framework for the following sections of this chapter, as I discuss the results of the Euromosaic study. Bourdieu concentrates his attention upon the way in which political domination, 'endlessly reproduced' (Bourdieu 1991, 46) by government and social institutions, produces linguistic domination, ultimately reinforcing one language's position, in our case French, as the language of authority. While he acknowledges that the state is heavily implicated in this process, Bourdieu also examines the effect of what he terms an 'invisible, silent violence' which ultimately compels the individual to conform to a dominant language norm (Bourdieu 1991, 52). He explains that

> the dominant competence functions as linguistic capital, securing a profit of distinction in its relation to other competencies … so that the groups which possess that competence are able to impose it as the only legitimate one in the formal markets (the fashionable, educational, political and administrative markets) and in most of the linguistic interactions in which they are involved (Bourdieu 1991, 56).

The dominant language becomes the language of prestige, its rules of usage synonymous with values such as 'good' or 'correct' (Le Page and Tabouret-Keller 1985, p.236). In the same way pejorative values become attached to speech systems that depart from the dominant code. In the French context this is evident when we consider that France's 'other' languages have often been labelled as backwards or unsophisticated; value laden classifications that lack any 'objective status' (Bourdieu 1991, p 236). Yet such classifications have a powerfully persuasive influence, for as Bourdieu argues, they can ultimately lead to a type of voluntary / involuntary assimilation to the dominant language code (Bourdieu 1991, 52). As the 'other' languages become minoritised in relation to the language with the highest profit of distinction, their speakers, by conforming to the most acceptable code, avoid becoming victims of the type of stigmatisation or prejudice that can result from their exclusion from the dominant speech community.

Breton and Occitan — background information

Breton, a language of the Celtic group, is traditionally spoken in Brittany a region encompassing the Amorican Peninsular, which juts out from the top north-western corner of France into the Atlantic Ocean.[4] Breton has never been the indigenous language of the whole of the Breton population, although it has been used at different times throughout the territory and across different classes of society (Euromosaic 1996). The Breton language's heartland has traditionally been the western half of the American Peninsular, known as *Basse-Bretagne*. Current numbers of Breton speakers are estimated to number between 500,000 to 700,000 persons (Laroussi and Marcellesi 1993, 88), or roughly 20% of the region's population (le Coadic 1999). It should be noted however that the Euromosaic survey also found that the majority of Breton speakers are 'in the agricultural and lower income categories of the labour market' with few professionals speaking the region's local language.

In comparison to the relatively small region of Brittany, the regions where Occitan or *Langue d'Oc* as it was known in the Middle Ages, is spoken, encompass one third of the territory of France; an area of 190,000 square kilometres encompassing nearly 13 million inhabitants (Lafont 1996, p 521). The regions comprising Occitanie (the territory on which Occitan has been spoken historically) cover 31 departments of modern France (Laroussi and Marcellesi 1993 90) stretching from the southern Atlantic coast, along the Pyrénees, to the Italian border in the east. Only the relatively smaller Basque and Catalan regions break this continuity.[5]

Occitan is a language of Latin origin, and while it has certain similarities to other Latin languages such as French, Spanish or Italian, its closest resemblance is to Catalan. The language is generally divided into three dialect groups, (Nord, Sud and Gascon) with southern Occitan further divided into Languedocien and Provençal variants (Laroussi and Marcellesi 1993 91). As both the language of the Troubadours in the Middle Ages, and 'a vehicle of official transaction' at this time, Occitan was an important emblem of southern European civilisation and culture, the 'expression of an original human community' (Euromosaic 1996). However the language's status was to become diminished by the late fifteenth century as it increasingly came into competition with French. From this point onwards Occitan's importance as a language of law and administration declined, and it appeared less and less in the written form, a phenomenon certainly compounded by the Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts (1539) which made the use of French in administrative and legal documents obligatory (Gaquin 1996, 509). Interest in Occitan's cultural importance has gone through several revivals, however. The Romantic period of the early nineteenth century encouraged a new concentration upon Troubadour poetry, and saw historian Augustine Thierry write a competing version of history that described the conquest of Occitanie not as another episode in the glorious birth of the French nation, but as 'a race war'[6] which resulted in 'the devastation and the destruction of the Midi by the North' (Devoluy 1941, 81).[7] The rise of the Félibrige movement in the late nineteenth century and the writings of renowned Occitan poet and author, Frédéric Mistral, also sparked renewed interest in Occitan language.

Current estimates of Occitan use are difficult to substantiate given the lack of verifiable statistics. *Média-Pluriel's* survey, conducted in the Languedoc-Roussillon administrative region in 1997, concluded that three million people could hold a brief conversation in Occitan, 2.6 million used the language from time to time, and two million used it regularly with family and friends. However the study also found that levels of language comprehension were in a state of 'permanent regression', with a decline of 14% apparent between 1991 and 1997 (Monin 1998). The Occitan language is facing an uncertain future, as Thierry Daullé, director of an Occitan language school in Lattes, points out

> there is a risk that one day we will bury the last grandpa who will take to the grave with him the last words spoken in Occitan (cited in Monin 1998).[8]

The family as an agent of language reproduction

The Euromosaic survey conducted in Brittany concentrated upon the experiences of a sample group of 1000 Breton speakers across a diverse range of areas. This survey examined the current levels of language use by looking at the social, familial and educational contexts of Breton versus French language choices. The study found that within the time frame of only two generations, there has been 'rapid transition' in the population from monolingual Breton speakers, through bilingualism, towards monolingualism in French. While respondents' grandparents were generally monolingual Breton speakers with little or no competency in French, their parents had a greater tendency to be competent in both Breton and French. In contrast to the previous generation however, the respondents themselves and their brothers and sisters, generally had a poor competency in Breton and were much more confident speakers of French (Euromosaic 1996).

By contrast the Euromosaic survey of Occitan speakers found that multilingualism, even two generations ago, was a widespread phenomenon, with over 60% of respondents claiming that their grandparents were competent in both French and Occitan. This is not a trend that has continued into the present day however. Questions relating to respondents' siblings' language skills demonstrated that a majority did not speak any Occitan. This is somewhat surprising given that only 10% had ever lived outside Occitanie. While the respondents themselves claimed that they could speak and understand Occitan, a precondition for their inclusion in the survey group, the majority claimed to be more competent French speakers (Euromosaic 1996).

A vast majority of respondents to the Breton survey claimed that they could speak and understand Breton, but had poor reading and writing skills in the language. This lack of literacy in Breton suggests that outside the immediate community and the family, there is little support for the language. While 74% of respondents claimed that both of their parents spoke Breton in the family home, an intergenerational shift away from Breton in the domestic sphere was evident when the respondents were asked about the use of Breton with their own families. The survey reports that 70% of current households used only French with their own children, 16% use a mix of Breton and French, and only 14% claimed to use only Breton. On the basis of this evidence, the study concludes that somewhere between 1950 and 1970, Breton speakers stopped using this language with their children (Euromosaic 1996).

The Occitan figures demonstrate a similar lack of literacy amongst Occitan speakers, with only an extremely limited number of respondents demonstrating a high degree of competence in all areas of language use. By contrast to the situation in Brittany, a vast majority of respondents in the Occitan survey claim they had been raised in families where French was the household's sole language. While Occitan was spoken from time to time with the respondent's grandparents, the participants indicate that in general, their domestic use of the language is extremely limited. When asked about the use of Occitan with their own families, only 2% of respondents claimed to speak the language with their children, while 13% spoke both French and Occitan. The above evidence indicates an extremely weak rate of intergenerational language reproduction. Although Breton's rate of transmission in the domestic situation is small, Occitan's domestic situation stands in marked contrast, and seems to be largely 'excluded from family life' (Euromosaic 1996).

In both cases the above evidence suggests that even within the family there has been a recognition that assimilation of the dominant linguistic competence has become a necessity, simply because in the formal linguistic markets this competence has secured a 'profit of distinction' that the local language cannot match (Bourdieu 1991, 56). At the same time, the rapid decline in Breton and Occitan's household use indicates that the family's role as an 'agent of language reproduction' is severely diminished (Euromosaic 1996). In the current context, both Breton and Occitan are used as household languages amongst only a small minority of generally rural families and are rarely spoken amongst young people under 25. This evidence would also seem to throw into question then, the classification of Breton or Occitan as maternal languages for at present this appellation would only be applicable in the literal sense to a tiny minority of cases (Euromosaic 1996).

Education

The introduction of the Loi Deixonne in France 1951 permitted regional languages to be officially incorporated into the French public education curriculum for the first time. To this day, however, the presence of local languages in the education system has been 'minimal' (Euromosaic 1996). To begin with, the provisions of the Loi Deixonne were extremely limited, allowing for instruction in only four regional languages, Basque, Breton, Catalan and Occitan and then only when a demand for this type of teaching was expressed by both pupils and teachers (Ager 1999, 31). The difficulty of administering this type of education was further compounded by the fact that initially the state did not provide teaching materials and pupils' achievements in this area of study were not included in their final assessment. By 1970 the law came to be applied in a more substantial way however, and achievements in these courses were included in the students' final assessment for the Baccalauréat (the final schooling certificate) (Ager 1999, 31). In the current context the law now provides for instruction in a number of other regional languages, for example Corsican, Alsacien, and Picard and allows for trainee teachers to graduate with a CAPES (Certificate d'Aptitude au Professorat de L'Enseignement Secondaire) in these languages. While these expanded possibilities allowing more scope for regional language education are undoubtedly a positive development, they do not do not diminish the fact that the emphasis placed upon these languages in the public school curriculum remains, at best, marginal. This idea will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs which will discuss the minimal presence of Breton and Occitan within the French education system.

The fact that Breton is currently accorded little formal status within the educational system means that the school plays only a marginal role in the production or reproduction of the Breton language. Only 6% of Euromosaic's respondents claimed that they had learnt Breton through formal education; 42% having acquired competency in Breton through their community, and 23% through contact with friends (Euromosaic 1996). Official statistics for the region show that roughly 8,000 primary school children receive at least one class per week in Breton, a figure which includes the classes conducted by private Breton teaching institutions known as Diwan Schools. At the college level, 2,800 students receive at least one hour's instruction in Breton per week, and on average, 1,200 pupils will take a course in Breton for their Baccalauréat. Considered as a proportion of the total student population, these figures indicate that a mere 2% of pupils receive some education in Breton throughout the whole of their schooling. At the same time, the areas where instruction in Breton is most readily available appears to be 'geographically peripheral' to those areas where Breton exists as a communal language. While communal use of Breton language is strongest in rural areas, the creation of Breton language schools has largely taken place in urban areas where there appears to have been something of a revival in interest in Breton language education (Euromosaic 1996). Given that professionally qualified teachers only began to graduate from the university system armed with their CAPES (teaching certificate) in Breton in 1992, the near future should see an increase in the number of graduates qualified to teach in Breton (Euromosaic 1996). While this should, in turn, expand opportunities for students wanting to learn Breton, we cannot always assume that these teachers will be employed in their local region. The highly centralised national education administration generally decides upon teaching appointments in France, which ultimately means that teachers can be dispatched to points across the whole of the country (Gilchrist 1999).

Where the state appears to some extent to have abandoned Breton to an inevitable decline by ignoring the role of education as a means by which to revitalise language use, private organisations have weighed into the battle, making a valiant effort to halt further reduction in the linguistic capital of the Breton language. The Diwan movement has played a vital role in demonstrating that the possibility for education in Breton can exist and, given recent growth in the movement, even has the potential to increase. Beginning as a campaign for the creation of Breton speaking play-groups and pre-schools in the 1970s, the Diwan movement established its own colleges in later years, and now has plans to create its own Breton language university (Gilchrist 1999). According to the statistics that appear on the Internet site for the Institute supérieur des langues de la République Française (an organisation funded in part by the French Education ministry), as of September 2000 the Diwan organisation was responsible for the operation of 30 primary schools, 4 colleges and 1 Lycée, and the education of roughly 2,400 students. Implicit in the Diwan Charter (Diwan n.d.) is the idea that the movement should look to develop Breton culture and foster a greater awareness of Breton language in conjunction with, and alongside all the other cultures of the region (Diwan Charter). Hence, the movement recognises the rights of immigrant groups to manifest their own cultural specificity alongside the other cultures of France which, in the words of the Diwan Charter, 'contribute towards the enrichment of our heritage'[9] (Diwan Charter).

Despite the fact that private organisations have been working to promote Occitan's importance as a language of education for over 150 years, this language's current position in the French education system, like Breton, remains marginal. The work of the Félibrige organisation has played an important role in this context however. Félibrige began life as a literary association in 1854 founded by seven poets working in Occitan, but soon became concerned with promoting Occitan throughout the community. By raising awareness of the Occitan language's profile through theatre productions, literature and song, the movement later became involved in promoting Occitan education from kindergarten to university level (Bigonnet-Chanvert 2000).

Fréderic Mistral was involved with Félibrige at its inception, and was without doubt the organisation's highest profile member. In a cruel irony however, at the time Mistral was awarded international acclaim as winner of the 1904 Nobel Prize for his work in Occitan, teachers forbade school children in the Occitan region from speaking the local language on state school grounds. Against this backdrop of rigorously enforced linguistic centralisation, emblematic of the universalising ideals of the Third Republic, Mistral's writings demonstrate an acute sensitivity to the value of all languages and a deep sense of commitment towards revitalising Occitan culture and language. If Félibrige lacked a maxim at this time, it can surely be found in Mistral's 1877 reflections upon the importance of language:

> a language, in a word, is a window on to everyday life, a manifestation of human thought, a sacred instrument of civilisations and a spoken testament of societies both past and present[10] (cited in Bigonnet-Chanvert 2000).

In recent times Félibrige has seen its role broaden somewhat and today defines itself as 'the defender of everything that is particular to the Langue d'Oc region … '[11] in cases when '… the natural heritage of the South of France has been abusively threatened'. [12] (Bigonnet-Chanver 2000). The organisation has over a dozen cultural institutions in operation across Provence.

Like the Diwan movement in Brittany, a movement to revitalise Occitan language, through the creation of private language schools, has gradually increased in strength in the last two decades. The first Calandreta, or Occitan language school, was established in Pau a little over 20 years ago. Recent statistics demonstrate that the movement now boasts 36 primary schools, one college, and an annual enrolment figure of 1,800 students (Institut Supérieur des langues de la République Française 2000).

By posing a challenge to France's republican education model which works hard to emphasise the universal over the particular, the independent language school movement seeks to demonstrate the positive value of cultural and linguistic diversity for the individual. And although in a weak position relative to the public education system's dominance, the Diwan and Calandreta schools' endurance demonstrates that the ongoing demand for indigenous language education is powerful enough to generate a self-sustaining infrastructure in an environment which is often marred by state hostility.

At present, these schools generally face considerable financial difficulties in the areas of investment and running costs, which often combine to make the schools day-to-day situation somewhat precarious. There is also a wider perception at the state level that there is a regional militancy bound up with the whole enterprise, which undoubtedly stems from the fact that parents and teachers are actively involved in many facets of school life.[13] While this type of negative stereotyping explains, to some extent, state unwillingness to underwrite these types of educational programs, it also overlooks the fact that given tight financial constraints, the Diwan and Calandreta schools tend to depend upon a certain level of community support for their very survival.

The contentious nature of the independent regional language schools was most recently highlighted in October 2001, when the Conseil D'Etat ruled against a plan outlined by the socialist government's Minister for Education, Jack Lang, to convert their private denominational status and more fully integrate them into the state education system (see also Jeanjean, this volume). Lang's personal support for bilingual education in France, built around the promotion of regional languages which he claims are 'a treasure to be preserved and developed'[14] (*Ouest-France*, 27 April 2001) was received with enthusiasm by regional language activists as 'the beginning of an historic reparation'[15] (Le-Drian 2001).

However, in line with a request from a number of formal associations, ranging from teaching unions to parents' federations, all with a strong interest in seeing the educational system retain its firmly republican bias, the Conseil D'Etat ordered a suspension of the agreement pending a process of further consideration. Regional activists were stunned by the decision, and vowed that the impetus generated by Lang's support for wider recognition of regional language education would not be lost. In a significant counter-move, a majority vote in the National Assembly, within a fortnight of the Conseil D'Etat ruling, saw a finance law passed which would provide funding for the full integration of the schools into the public education system in time for the beginning of the 2002 scholastic year. On 27 December 2001, however, the Conseil Constitutionnel found that nine articles of this new law contravened the French constitution, a move which once again, to the increasing despair of regional activists, makes the prospect of fully state-integrated regional language schools appear unlikely in the short term.

Despite these recent setbacks, we should not ignore the fact that the Diwan and Calandreta movements have created agents of language reproduction that function independently of the state, thus offering an alternative to the state-dominated system that reinforces French linguistic market monopolisation. Certainly these movements remain relatively small in size, and it will be some time before they are able to make a significant statistical impact upon the number of students educated in the public education system. The fact remains that in many areas of Brittany and Occitanie, students simply do not have the opportunity to study their local language, due to an insufficient number of teachers and teaching resources (Euromosaic 1996). However, while the Diwan and Calandreta movements' achievements may be limited insofar as student numbers are concerned, the symbolic value of these movements should not be overlooked. As Bernard Menciassi of the European Bureau of Lesser Used Languages points out when he discusses the Breton example, Diwan is an organisation that is 'getting more and more efficient and compelling the French government to create some bilingualism in education' (cited in Gilchrist 1999).

That these languages have a place in the public education system at all is significant, for their presence challenges the universalising traditions of French Republicanism, and the dominant historical perception that recognition of regional cultural specificity will ultimately lead to the much feared 'Balkanisation' of the French nation (Rouart 1999).

The media

Neither Occitan nor Breton has a strong presence in the electronic or print media, despite evidence that there is quite a significant demand for such content — at least where radio and television broadcasting are concerned. As a general rule, state-owned electronic media outlets are generally reluctant to give much of their broadcasting time to cater to regional language speakers' interests. While regional languages command some level of recognition on state-owned radio channels, the presence of these languages on television is almost negligible. Alec Hargreaves argues that this situation should be seen as something of a hangover from the past, which saw full state control of television broadcasting in France only relinquished in the mid 1980s (Hargreaves 1997, 84). He explains that, until then, television output was 'controlled by public agencies deeply imbued by ideals of French Republicanism, which were fundamentally hostile to the formal recognition of minority … groups' (Hargreaves 1997, 84). Even though state control has loosened in the intervening years, this does not necessarily mean that minority groups have come to see their particular position represented on the small screen. Given that all television stations, both government and private, are currently dependent to some extent upon advertising revenue for their survival, broadcasters have tended to veer away from addressing specific regional or minority group audiences, simply because there is little commercial incentive driving this type of programming (Hargreaves 1997, 88). Privately-owned regional or local radio stations which aim to broadcast a significant amount of their content in Breton or Occitan, have made an important contribution by challenging French language monopolisation of the electronic media, however their efforts are often hampered by a lack of financial resources and limited broadcasting range. The presence of regional languages in the print media is also minimal, but at the same time it should be recognised that demand for such material is limited, given that levels of literacy in Breton and Occitan are generally low, even amongst those who claim to have good oral and aural skills in these languages (Euromosaic 1996).

Broadcasting in Breton is a new and fairly limited phenomenon which helps to explain why French, at the moment is by far the dominant language of the electronic media in Brittany (Euromosaic 1996). The state-owned television station France 3, the only station to maintain a regional focus in France, runs daily broadcasts in Breton, however statistics for 1999 show that these generally amount in total to only about 45 minutes per week (Gilchrist). The status of radio broadcasts in Breton is a little more positive, with both local-owned and state-owned regional stations programming between 2 and 14 hours of Breton language content per week. Local association stations are also very active in this area, with stations such as Radio Kriez Breizh broadcasting up to 20 hours a week in Breton, and Radio Bro Gwened about 17 hours per week (Euromosaic 1996). While the Euromosaic survey found fairly low audience ratings for these broadcasts, it speculates that this does not necessarily mean a preference for French radio, but merely reflects the fact that many areas lie outside the broadcasting range of the local stations. The study therefore concludes that if a full broadcasting service in Breton were to be made available, it would potentially generate quite a significant audience (Euromosaic 1996). The 1998 dispute over the right to have World Cup soccer television broadcasts transmitted in Breton, a dispute which after much 'wrangling' ultimately produced a positive outcome for Breton speakers (Gilchrist 1999), would seem to indicate that given the right climate, vocal demands for Breton language content in the media can indeed produce results. This would seem to auger well for a newly-formed consortium of Breton businessmen who have established a private television channel which will broadcast two hours of Breton language content daily (Euromosaic 1996).

A relatively small demand for printed material in Breton is probably explained by the fact that the Euromosaic survey consistently found low levels of literacy amongst groups that claimed they could speak and understand Breton. While there are some periodicals available, they appear to have a very limited readership of between 1,000 and 3,000 people (Euromosaic 1996).

Occitan appears to occupy an even more marginalised media position than Breton. Again, France 3 is the only television station to air programs in Occitan, but here too these transmissions are limited and amount to little more than a couple of hours a week (Euromosaic 1996). No state-owned radio station broadcasts in Occitan, and the private stations that do have only a very limited broadcast range. Radio Pais, which produces the majority of its output in Occitan, broadcasts out of Pau, and has a range that covers the whole of Gascony but not beyond (Euromosaic 1996). Another station based in Toulouse, Radio Occitania which relies heavily on voluntary contributions to keep the station on the air, produces 60 to 70 per cent of its content in Occitan, but states that it is also open to the 'other linguistic communities of Toulouse' (Radio Occitania n.d.). Metropolitan newspapers, such as *La Marseillaise* or *La République des Pyrénées*, generally print a single page or at the very least, single articles in Occitan on a weekly basis (Euromosaic 1996). The majority of Occitan printed material, which is limited to some 20 or so publications, is produced by various cultural and literary organisations, and to a lesser extent, by militant political organisations (Euromosaic 1996).

Reflections

In order to redress the imbalance affecting Breton or Occitan language media content, a certain level of demand for such content must be created, restimulated, or where it exists already, powerfully articulated. However, it is evident that only when other agents of language production, such as the school and the family, are able to reignite interest in regional languages and encourage a greater day-to-day use of these languages that French language dominance of the media will in any way be questioned. By the very fact that it has been able to influence the shape of the formal linguistic market through its past control of institutional agents of language reproduction, such as education and sections of the media, the state has played a substantial role in deflating the linguistic capital of all the competitor languages in France.

In addition, as the linguistic capital of regional languages has decreased, they have historically become stigmatised as lesser languages, marking their speakers as those lacking in sophistication. This fact in turn has meant a marked reluctance even at the household level to use these languages, as the results of the above-cited study indicate. This 'bottom-up' convergence towards the dominant linguistic code at the domestic level is convincingly explained by Bourdieu (1991), who illustrates the ways in which the individual's fear of prejudice informs his/her language use choices. In the cases where certain languages (in this case regional languages) become laden with a socially negative charge, Bourdieu argues that the individual's desire for social acceptability encourages a type of voluntary/involuntary assimilation of the more broadly socially acceptable competence (Bourdieu 1991, 52). The practical outcome this process engenders is evidenced in the ensuing generations' decreasing use of minoritised languages at the household level.

Against this backdrop, the chances of revitalising regional and minority language use at the grass roots level would seem remote unless a new emphasis upon the importance of linguistic and cultural diversity can reinvest minoritised languages with a linguistic capital equalling that of French. The fact that French, in comparison to Breton or Occitan, has a dominant position as the language of the media and education reinforces its legitimacy as the language of state authority and administration, simply because it has secured a 'profit of distinction' as the most visible, most audible competence. This in turn encourages a convergence towards the dominant code across all spheres of social life, including the familial. The circle has been vicious and self-perpetuating, ultimately dismissive of everything other than the dominant linguistic competence. The fact that the state has played a definitive role in shaping previous education and media formats means that it has been able to maintain a powerful function as a kind of culturally homogenising juggernaut that has legitimised only one variety of French language and culture, and smothered everything that has competed for the same linguistic or cultural space. In more recent times, the advent of the Diwan and Calandreta schools, and the presence of an independent media producing content in local languages, pose a significant challenge to the modern Republic's universalist ideals, that particularly French tradition that has so often been mistrustful of particularist tendencies made manifest in the public realm.

With regard to the status of independent language schools, only time will tell what the next stage in this battle between regional will and republican might will produce, particularly as regional groups have vowed to use the 2002 presidential election campaigns as a forum to encourage further debate on the issue (Guillemois 2001). Such passionate and calculating responses on both sides of this issue are significant however, for they highlight the fact that while private regional language schools may occupy only a small space in the overall scheme of things, they have a symbolic value that far exceeds their diminutive size. These organisations' importance lies in the fact that they successfully demonstrate to the state that, even in a generally hostile environment, demand for regional language education can exist and generate a momentum that is powerful enough to create its own infrastructure, and survive with or without state support.

Member of the Occitan musical group, the Fabulous Troubadours, Claude Sicre, argues that only a decisive move in the direction of 'cultural decentralisation'[16] will succeed in weakening what up until now has been a well defended 'cultural oligarchy'[17] which has established a stranglehold over France's linguistic and cultural markets (Sicre 1999). Sicre's dismissal of the idea that regional or minority languages should be preserved 'like an endangered species'[18] means that he uses terms such as 'reinvention' and 'revitalisation' when he discusses the future situation of France's regional languages. His argument in many ways appears to echo the views of Salikoko Mufwene, chair of the Linguistics Department at the University of Chicago, who claims that 'preserving a language is more like preserving fruits in a jar' (Knight 2000, 17); the implication being that regional or minority languages' future survival depends upon creating an environment in which they can remain fluid and evolve. In Sicre's (1999) opinion, greater cultural decentralisation in France would go a long way towards fostering such an environment by encouraging a greater awareness of cultural plurality and breaking down the hierarchical relationship between centre and periphery that has governed the nation's cultural life up until now.

The Council of Europe's *European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages* would have gone some way towards promoting this type of environment should French ratification have gone ahead in 1999.[19] If we consider that from the very outset the charter's preamble makes it clear that its intention is not to undermine official languages' status, but to protect the minority languages, then we me may be forgiven for asking ourselves why French opposition to it, particularly in Republican quarters, was so intense. Only when we consider the content of the Conseil Constitutionnel's 1999 ruling, which declared the unconstitutionality of the charter, does it become clear that this is an issue that goes far beyond the boundaries of linguistic policy. For this decision was to a large extent based upon the idea that the provisions of the Charter would undermine the unicité or indivisibility of the French people (Conseil Constitutionnel 1999), a fundamental notion framing the way in which citizenship in France is understood. This idea is encapsulated in Article 1 of the *French Constitution* (Art. 2 prior to 1981) which states 'France is a Republic, indivisible, secular, democratic and social. France protects the equality of all citizens before the law regardless of their origins, their race or their religion' [20] (French Republic 1958). Defence of Article 1 has meant that on several other occasions in the last few decades, France has refused to fully ratify international agreements relating to linguistic rights. For example, Article 30 of the *UN Resolution on the Rights of the Child,* which defends the right of children from minority groups to employ their mother tongue, and Article 27 of the *UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,* which also relates to linguistic rights, have been identified as incompatible with the French Constitution, and thus excluded at the time of French ratification. In this context then the French decision not to ratify the Council of Europe Charter seems entirely consistent with state's previous decisions in this regard. To this day, the notion of *unicité* is felt to underpin the French conception of nationhood and explain its coherence, and as a result, any recognition of the rights of specific groups is held by hardline neo-republicans at least,[21] as a first step towards the eventual dismantling of the nation itself. This position was powerfully articulated by the youngest member of the Académie Française, Jean-Marie Rouart, who claimed at the height of the debate on the Charter that greater recognition of regional idioms was 'exorbitant' and would 'begin a process which will sooner or later lead to ... the dismantling of the French identity'. 'France' he wrote 'must not be Balkanised' (Rouat 1999).

Conclusion

The status of the regional and minority languages of France has suffered due to state unwillingness to foster any notion of linguistic diversity. State policy designed to increase the status of French as the nation's official language, has meant that the indigenous languages have to a large extent been squeezed out of the linguistic market, a process that has been ongoing for over two hundred years. The current predicaments of both Breton and

Occitan, two languages which have felt the effects of this process, are dire, as the above case studies indicate. Both languages have seen their speaking populations shrink dramatically in recent years as the school, and the media — agents that play an important role in language reproduction — have instead consistently employed the dominant idiom, relegating local language use to a very peripheral situation. As the most audible, most visible competence, French seems to have secured for itself a profit of distinction which regional languages cannot match, hence, even at the domestic level, there has been a general convergence towards the dominant code. What independent efforts have taken place to halt this process, whether they be independent media outlets or independent educational institutions, are to a great extent hamstrung by a lack of financial resources. Nevertheless, these organisations have an important symbolic presence, for they demonstrate to the state that, while indigenous languages may be under pressure, there is still a certain level of demand for education and media content in these languages that refuses to be completely ignored.

Regional activists do not argue for language preservation. Rather, they look to governments to create the type of environment that will allow for a revitalisation of these languages in order that they remain current. They focus their attention upon the notion of equality between the cultures of France, and challenge Parisian cultural imperialism which has to a large extent viewed regional citizens and regional culture as ‘second class’. Certainly, ratification of the Council of Europe’s Charter for Regional and Minority Languages and recent government moves to integrate independent language schools into the state educational system, would have helped to destabilise this hierarchical conception of French cultural life by at least ensuring that the rights of indigenous language speakers would be protected in various areas of French social and political life. That the current government’s programs in support of regional language promotion continue to be frustrated, ultimately demonstrates that French reservations about greater linguistic diversity and all that this entails, i.e. the recognition of specific groups’ rights, remains an extremely contentious issue in the French Republican context, especially given the increased temperature of neo-republican rhetoric in recent times. While the question of formal protection for France’s indigenous languages may, to the non-French observer, seem a somewhat inconsequential formality, within the context of French political life this issue carries far more weight. In essence, it strikes at the heart of republican ideology which focuses upon the *unicité* of *le peuple français* as the cornerstone of the nation, a concept which underpins and, in a sense, helps to justify the uniquely French Republican conception of nationhood in its entirety.

Notes

1. ‘l’affirmation par la république de son unité linguistique idéologique, s’accordait mal avec un décompte régulier des citoyens non-conformés au modèle’.
2. ‘la diversité s’épanouit partout dans notre pays, on y pratique volontiers les langues régionales sans aucune entrave et, pour unitaire et indivisible que se prétend la République, elle s’accommode fort bien de la différence et de la pluralité’.

3. 'on a des idées plus ou moins imaginatives sur la situation de la langue bretonne dans la pratique' .

4. Brittany functioned relatively independently from France and the other European powers until 1532 when it accepted the Traité d'Union. which incorporated the region into the French State. While the Traité accorded Brittany some degree of autonomy on paper, in practice these clauses were for the most part 'violated' from the very beginning of French administration of the territory (Gaquin 1996, 119). The history of the region has therefore been marked by many acts of resistance to French rule that have often met with brutal suppression by the French authorities. One such uprising, known as the Révolte des Bonnets Rouges, considered one of the most significant popular rebellions in France prior to the 1789 revolution, took place during the rule of Louis XIV. French retaliation to this event was swift and violent, resulting in the execution of thousands of Breton peasants and the destruction of villages, farms and personal property. French heavy handedness however has not been sufficient to douse the fires of Breton regionalist loyalty, or diminish local pride in Brittany's cultural distinctiveness which demonstrates a strongly Celtic influence. Nor has it silenced those political groups who to this day continue to demand an end to Parisian administrative domination which they argue has had a particularly retrogressive effect upon the region in the long-term. Today Brittany has a number of nationalist organisations, such as the Gwen ha Du or the highly militant Breton Revolutionary Army (ARB) that energetically campaign for the right to greater regional autonomy.

5. The process of annexation which saw the different regions of Occitanie become part of the French state, regions such as Guyenne, Gascony, Languedoc, Béarn, Rouergue, Auvergne and Limousin, and Province, took almost six centuries to achieve (Gaquin 1996, 505). Auvergne, the first part of the territory to be taken over by the French, was invaded by the monarchy's forces in 1211. However the complete conquest of Occitanie was not achieved until 1789, a year which saw the Béarn and Avignon relinquish their sovereignty to become part of the new French republic. As a final addition Nice came under French rule late in the nineteenth century, as a result of Italian unification (Gaquin 1996, 508). As in Brittany, the French administration has long been accused of neglecting the Occitan region, which has up until fairly recently, suffered a long process of deindustrialisation forcing the region to become increasingly reliant upon agricultural production as its main source of income (Gaquin 1996, p 515).

6. *'une guerre de race'.*

7. *'la dévastation et la spoliation du Midi par le Nord'.*

8. *'le risque, c'est qu'un jour on enterra le dernier papet qui aura prononcé le dernier mot en occitan'.*

9. 'concourent à enrichir le patrimoine humain

10. 'Une langue, en un mot, est la révélation de la vie de tous les jours, la manifestation de la pensée humaine, l'instrument sacro-saint des civilisations et le testament parlant des sociétés mortes ou vives'

11. 'le défenseur de tout ce qui constitue la spécificité des pays de langue d'oc'

12. 'le patrimoine naturel du Sud de la France lorsque celui-ci était abusivement menacé. '

13. The reasons for mistrust on this front are many and varied. While regional identification and regional activism have, since the time of the 1789 revolution, been viewed as contrary to the Jacobin tradition, the alleged collaboration between Breton activists and German forces during the World War II Nazi occupation of France has, for example, also helped perpetuate the broader notion that a natural sympathy exists between regional activists and those who support the political agenda of the extreme Right.

14. *'un trésor à préserver et à développer'.*

15. *'le début d'une réparation historique'.*

16. *'la décentralisation culturelle'*

17. *'oligarchie culturelle'*

18. *'comme des espaces rares'.*

19. The preamble to the Charter states that the document is based upon the premise that the 'right to use a regional or minority language in private or public life is inalienable.' While the Charter seeks to emphasise the importance of 'interculturalism and multilingualism', it also attempts to sidestep the accusations that it will necessarily undermine the position of national languages. The Charter explicitly states that it is concerned with the predicament of European indigenous languages only and that its provisions do not relate to migrant groups languages. It also makes clear that the 'protection of regional and minority languages should not be to the detriment of the official languages and the need to learn them' (Council of Europe 1992). See also Liddicoat, this volume.

20. *'La France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et social. Elle assure l'égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction d'origine, de race ou de religion.'*

21. The neo-republican banner describes a loose grouping of vocal Republican activists who come from both sides of the political divide, and who count amongst their number political figures such as Charles Pasqua and Philippe de Villiers, founders of *Rassemblement pour la France* on the Right, and Jean-Pierre Chevenement and Georges Sarre who head the *Mouvement des citoyens* on the Left. In addition, the movement features a number of prominent intellectual figures such as Max Gallo, Régis Debray, Blandine Kriegel and Paul Thibault, a collection of activists that some commentators have baptised *Les enragées de la République* (Jallon and Mounier 1999). These most vocal neo-republicans appear to have a common aversion to anything that is felt to threaten French sovereignty or undermine Republican unity. At different times the threat to the Republic has been deemed to stem from such things as EU policy, the rise in racism, the crisis facing French schools, increasing urban violence, or the perception that there is a lack of national cohesion evidenced by the recent explosion in identity politics (Jallon and Mounier 1999, 9). In this vein, regional activism with regard to language policy has been interpreted by the neo-republican movement as an

attack on French identity. For a clear statement of the neo-republican position, see an open letter co-authored by Régis Debray, Max Gallo, Jacques Julliard, Blandine Kriegel, Olivier Mongin, Mona Ozouf, Anicet le Pors and Paul Thibault entitled '*Républicains n'ayons pas peur!*' which appeared in *Le Monde* 4 September 1998.

References

Ager, D 1999, *Identity, insecurity and image: France and language*, Multilingual Matters, Clevedon.

Bigonnet-Chanvert, B 2000, 'Frédéric Mistral a créé le Félibrige pour sauvegarder et promouvoir la langue et la culture des pays de langue d'Oc', <http://www.felibrige.com>.

Bourdieu, P 1991, *Language as symbolic power*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

Conseil Constitutionne 1999, *Decision no 99-4DC du 15 juin 1999: Charte européenne des langues régionales ou minoritaires*, <http://conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/1999/99412/index.htm>.

Council of Europe 1992, *European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages*. <http://conventions.coe,int/treaty/EN.cadreintro.htm>.

Daniel, J 1999, 'Tous les Kosovo du monde', *Nouvel Observateur*, No. 1808, July, (electronic version).

Debray, R et al. 1998, 'Républicains n'ayons pas peur', *Le Monde*, 4 September, 1998.

Devoluy, P 1941, *Mistral et la rédemption d'une langue*, Grasset, Paris.

Diwan, n.d., *La charte de Diwan*, < http://www.chez.com/buan1/buanchadiw.htm>.

Euromosaic 1996, *Euromosaic: The production and reproduction of the minority language groups in the European Union*. <http://www.uoc.es/euromosaic/>.

Extra, G 2000, 'Migration and multilingualism in Europe and Australia', *Dialogue*, Vol. 19, no. 2, pp 55–62.

Gaquin, A (ed.) 1996, *Peuples et langues de France*, University Press of America, Lanham, NY.

Gilchrist, J 1999, 'French druids seek haven in the British inner circle', *Scotsman*, 26 July 1999.

Giordan, H 1991, 'La visibilité de l'Autre', in B Etienne, H Giordan, and R Lafont (eds) *Temps du plurielle, la France dans l'Europe multiculturelle*, Editions de l'aube, Paris.

Guillemois, C 2001, Diwan: 'Le débat est pédagogique', *Ouest-France*, 3 November 2001 <http://www.france-ouest.com/>.

Hargreaves, AG 1997, 'Gatekeepers and gateways: post-colonial minorities and French television', in AG Hargreaves, and M Mckinney, (eds), *Post-colonial cultures in France*, Routledge, London.

Institut Supérieur des Langues de la République Française 2000, *Institut Supérieur des Langues de la République Française* <http://www.aprene.org/islrf.htm>.

Jallon, J and Mounier. P 1999, *Les enragées de la République*, Editions la découverte, Paris.

Knight, J 2000, 'Lost for words', *New Scientist*, 12 August.

French Republic 1958, *La Constitution de la République Française* <http://www.assemblee-nat.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp>.

Lafont, R 1996, 'L'occitanie demain', in A Gaquin (ed.) *Peuples et langues de France*, University Press of America, Lanham, NY.

Laroussi, F and J-B Macellesi 1993, 'The other languages of France: towards a multilingual policy', in C Sanders (ed.) *French today: language in its social context,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

le Coadic, R 1999, 'Les Bretons n'ont pas de leçons à recevoir', *Le Monde des débats*, September 1999.

Le-Drian, J-Y 2001, 'Le ministre mise sure les langues régionales', *Ouest-France*, 26 April 2001 <http://www.france-ouest.com/>.

Le Page, RB and Tabouret-Keller, A 1985, *Acts of identity: Creole-based approaches to language and ethnicity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Monin, J. 1998, 'En Languedoc-Roussillon, de l'occitan 'naturel' à l'occitan 'chimique'' *Le Monde*, 3 July 1998.

Radio Occitania n.d., Radio Occitania <http://www.dobl-oc.com/Engles/Medias/D335RA001_en.htm>.

Rouart, J-M. 1999, 'France: the French language — our lingo, by jingo', *The Economist*, 3 July 1999, <http://www.economist.com/>.

Sicre, C 1999, 'La pluralité pour renforcer la nation', *Libération* 13 July 1999 <http://www.liberation.com/>.

Jack Lang and minority languages: a radical change in French linguistic policies or more of the same?

Henri Jeanjean

University of Wollongong

Introduction

'One step forward, fifteen years backwards'. This is how the daily *Libération* (Davidenkoff 2001) greeted the Conseil d'Etat's decision, on 30 October 2001, to refuse the integration of the Breton Diwan schools into the national education system. The Council of State — the highest court dealing with administrative matters — thus negated the agreement signed on 28 March between Jack Lang, French Education Minister, and the Diwan organisation. As the Diwan schools use the immersion method, where Breton is not only taught but is also used as the language for teaching, this agreement appeared to be the long overdue gesture indicating that minority languages could at last be recognised in France. It seemed to reverse the long-standing French language policy which, drawn up as early as the 16th century and sustained by every single following government, had aimed at the eradication of regional languages and cultures.

Language policy

There has always been a very strong political temptation in France to impose a single language, which would help to standardise the cultural values of all the populations to be controlled (Jeanjean 1998).

The first text to translate this concept into legislation, the Edict of Villers-Cotterêts, dates back to 1539. The aim was not to force French on the local population with the intention of educating them, as there was no state education provision at this time,[1] but to unify the local elites, who, cut off from their roots in the culture and society around them, would identify with the French state and serve it with greater loyalty. Language therefore became, *de facto*, an instrument of social discrimination: social superiority and linguistic superiority were merged as symbols of power and allegiance to the centre. The French Revolution maintained this policy once the centralist Montagnards were victorious over the federalist Girondins. The revolutionary leaders argued that French was the only language capable of disseminating revolutionary ideas, and that all 'foreign' languages were inevitably the carriers of reactionary and counter-revolutionary ideologies. The decree of the 8 of Pluviôse Year II banned the use of any language other than French in all dealings, including private business.

In a centralised system of government and administration, the lower classes, not speaking standard French, were excluded from the centralised democratic process. The assertion of their linguistic superiority helped the bourgeoisie to maintain their political ascendancy.

As recently as 1992, an amendment to the second article of the Constitution adding the statement, 'French is the language of the Republic', was supported by all the major political parties. During the parliamentary debates on the proposal, some members of the French Parliament tried to insert the phrase 'with all due respect to France's regional languages and cultures'. The Garde des Sceaux[2] formally opposed the motion. This refusal to compromise, which was encouraged by the government, strengthened the discriminatory effect of the law against minority languages, and whereas they had previously been tolerated, they now became officially illegal (*La Setmana*, No. 47, 11 April 1996). Article 2 has since been used as a justification by the Conseil Constitutionnel to reject a certain number of proposals in favour of minority languages deemed to be unconstitutional. In particular, on 17 June 1999, it concluded that ratifying the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, signed in Strasbourg on 5 November 1992, would be unconstitutional in France (Conseil Constitutionel 1999). When the UN 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child came to the French Parliament for ratification, a similar argument was used against it. In particular, Article 30 was targeted. This article stated that:

> In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practise his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language.

Two types of objections were raised. The more specious objection argued that, as there are no minorities in France, there is no need to ratify that part of the Convention. The other, which was more serious, objected that officially treating any group differently from other groups was unconstitutional, as the first article of the French Constitution states that: 'France is an indivisible, secular, democratic, and social Republic. It ensures the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction as to origin, race, or religion'.

Education policy

Between 1790 and 1794, a number of reports on education were tabled in the various assemblies[3]. The reports served as the basis to the Jules Ferry's 1881 and 1882 laws making primary school education compulsory in France. Placing himself under the ideological patronage of Condorcet (Barral 1985, p 92), Ferry thought that national education should not confine itself to the broadening of the mind, but should rebuild the national soul (Barral 1985, p 101). Compulsory schooling became the instrument for forcing French onto communities that the government was not certain it could rely upon. At the time, after the loss of Alsace-Lorraine following the 1870 French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war, French nationalism was in the process of being redefined.

The books published by the education ministry to explain and detail the 1985 reforms of the education system, carry the very same values. For example, the program and instructions regarding primary school (Ministère de l'Education Nationale 1985) is peppered with

84

statements such as: 'life at school cultivates the love of France' (p. 17), 'the French language is the first instrument of freedom' (p. 21), 'history and geography are a part of the emergence of a national conscience' (pp. 57–58), or 'civic education develops love for the Republic' (p. 67).

Defending the Occitan language

Militants from the non-French speaking regions of France have continuously fought against this cultural interior colonialism and the destruction of their languages.[4] They have been demanding a statute for regional languages which would allow them to flourish by being taught in primary schools and being used in the media, and the official recognition of bilingualism.

The first struggles

In the 19th century, Frédéric Mistral, the winner of the 1904 Nobel Prize for Literature, set up the Felibrige, a structure for the defense of Occitan. He was the first to perceive the relationship between school and acculturation. In *Mémoires et récits*, he explained he created this movement 'to provoke the resurrection of the region natural and historical language against which all the schools are waging a war to the death' (Mistral 1906, p 132). Unfortunately, members of the Felibrige, including Mistral himself, locked themselves in a purely linguistic resistance based on a glorified view of living in the past, removed from contemporary socio-economic realities.

In post-war France, as Indochina, Algeria, Madagascar, and other colonies rebelled against their French colonial masters, a few books were published that explored the nature of colonisation. Octave Mannoni's *Psychologie de la colonisation* (first published in 1950), Frantz Fanon's *Peau noire masques blancs* (1952), Aimé Césaire's *Discours sur le colonialisme* (1955), and Albert Memmi's *Portrait du colonisé* (first published in 1957), spearheaded the intellectual soul-searching which led to a new nationalist push, not only in the colonies themselves, but also in some regions of France. In the 1950s, influenced by this literature of decolonisation, and more radical because of it, Occitan militants, and their counterparts in other regions, started reappraising their own historical, social, and economic situation. The events of May 1968 brought in new members and gave new impetus to these militant groups.

Pressures from political and cultural organisations helped slowly chip the monolithic centralist education system, both from within and from outside its organisation, but any advance was systematically opposed or undermined by those who opposed any change in that language policy.

Changes to the system

In 1951, for the first time, the *loi Deixonne* (*Loi* 51-46 of 11 January 1951) allowed the optional teaching of one hour of the 'local languages and dialects in primary and high schools' within the framework of what were called 'organized activities'. These activities, however, were abolished in subsequent educational reforms, rendering the law useless or inoperative (Jeanjean 1992, p 31-32). In 1976, the provisions of the *loi Deixonne* was revisited by the *loi Haby* (*Loi* 75-620 of 11 July 1975), which did not change its structure and only extended its possibilities by including local languages and dialects as an optional subject in the Baccalauréat. Regional languages were still not given a proper place in the education system, and the teacher training, which had been repeatedly requested, was not provided. Memoranda from education ministers from both sides of the political spectrum followed: notably, Alain Savary in 1982 and 1983, and François Bayrou in 1995.

During this period, dozens of proposals for new laws were prepared by members of parliament, but none ever came up for debate. Promising a law placated the electorate who, by and large, was favourable to measures ensuring the survival of their language and culture, while not putting this proposal up for debate avoided antagonising the Jacobin forces from both the Right and the Left. In particular, most teacher unions were strongly opposed to any change in the curriculum which would undermine the monopoly of French in the system. The argument, as clearly put forward by Mr. Vialle, a member of the National Executive of the powerful SNI (primary school teachers union), was that 'the exploited are the same in the North as in the South. It's impossible to call in question the national unity forged throughout the centuries.' (*Ecole Libératrice*,23 Avril, 1976).

The vast majority of teachers viewed their mission as educators in the spirit of the French Revolution, that is, within the framework of the nation-state, its centralism, both political and linguistic. Therefore, trade unions and administrators combined at the local, regional or national levels to swat any attempt at promoting and/or improving the teaching of regional languages in schools.

Within the militant movements two analyses emerged: for some it was impossible to conceive a reconquest of their language within the framework of the state education system, whilst for others, to envisage anything outside the state system was ideologically unthinkable, and the militants' efforts must be first channelled towards improving the structures, and changing the philosophy of the national education organisation.

Outside pressures forced the various governments to take into account the regionalists' aspirations and to:

1. define programs of action designed to ensure that the public service would better take into account regional cultures and languages, and put in place mechanisms for their teaching in nursery, primary, and secondary schools (Savary 1982);
2. decide on the objectives and the methodology of such teaching (Savary 1983).

Working for changes from within

These reforms, however modest, gave heart to those who believed that changes could and should happen within the public sector. The Occitans organised themselves within centres for the teaching of Occitan (Centres Régionaux pour l'Enseignement de l'Occitan — CREO), which organised grant applications for the production of teaching materials, for the creation of new teaching positions, or for professional development. They also discussed how to deal with the education unions and the parents' associations which were opposed to their projects.

The 1982 decentralisation laws had also transferred some of the cultural and education responsibilities from the state to the regions and the departments. In the Languedoc-Roussillon Region, a cell was established to set up a linguistic and cultural policy for the region. Several investigations and surveys have shown the importance of Occitan in the region (Hammel 1996; Hammel and Gardy 1994). These found that between 60% and 70% of parents would like their children to have contact with Occitan. This result is in conformity with surveys done in other regions of France. In 1989, the first bilingual Occitan-French nursery school was established in Albi, followed by one in Saint-Affrique (*La Dépêche* 8 June 1989). The 1982 Savary Memorandum made possible the establishment of bilingual education as it stated that: 'some teaching may be done in the regional language as an experiment…' (Savary 1982).

Some opponents to the introduction of regional languages in schools argued that teaching regional languages was a useless exercise as these languages were an obsolete remnant of the past. It was therefore argued that if any language was to be taught at an early age, for reasons of modernity and efficiency, only English should be considered. However, as they are still naturally present in most regions, regional languages are seen as the best chance for many children to develop early bilingualism and acquire the advantages of multilingualism which come with this (cf. Petit 1985).

On 4 July 1994, a national convention was signed by the then Minister of Education with the Midi-Pyrenees Region. Two years later this convention was activated, and a regional taskforce for the Occitan culture and language was put in place, as well as a language committee whose role was to supervise the various projects that this convention would generate (*La Setmana,* N°48 18 April 1996). Other structures were to be put in place in Occitanie, as well as in other regions, but their efficiency, their potential, was, again, often curtailed by the resistance found in the administration and in the national education system. The responses of teachers unions, the educational hierarchy, and parent organisations, however, make any real change difficult, because such projects were viewed as departures from the centralist perspective of the French Republic. Teachers, from the very beginning of the state system in the 1880's, have defended the values of the centralist, Jacobin nation-state and had the support of the major associations of parents in state schools, who were controlled by then very centralist political parties (the communist party and socialists).

Working from the outside

Aware of the staunch opposition to regional languages in the public system, some militants decided to create their own bilingual schools, using immersion methods by which the regional language was not only a subject to be studied, but also the language used for teaching. In 1969, the first Ikastola was started by the Basques. Now around 2000 students are being taught in the various primary and secondary schools. The same progression can be seen in the Diwan schools in Brittany, the Calendretas in Occitanie or the Catalan Bressolas. These schools were established on the same basis as the state schools: a free and secular education. The emphasis on bilingualism and modern pedagogical methods, using the latest findings in child and educational psychology, made these schools attractive to a wider range of parents than the initial regionalist militants. These bilingual schools all joined forces to establish the Institut Supérieur des Langues de la République Française in order to provide a common program of teacher training for staff employed in such minority language schools in all the regions of France (*La Setmana*, N° 153, 7 May 1998).

Because traditional policies had always been aimed at the systematic destruction of minority languages in France, and because civil servants in the education system and trade unions were strongly opposed to any change in such policies, the various governments had difficulties in dealing with the pressures exerted by minorities. The archives in the federation of the Calendretas point out some of the difficulties that this organisation had when dealing with the different ministers of education.

When Mitterrand was elected in 1981, the founders of the first Calendretas were certain that those schools which had been set up on the republican principles of state education — free and secular — would be rapidly integrated into the state education system. In 1983 Alain Savary proposed a choice to the Ikastolas, Diwan, Calendretas and Bressolas:

1. adopt the status of private schools within the parameters of the 1959 *loi Debré* within which the state would take over full responsibility for teachers;
2. sign a convention which is in keeping with the process of integrating the schools into the state system, but only pays for half the teachers' salaries (Savary 1983).

All opted for the second option despite the fact that this decision was financially less attractive. The militants involved in these schools believed in the state school system and its values of free secular education, and wanted their schools integrated into this system. The status of private school invoked a different set of associations as private schools in France were strongly associated with religious organisations, and such an association was contrary to the objectives of the militants promoting regional language schools. In this case, funding was sacrificed for other political objectives.

The application of that convention was continually delayed by the administration. Finally, in December 1985, because elections were due a few months later, the teachers already employed in the bilingual schools were integrated in the state schooling system. The Conseil Constitutionnel, however, quashed this decision on constitutional grounds. Confronted with numerous demonstrations one month before the 1986 parliamentary elections, the ministry sent out a fax offering schools integration through the framework of the experimental schools' scheme. After the elections, however, the new Education Minister, René Monory, refused to pursue this policy and offered the status of private schools to the minority languages schools. Financial problems compelled the Diwan schools to accept, but the others refused.

The 1988 elections saw the return of a socialist government, but the new minister of education, Lionel Jospin, did not feel bound by the decisions of previous socialist ministers. His aim was to find a solution for the teachers, but not for the schools themselves: he was prepared to have the teachers who were already employed integrated in the national education system but he was not prepared to integrate the schools themselves and what they represented into the state education system. A new convention was signed in 1990, but most of the elements it contained were never acted upon. Jack Lang, in his first stint as Education Minister, signed a new convention, one month before the 1993 legislative elections. This convention envisaged the integration of the minority schools into the public system. After the elections, the new minister, François Bayrou, although sympathetic towards minority languages, only agreed to negotiate within the framework of the 1959 *loi Debré* on private schools. In 1994 an agreement was signed recognising, in particular, the specificity of the teaching by immersion, and integrating the teachers, but once more the administration was reluctant and put hurdles at every step. Immersion schools often had to rely on subsidies from various local government levels in order to survive.

Following another change of government, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, showing an awareness of the Occitan culture, asked for even more reports. The 1998 Poignant Report (Poignant 1998), urged the Prime Minister 'to step out of the hypocrisy' (p. 11). The report further pointed out that during the previous school year (1996-1997) 330 000 students had enrolled in some regional languages courses, more than 5000 of those in associative schools[5] using immersion methods, and that the demand could not be satisfied because of a lack of funded positions, and a lack of space (p. 16-17). The report made several suggestions based on ten basic principles. In spite of this, the Education Minister, Claude Allègre, refused to open new negotiations, or even act up on already signed agreements. By the time he was sacked, Claude Allègre had left the situation of some schools and some teachers very desperate.

Jack Lang's second ministry

On 27 March 2000, Jack Lang was again appointed Minister for Education 'to give back impetus and confidence to national education',[6] and some measure of cautious hope was restored for representatives of minority languages, as the doors of the ministry were once more opened to them.

Primary education

In a press conference on 20 June 2000, Lang explained his vision for primary school education. In particular, within five years, every child would learn two other languages, one in high school and one started in primary school. As early as their first year in high school, students must be capable of being taught at least one subject in a language other than French. Migrant and regional languages were particularly identified as being undervalued and in need of special consideration. Along with the traditional introductory and the bilingual courses already in place in the state education system, Lang was also considering the immersion method favoured by the minority language schools.

During another press conference, held on 4 September 2000, to mark the beginning of the school year,[7] Jack Lang confirmed his earlier statements, specifying that the state education system had opened more than 100 new bilingual classes in regional languages for that year. He also flagged the signing of a convention between the state and the Alsace Region, and the *départements* constituting that region.

The convention with Alsace

This convention was signed on 18 October 2000. In his speech marking that event, Jack Lang confirmed the timetable for the teaching of languages in French primary schools, which would see, by 2005, every school child learn one language from kindergarten onwards, and start another one in their first year of high school.[8] He also gave undertakings regarding the setting up of adequate linguistic training facilities for primary school teachers, either through exchanges with Germany, or through courses in the Instituts Universitaires de Formation des Maîtres (IUFM).

The year 2001, designated as the Year of Languages in Europe, gave ample opportunities to Jack Lang to reaffirm his beliefs in establishing France as a multilingual society, a necessity to deal with the multilingual and multicultural European reality. A one-day seminar was organised for decision makers, at all the different levels of the state education system. They were the key personnel who would have to implement the minister's plan for languages. One of the main criticisms made by the proponents of minority languages was the fact that there was no coordination between the vertical and horizontal levels of administration, each civil servant acting with scant regard to the government or the parliament's decisions. Therefore this first attempt at coordination seemed welcome: the appointment of a new Director of Schools Education, Jean-Paul de Gaudemar, who had shown genuine interest for regional languages in his previous postings in Alsace and Occitanie, seemed to guarantee this.

In a major speech on 25 April 2001, Jack Lang reaffirmed his commitment to regional languages. Endorsing the Poignant Report, he set out to give some details on his policies and their implementation. Some of the key points included:

- promoting continuity of education between primary schools and high schools, including opening new high schools, where and when necessary, to ensure this continuity;
- providing details of teacher professional development innovations;
- introducing a specific examination for recruiting teachers capable of teaching regional languages and teaching in those languages;
- creating a regional languages academic council by the government with a membership drawn from representatives of the administration, the schools and the associative organisations;
- developing a closer partnership between the state and local authorities.

In this speech, Lang alluded to negotiations taking place with *Diwan*, the Breton immersion schools. These led to the signing of an agreement towards their integration into the public education system on 28 May 2001.

This convention[9] firstly defined the teaching of a regional language using the immersion method, accepting that all activities in the school, even outside the classroom, are conducted in the regional language, with a gradual introduction of French in the classroom. It acknowledged that such a program must lead to the students being as competent in the target language as in French and as competent in French as those attending a monolingual French school. Between 1994 and 2000, school inspections and various tests had verified that the level of competency in French achieved in immersion schools was at least equal to the level achieved in monolingual French schools. In particular, this had been closely monitored at the entrance to high school and in the *Brevet* results.[10] Therefore, it was agreed that the pedagogical methods would be maintained, including the time allocation for various activities. The document included in an annex the draft of a departmental order recognising the pedagogical aims of such schools, and setting up immersion teaching in regional languages within 'regional languages' primary and secondary schools, or bilingual teaching in 'regional languages sections' of state schools.

Jack Lang did seem to make some real progress in an area that had proved so difficult beforehand, but his reforms were proposed at a time when politicians were already deeply divided on proposed changes in Corsica.

The Corsican dimension

The Corsican nationalist movement, ever since Paoli in the 18th century, has always been active, and armed struggle for independence has been a regular feature.

On 20 July 2000, all the elected members of the Corsican Assembly agreed to accept a text presented by the Prime Minister, putting in place the 'Matignon Process'. This document asserted that the Corsican Assembly would see an extension of its powers and that Corsican would be taught in all schools. The agreement bitterly divided both the government and the opposition. In particular, Chevènement, the Minister of the Interior, resigned rather than having to present this agreement to the parliament.

The Matignon Process was seen by other regionalist movements as a precedent which should flow on to other regions. Leaders of the Basque and Breton movements were quick to point out that their peaceful requests did not meet the same positive responses from the government and therefore they were pondering whether or not violence was the only argument the government listened to (Forcari 2000; Dufresne 2000). In the summer of 2000, the question of whether or not violence was necessary to ensure any progress was raised and debated in every general meeting of regionalist movements I attended. It was, mostly, very rapidly brushed aside, but the mere fact it had been put on the agenda — for the first time since the 1960s — was, in itself, a good indication of the frustration of the members of generally very peaceful cultural organisations.

Opposition from organisations in the education system

On 3 October 2001, the five organisations[11] composing the Comité National d'Action Laïque (CNAL), the national action committee for public education, decided to appeal to the Conseil d'Etat, asking for an injunction against the implementation of the integration of the Diwan schools into the state system. It argued that immersion in Breton 'is contrary to Article 2 of the French Constitution stating that French is the language of the Republic' (AFP 2001a), and contrary to Article 1 of the *loi Toubon* (Law No. 94-665 of 4 August 1994), which states that 'French shall be the language of instruction, work, trade and exchanges and of the public services'. The CNAL is also challenging all decisions made by local and regional administrations regarding their funding of regional language schools.

Although the Syndicat National des Enseignants du Secondaire (SNES), the major secondary school teachers' union, had initially approved the agreement, it opposed some aspects of the decree defining bilingual teaching by immersion in 'regional languages' schools. In particular, it opposed the preferred use of regional languages for administration and meetings. The Conseil d'Etat suspended the implementation of the agreement, and of the May, July and September 2001 decrees or memoranda. The AFP (2001b) dispatch announcing the result further commented: 'In the name of the oneness of the Republic, one century after the forced Francization of children in the French countryside, the main argument of Jules Ferry's schooling is being used again by the defenders of the public school, seriously harming the agreement reached after long negotiations.' This is seen as a rebuke for Jack Lang's policies on regional languages.

In Brittany, the decision was met with an uproar. All Breton political and cultural organisations expressed their dismay and the feeling of being betrayed (*Le Télégramme de Brest* 1 November 2001). Most Breton members of parliament have supported the minister and members of regional and local assemblies want more power to be given to the regions, as this appears to be the only way to ensure some progress is made. Calls have been made for demonstrations against the decision and the independentist movement, *Emgann,* denounced the 'objective attack against Breton' and 'a denial of the democratic process' (*Le Télégramme de Brest* 31 October 2001.)

Jack Lang's decisions in favour of minority languages may have been partly based on his own beliefs and partly on the pressure exerted by regional minorities, but his speech of 25 April 2001, announcing he had signed or was ready to sign a specific convention in Alsace, a specific convention with the Basques, and a contract concerning bilingualism in Brittany, seemed to indicate an *ad hoc* approach, not a carefully planned national policy equally valid for all the minorities of the hexagon. The debate around the decision made by the Conseil d'Etat sent militants searching for the relevant administrative texts to support their positions, and they were surprised to discover that the only law ever passed in favour of regional language teaching had been quietly abrogated and replaced by two articles in the Education Code, through an ordinance signed on 15 June 2000 by President Chirac, Prime Minister Jospin and other ministers, including Jack Lang, the Education Minister and Jean-Pierre Chevènement, the Interior Minister. The first article (L.312-10) states that teaching of regional languages may be offered as a part of schooling, and the second (L.312-11) states that teachers can use regional languages when such use can benefit their teaching and the teaching of French. Whilst commentators are divided on the practical impact of such a decision, its discreet publication at the very end of the school year,[12] without any debate or consultation, left some questions unanswered regarding the possible motivation behind it.

It is certain that the questions of regional languages and political devolution to the regions and local assemblies will be an important part of the political debate raging in France during the 2002 presidential election campaign. Besides the traditional division between Right and Left in French politics, another division has become more and more prominent in the last few years. Since the campaign for and against the Maastricht Treaty, 'sovereignists' from both the Right (Pasqua, Séguin) and the Left (Chevènement) have been fighting together against the pro-Europeans, often allied to the regionalists again from both the Right (Bayrou) and the Left (Lang). Chevènement was and is totally opposed to anything that, in his eyes, may weaken the French nation-state. When Minister of the Interior, he even publicly criticised the Spanish Constitution for allowing autonomous regions. This led the Catalan Daily *Avui* to describe him as '*el politic més sinistre i repugnant de tota l'Europa democràtica*' (Quintà 1998).[13]

According to an Ipsos-Le Point poll, a few months before the presidential elections, Chevènement was credited with 12% of the votes in the first round, and it was alleged that the president of the socialist group in the assembly had already contacted him to ask him to give his preferences to Jospin in the second round (*Le Figaro*, 25 October 2001). This could only eventuate if Jospin abandoned his plans for more devolution to the regions and reverted to a strict monolingual education system. One of the two major points crystallising Chevènement's opposition to the Matignon agreement was the inclusion of teaching Corsican during normal hours in primary schools, unless parents specifically asked for their children to be exempted. The fact that this was the same provision which had been approved in 1996 for Polynesia did not prevent the Conseil d'Etat from expressing its opposition in the case of Corsica. Members of the independentist movements want Corsican to be compulsory for everybody, and the leader of *Corsica Nazione*, Jean-Guy Talamoni, has commented that any blocking in the courts of the law, which has already been watered down, would be considered as a *casus belli* (Forcari 2001).

Chevènement's position gathered some momentum early in the presidential campaign as an eclectic group of politicians from the Left to the extreme Right gave him their support. This range of support reinforces the arguments being made, and although early polls may differ from the actual vote on election day, Chevènement's hard line may stall any progress in both the political and educational recognition of regional languages and identities, as other candidates seek to avoid alienating supporters of the centralist line. A remake of the old struggle: Girondins versus Montagnards, federalists versus centralists will decide on whether the end of linguistic imperialism in France will come peacefully and democratically, or through more divisions and increased violence.

Notes

1. There was one exception: when it was annexed in 1620, Béarn had, for religious reasons, a well-established schooling policy.
2. The Justice Minister, equivalent of the British Lord Chancellor.
3. Talleyrand, Condorcet, Romme, Lakanal, Daunou, Sieyès, Le Pelletier and Bouquier all proposed projects on education cf. Parias (1981).
4. Alsatian, Basque, Breton, Catalan, Corsican, Flemish, Occitan and Savoyard (or Franco-Provençal)
5. The term 'associative schools' refers to schools which have been set up by groups of people within the framework of the 1901 law controlling non-profit organisations. It is specifically used in regard to minority language schools such as *Diwan*, *Calendretas*, etc.
6. Press conference held 20 June 2000. All conferences and speeches as well as laws and memoranda from the national education ministry can be found at: <http://www.education.gouv.fr/>.
7. <http://www.education.gouv.fr/discours/2000/langrentree.htm>.
8. <http://www.education.gouv.fr/discours/2000/convalscace.htm>.

9. <http://www.education.gouv.fr/discours/2001/diwan/dpdiwan.htm>.
10. Examination taken at the end of the fourth year of high school.
11. DDEN (Délégués Départementaux de l'Education Nationale) — National Education Department delegates; FCPE (Fédération des Conseils de parents d'Elèves des Ecoles Publiques) one of the parents' associations; La Ligue de l'enseignement (The Education League); UNSA-éducation (a teachers' union); SE-UNSA (a teachers' union).
12. Ordonnance No 2000-549 du 15 juin 2000 relative à la partie Législative du code de l'éducation. J.O No 143, 22 June 2000 page 9346.
13. The most sinister and repugnant politician in the whole of democratic Europe.

References

AFP 2001a, *Le conseil d'Etat suspend le protocole d'accord avec les écoles bretonnes Diwan*, 20, p 48, 30 October, 2001.

AFP 2001b, *L'entrée de Diwan dans l'école publique fortement compromise,* 19, p 59, 30 October 2001.

Barral, P 1985, *Jules Ferry: une volonté pour la République*, Presses Universitaires de Nancy, Nancy.

Conseil Constitutionnel 1999, *Charte européenne des langues régionales ou minoritaires,* Décision Nos. 99–412 DC15 June.

Cézaire, A 1955, *Discours sur le colonialisme*, Paris, Présence Africaine.

Davidenkoff, D 2001, 'Diwan: La Bretagne consternée', *Libération* 1 November 2001.

Dufresne, D 2000, 'Le gouvernement prend un risque', *Libération* 22-23 July 2000.

Fanon, F 1952, *Peau noire, masques blancs*, Le Seuil, Paris.

Forcari, C 2000, 'L'accord corse réveille les régions', *Libération* 22-23 July 2000.

Forcari, C 2001, 'Les députés tirent la langue', *Libération* 19 April 2001.

FP 2001b *L'entrée de Diwan dans l'école publique fortement compromise* 19, p 59, 30 October 2001.

Hammel, E and Gardy, P 1994, *L'occitan en Languedoc-Roussillon*, Perpignon, Trabucaïre.

Hammel, E 1996, *Aide-Mémoire Langues et cultures régionales et region Languedoc-Roussillon, 1985–1996,* Perpignon, Trabucaïre.

Jeanjean, H., 1992, *De l'Utopie au pragmatisme? Le mouvement occitan 1976–1990*, Perpignon, Trabucaïre.

Jeanjean, H 1998, 'La politique linguistique de la France', in *Mots Pluriels N°8*, October. http://www.arts.uwa.edu.au/MotsPluriels/.

Manonni, O 1984, *Prospéro et Caliban; psychologie de la colonisation*, Editions Universitaires, Paris.

Memmi, A 1973, *Portrait du colonisé*, Payot, Paris.

Ministère de l'Education Nationale 1985, *Ecoles élémentaires: programmes et instructions*, CNDP, Paris.

Mistral, F 1906, *Mémoires et récits*, Plon, Paris.

Parias, L-H (ed.) 1981, *Histoire générale de l'enseignement et de l'éducation en France*, Volume 3, Librairie de France, Nelle.

Petit, J 1985, *De l'enseignement des langues secondes à l'apprentissage des langues maternelles*, Champion-Slatkine, Paris-Genève.

Poignant, B 1998, *Langues et cultures régionales Rapport de Monsieur Bernard Poignant Maire de Quimper, à Monsieur Lionel Jospin, Premier Ministre.*

Quintà, A 1998, 'Chevènement i nosaltres', *Aviu* 17 October 1998.

Savary, A., 1982, Memorandum 82-261 of 21 June 1982, *L'enseignement des cultures et langues régionales dans le service public de l'Education Nationale.*

Savary, A 1983, Memorandum 83–547 of 30 December 1983.

The problem of English as the *lingua franca* of scholarly writing from a German perspective

Winfried Thielmann

Australian National University

Preliminaries

Over the past two decades and more, English has become increasingly entrenched as the language of scholarly communication in Europe. This process is frequently viewed as a 'natural' development, a 'necessary' contribution to internationalisation and globalisation. In this paper I shall argue, from a German perspective, that the almost silent adoption of English as the *lingua franca* of scholarly or scientific[1] communication imposes a set of serious problems that need to be addressed through language policy.

Frequently, European scholarly writers do not recognise the complexity of scientific English. The 'European taste' of publications (Skudlik 1990, p 153) is therefore likely to alienate an English speaking audience. At the same time, this uninformed use of English as a foreign scientific language often results in a rudimentary idiom that prevents scientific findings from being expressed as clearly as possible. Given the challenges of modern scientific endeavours, it seems absurd that findings should have to be presented in some kind of scientific pidgin. At the same time, the adoption of English as the scientific *lingua franca* has led to a situation where the other scientific varieties of European languages are already suffering from a lack of linguistic expansion (*Sprachausbau*).[2] This means that in the foreseeable future these languages will no longer have the linguistic resources to conduct research and express the results in adequate language. I shall now present and critically investigate these problems and then discuss possibilities of a solution through language policy.

English — an 'easy' scientific language?

This section will attempt to demonstrate that the major difficulties of writing English as a foreign scientific language lie in areas still hardly understood, such as text organisation and 'everyday scientific language'.

'All perfect in english langugage'

In 1994 the Finnish linguist Eija Ventola sent a questionnaire to a German medical journal that had just started publishing abstracts in English. She inquired why the journal had made this decision to publish abstracts in English and whether these abstracts were edited in any way. The response was that the English abstracts were intended '(…) for the foreing [sic] readers, libraries and clinics and because it [i.e. the journal] is regularly listed in *Current*

Contents and Clinical Medizine [sic]' (Ventola 1995, p 370). One of the abstracts of this journal reads as follows:

> The histories of three possible cases of 5-ASA-induced toxic interstitial lung disease are presentated [sic]. In addition diagnostical methods and procedures for the differential diagnosis are discussed and as [sic] diagnostical program for the identification of remedy-induced toxic lung damages is explained. (Ventola 1995, p 370).

The journal's response to the question whether they would edit the English abstracts they received was — not surprisingly — that this was not necessary '(…) because our authors are all perfect in english [sic!] langugage [sic!]' (Ventola 1995, p 371)

This medical journal had started publishing English abstracts for the international market. The pressure of citation indices and globalisation has led to a situation where even the well reputed German *Annalen der Physik*, where Einstein once published his theory of relativity in excellent German, are now thoroughly published in English — along with almost every other scientific journal, be it biology, chemistry or geology. Moreover, the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich, well aware of the challenges lying ahead, has been, for instance, offering lectures on Hegel in English, even though the works of this philosopher do not exactly profit from English translation.

English, one could conclude, has become the *lingua franca* of science. This process has taken place almost silently, and has not yet caused any institutional reaction other than ministerial pressure on universities to follow the trend and offer lectures in English to serve the foreign market.[3] At the same time, this silent process has not yet caused any reflection regarding the language and scientific culture one is so willingly subjecting oneself to. According to Ventola (1995), French parents who want to give their children a good education make their children learn German. German is considered to be an intellectual challenge, while English is considered to be 'easy'. English, Europeans seem to believe, is 'picked up' as one goes along.

As the first examples demonstrate quite clearly, Europeans also do not seem to believe that English presents any difficulties as a scientific *lingua franca*. They do not realise that their scientific contributions to the international market are frequently disqualified for linguistic and structural reasons. English publications revealing a 'European taste' (Skudlik 1990, p 153) are usually ignored. At the same time, American universities have stopped the practice of translating foreign journals. Europe's obliging obedience to globalisation through English has had quite an effect — it has backfired.

Intricacies of text organisation

I would now like to discuss text organisation as one of the more intricate problems English scientific writing presents for non-native speakers, from a German perspective. The following extract is the introduction to a book chapter written in English by a native speaker of German. The segmentation is, of course, mine:

Lexical knowledge and text interpretation

(1) Text production and text understanding are processes performed daily and repeatedly by everybody and which are again and again observed in human social interaction. From our communicative practice we know that, in the process of text production and text interpretation, we fall back on social experience gained in our process of socialisation. Text production and text reception, therefore, are rooted in the field of social conditions and the social and intersocial relationships in them. On the one hand, text production and text understanding themselves are cooperative activities, on the other hand they are the prerequisites to interaction in human society. Although these two processes are everyday routines, they evidently proceed automatically and become realized by us only when impaired in some way or other.

(2) Both the linguistics and psychology of text processing have so far had little success in elucidating these complex phenomena which are largely inaccessible to direct observation and are described in terms of a stringent theory. However, since the mid-70ies, an interdisciplinary research approach has emerged in the borderland between text linguistics and cognitive psychology which, under the name 'psycholinguistics of text processing' (see Rickheit und Strohner 1985), integrates both text-oriented and practice-related investigations in the attempt to describe and explain text production and text understanding in the broadest sense.

(3) In this context of research work the following discussion should be understood as well, which is at first meant to formulate a number of basic assumptions concerning the processes of text processing and then to outline, in exemplary manner, which knowledge systems are involved in the processes of text interpretation. Here particular attention will be paid to so-called lexical knowledge, its organisation and manifestation in text structures. Also, in this context, those dimensions of insight will be allowed for that cover the interpretation of technical texts. (Viehweger 1991, p 254f)

This author clearly does not have any of the grammatical and lexical problems encountered in the medical examples above. However, I believe that this introduction would not be generally accepted by an English readership. What, then, is wrong with this text?

Although this is obviously an introduction, the author does not seem to be worried about telling his readers what the chapter he introduces is going to be about. He talks about social practice. He talks about research, but he does not tell readers what his particular contribution is going to be. Hence, if he cannot even outline what he is going to do, why should readers waste their time and read on?

The following summary of this introduction may reveal the — from an English perspective, almost alien — structure of this text, as shown in Table 1.



Text production and text under-standing are important and complex everyday routines that proceed automatically.

Both linguistics and psychology of text processing have not yet been able to elucidate these complex phenomena; the ‘psycholinguistics of text processing’, however, have had some success since the mid-70s.

The following discussion takes place within this psycholinguistic framework and focuses on lexical knowledge, its organisation and its manifestation in text structures.

Table 1: Structure of the introduction

In producing this summary, I have put arrows in that, of course, are not part of the text. These arrows represent a *mental act* the reader of this introduction is supposed to perform. The reader has to read the first segment as a *justification* of the second and the second as a *justification* of the third. The linguistic interactive pattern of *justification* (cf. Ehlich and Rehbein 1986) has been turned into a device for constituting a genre (cf. Thielmann 1999b, c). Hence, the structure of this introduction is thus: a complex societal practice (i.e. text production and text understanding) *justifies* research into this practice. The deficiency of this research (even the ‘psycholinguistics of text processing’ has only had ‘some’ success so far) *justifies* the further contribution the author is going to make in the form of the article that is to come.

The 'alien' structure of this introduction arises from the fact that its author has reproduced the classical pattern of German introduction writing in English. What must seem to English readers a sequence of three unrelated segments is — to German readers — a complex justification of the study itself. German readers — so much for text processing — read the first two segments as justifications. They are able to do so because of their genre knowledge, and they expect, as part of their scientific culture, that contributions to science be properly justified in this manner because otherwise they are not going to read them.

The English introduction style is *reader-orientated* (Thielmann 1999b, c). The author informs the reader about what he is going to present. The German introduction style, on the contrary, is *institution-orientated* (Thielmann 1999b, c). The author *justifies* his article as a contribution towards the institution of science. It appears that the respective manifestations of English and German introduction writing model two completely different conceptions of scientific culture. In the English scientific culture, authors present their contributions to *individual* readers. Hence they try to do their best to make their articles accessible from the very beginning. Science is modelled as a *discourse* — much like a seminar where individual participants need to be convinced. German introduction writing, however, models science as an *institution with a societal function*. The individual contribution requires to be justified in terms of its societal relevance (at least in the arts), and in terms of its scientific relevance, i.e. through the *incompleteness* of previous research. At the moment, we know very little about these substantial, complex and tacit differences between scientific cultures. The comparative linguistics of scientific cultures has made its first valid and striking points, but comprehensive studies are still lacking.

'Scientific everyday language'

Ironically, terminology is not one of the greatest challenges of writing English as a foreign scientific language. Terminology is obvious and is learned in due course (cf. Ehlich 1995). The genuine lexical challenges lie in a much less obvious, and therefore rarely addressed, area of scientific language. A good example is this — rather awkward — phrase from the previous text:

> […] in this context of research work the following discussion should be understood as well […]

This phrase occurs at the beginning of the third segment. The author has just unfolded the deficiency of the research that justifies his own contribution. He has also mentioned an area of research that had 'some success in elucidating the complex phenomena' and intends to point out to the reader that his contribution is going to avail itself of the same framework. This is — in terms of German introduction writing — a routine situation for which routine formulations are available, such as '*die folgende Untersuchung ist als ein Beitrag im Rahmen dieses Forschungszusammenhangs zu verstehen*'. The author's problem is, however, that English does not offer routine formulations for this situation because this situation does not arise as a typical problem in English introduction writing. Hence the author runs into difficulties because the author's literal translation of the German routine formulation is likely to confuse an English speaking audience.

This scarcely understood area of scientific language is the study of the linguistic devices that researchers use to indicate transitions from one point to another within a genre, to discuss the results of other researchers, to contrast their findings with those of colleagues, to weigh the outcomes of different schools of thought, etc. While much research has been undertaken in the area of terminology, it is actually these less well researched linguistic devices that are the most difficult to master in a foreign scientific language, as Ehlich (1995) has pointed out. Ehlich (1995, p 340) has named this area — and I think very aptly — *scientific everyday language* (*wissenschaftliche Alltagssprache*).

Discussion

From the observations made, we may conclude that a German researcher trying to publish in English is — once he has mastered English grammar and vocabulary — faced with three deeply interrelated problems: the English scientific culture, its embodiment in English scholarly genres and everyday scientific English. English being a pluricentric language provides, of course, further challenges. I shall not, however, address these here. All of these problems are barely understood and comparatively little research has been undertaken to elucidate them. Publishing in English comes so naturally to German — and I may also say, European researchers — that the adoption of English as the *lingua franca* of science is considered to be a natural process unworthy of institutional attention, not to mention language policy. I shall now focus on some of the problems this neglect of German and European academic cultures and languages may entail for the future.

Opportunities in the diversity of scientific languages

The following section will attempt to demonstrate that, to a certain extent, conceptual resources are language-bound — a fact that at the same time can be seen as a barrier or as an opportunity.

The principles of creating scientific terminology in English and German

Scientific languages do not just come into being as a result of some natural cultural precipitation. On the contrary, the European scientific languages arose from the centuries-old struggles and battles scholars fought once they had abandoned Latin for their vernacular. I should like to mention, for instance, the huge linguistic contribution Galileo made to Italian by equipping this language with the means required to conduct complex scientific argumentation.

Germans owe a huge part of their 'everyday' scientific terminology to a man they barely remember: the philosopher Christian Wolff. Wolff translated the entire Latin scientific and philosophical terminology of his time into German. And he did this on the basis of sound linguistic theory — by creating technical terms according to the following principle:

> […] that I take the German words according to their regular meaning and take this meaning as the basis when I turn the German word into a technical term. Because of this the technical term I created is purely German — since I use

> German words according to their real meaning — and even more so, because I, in creating the technical term, make it apply to matters related to the German word's authentic meaning. (Wolff 1733/1973, pp 34–5, author's translation)

Scholarly practice has, as I said before, honoured Wolff's contribution. He coined the German words in Table 2 with such insight and intuition that they have become part of everyday scientific German:

German term	**Latin term**
Anmerkung:	scholion
Aufgabe:	problema
Ausnahme:	exceptio
Aussage:	enunciatio
Begriff:	notio, idea
Eigenschaft:	attributum
Einbildungs-Kraft:	imaginatio
Grund-Satz:	axioma
Lehrsatz:	theorema

Table 2: examples taken from Christian Wolff (1713/1978)

Wolff's principle of creating *motivated terminology* (cf. Ricken 1995) was adopted by German scientists and has, to this day, prevailed. A very prominent example of the fruitfulness of this principle is the terminology of Sigmund Freud (cf. Kuenkamp 1995). Freud made ample use of the capacity of the German language to turn any word into a noun. Consequently, he created his terms for the instances of the soul by turning German personal pronouns into nouns, as in Table 3.

English	German	Freud's terminology	English translation	Latin
I	ich	das Ich	the ego	ego
it	es	das Es	the id	id
		das Über-Ich	the superego	

Table 3: Sources of Freud's terminology in German and French

Table 3 demonstrates quite clearly, I believe, that the principles of naming scientific concepts in English and German are basically mutually exclusive. The traditional English principle is to employ Latin and ancient Greek resources to name new concepts — which makes texts virtually inaccessible to non-expert readers. The German tradition is, on the contrary, to use ordinary German words that name concepts bearing some relation to the scientific concept that requires a name.

Language as a resource for scientific intuition

The birth of psychoanalysis demonstrates clearly the degree to which scientific intuition can be language-bound. Freud himself declared that his reason for employing German pronouns as names for the instances of the soul was the desire to maintain terminological transparency when dealing with his patients (Kuenkamp 1995, 132). The main reason for this kind of terminology, however, is to be seen in the desired hermeneutic elasticity of the concept itself. The conceptual tools of a new science grow with the knowledge created by the new approach. This is why Freud's term *das Ich* may name quite different concepts depending on the respective stage of theory development, and why the English translators had, in certain contexts, to come up with an alternative to *ego*, namely the *self* (cf. Kuenkamp 1995, 133). In using *motivated terminology*, Freud acted in accordance with the *hermeneutic* German tradition of allowing concepts to grow with the development of a new theory. This kind of approach, however, would have been almost prevented by the finality suggested by Latin terminology.

Another good example of language advancing theory development is the Freudian concept of *Fehlleistung* (literally 'faulty achievement'; standard translation: *parapraxis*). This piece of beautifully motivated terminology is employed to name seemingly purposeless or counterproductive actions committed because of a deeper reason. Such 'faulty achievements' can be a slip of the tongue or losing a dear object once given to us as a present by someone we have recently started to dislike.

As Kuenkamp points out (1995, 139), chance events of German language history provided Freud with a ready-made list of such involuntary activities all of the following verbs share the same prefix *ver-*, as in the examples in Table 4:

*ver*lieren	to lose
*ver*legen	to misplace
*ver*gessen	to forget
sich *ver*lesen	to misread
sich *ver*schreiben	to make a slip of the pen
sich *ver*hören	to hear wrong
sich *ver*sprechen	to make a mistake in speaking, to slip

Table 4: German words for involuntary activities

Indeed, this list of involuntary activities — which could easily be extended — is quite suggestive of a common denominator worthy of psychological attention. English scientific culture, however, would not only have frowned upon the term 'faulty achievement'. The English language also would not have guided scientific intuition by making 'faulty achievements' readily available through a common prefix.

My point here is not, of course, to suggest that German is a better language for conducting psychology. My point is that language is the primary and last resource for scientific endeavours. All science starts from reasoning in language. The ultimate test of a mathematically formulated theory in physics frequently occurs by reasoning in language — which makes the *thought experiment* one of the most powerful tools in physics (cf. Thielmann 1999a).

Scientific linguistic diversity as a resource

The example of psychoanalysis and its reception demonstrates quite clearly, I believe, that diversity of scientific languages and cultures is one of globalisation's greatest assets (cf Mühlhäusler 2001). The observations made so far are quite suggestive of the fact that Freud's intuition was inspired by certain paths the German language readily provides, and that he availed himself of strategies of theory formation pertinent to the hermeneutic tradition of German scientific culture.

At the same time, however, this initial dependence of Freud's theory on a specific scientific language and culture has not by any means undermined the value of the knowledge generated by his approach. While this knowledge cannot — as the still very much alive debate about the English translation of Freud's works indicates (cf. Kuenkamp 1995) — be viewed as being entirely independent from the German scientific language and culture, it has greatly enriched American psychology and become an integral part of the American teaching canon (cf. Kuenkamp 1995, 124). Because of this, I wish to argue that a certain degree of dependence of conceptual frameworks and theory formation on the resources of specific scientific languages and cultures does not devaluate the knowledge generated by these respective approaches. On the contrary, the diversity of scientific languages and cultures ensures that alternative theoretical approaches and conceptual frameworks can arise.

Scientific linguistic diversity is, in fact, one of globalisation's greatest assets because this diversity guarantees that the scientific challenges lying ahead are met with the greatest possible amount of conceptual resources, perspectives and ideas. It is therefore inconceivable that Europe would seem to be inclined to discard its richly endowed scientific languages and cultures. It does not make any sense that Europe favours the idea of a scientific monoculture and thus is about to give up one of its greatest investments. For languages — also in their scientific variety — require an *ecology* to survive.[4] If the current trend towards English continues, the other scientific languages of Europe will suffer further losses of expansion and will eventually become unfit for rendering scientific thought, unfit for innovation.

Discussion

If one accepts that a science is only as good as its conceptual tools — i.e. that scientific progress starts at a conceptual level — it is quite obvious that scientific thought and intuition have run, since Aristotle,[5] along paths a certain language readily provides. Therefore, if the final purpose of globalisation is indeed the *common good*, linguistic diversity in the sciences should be highly desirable, because it increases perspectives and opportunities for scientific intuition and thus innovation. Linguistic diversity in the sciences should be understood as a resource that needs to be maintained and expanded, and should not be disposed of as a supposed threat to the maximum efficiency of the flow of information. It cannot be in the interest of governments or societies to endorse a scientific monoculture. Doing this would mean to renounce one of the greatest assets science as a global enterprise possesses: the diversity of ideas, concepts and ways of thought preserved in different scientific languages and cultures.

The following section will attempt to unfold how — at least within Europe — these matters could be addressed through language policy.

How to maintain scientific linguistic diversity through language policy

In this section I shall argue that — at least in Europe — the process of monolingualisation in the sciences does not have to be accepted as a quasi-natural phenomenon, but that this process can indeed be channelled in a way that allows for the preservation and expansion of scientific languages other than English. The solution I attempt to advocate would allow for coexistence of English as the *lingua franca* of scholarly communication and other European scientific languages and cultures as resources for scientific innovation.

Maintaining and expanding European scientific languages through academic teaching

The maintenance and expansion of European scientific languages cannot be achieved through measures aimed at conservation because the language thus preserved would quickly end up serving no other purpose than its own existence. If European scientific languages were, however, maintained in *academic teaching*, they would not only continue to serve part of their true purpose, they would also need to be continually expanded in order to keep up with expanding knowledge. Currently, German education ministries for example, actively encourage the use of English at universities, and textbooks in the natural sciences are frequently only available in English.

These developments are terrifyingly counterproductive. Science is, in the first place, a linguistic challenge. Every science is only as good as its — necessarily language-bound — categories. Hence the quality of teaching very much depends on the quality of the mediation of *conceptual thinking*. Currently, however, students are more and more compelled to avail themselves — during the most decisive phase of their conceptual development — of a rudimentary idiom, i.e. that kind of English that lecturers who are obeying the trend believe to be the scientific variety. However, only those students who have learned properly how to think and act scientifically are actually capable of making the transition to a foreign scientific language and culture.

Measures aimed at counterbalancing and improving this situation could, however, be kept at a minimum level. European textbooks do not need to be published in English. This 'trend' could easily be stopped through institutional support and support for scientific translation. Lectures, seminars and tutorials in Germany and elsewhere do not need to be conducted in English. They can effectively be taught in the local language. The 'trend' to English could be counteracted through ministerial directives. At the same time, however, scientific English has to be taken seriously, i.e. conceived of as a scientific language supported by a richly endowed scientific culture.

The necessity of taking English as a foreign scientific language seriously

Since Europe does intend to partake of the advantages of English as a *lingua franca* of scholarly communication, European graduates and scientists should not be left to their own linguistic devices in acquiring and using this variety. European scientists and graduates need to be given the opportunity to acquire solid scientific English and receive instructions and guidance for preparing their publications based on a *comparatively informed linguistics*. This requires the creation of institutions that conduct research into the comparative linguistics of European scientific languages and offer advisory and editorial services to the academic community.

Discussion

The current situation — institutionally endorsed speechlessness in the *lingua franca* and neglect of European scientific languages other than English — calls for a solution through language policy. Sensible language policy should aim at the maintenance and expansion of European languages and, at the same time, provide the necessary prerequisites for a *genuine* participation of European graduates and scientists in the *lingua franca*. This could be achieved through institutionally endorsing European scientific languages in academic teaching and providing *comparatively informed* instruction and guidance in scientific English.

Conclusion

Science is an enterprise the success of which depends on the acuteness of its conceptual tools. These tools, however, are language-bound and have been — since the abandonment of scholarly Latin — sharpened within different scientific cultures that have created their respective scientific language varieties. Choosing one of these languages as a *lingua franca* is a practical choice that should not have the death of other scientific languages as a consequence. The immediate international availability of scientific discoveries does not have to result in a scientific linguistic monoculture.

Such a development would also not be in the absolute interest of globalisation, since diversity of scientific cultures and languages ensures that the common goal, i.e. the expansion of knowledge, can be pursued from different perspectives and with respectively alternative means. A particular scientific language or a principle pertinent to a particular scientific culture, may very well guide intuition across a mountain range that otherwise would have to be circumnavigated. Hence scientific linguistic diversity is not a deficient situation yearning for a *lingua franca* as the only remedy. This diversity of scientific cultures and languages is actually an achievement of centuries of thoughtful linguistic expansion, a process that made these languages capable of expressing and entertaining the most complex thoughts.

These abundant resources however, have not yet been recognised as such by Europe. Within a period of less than three decades Europeans have almost completely abandoned their scientific languages for the sake of a *lingua franca* the complexities and intricacies of which they have — not surprisingly — also not yet recognised. Europeans are throwing magnificent tools overboard for the sake of popular new ones they cannot yet handle properly. It is to be hoped that European institutions will soon recognise the value of scientific linguistic diversity. Sensible language policy — maintaining European scientific languages in university teaching and providing comparatively informed instruction and guidance in scientific English — could be a first step to address these problems.

Notes

1. Throughout this paper I shall employ the expression 'scientific' in a sense comprising both the natural sciences and humanities.
2. I use the term 'linguistic expansion' to render the German concept *Sprachausbau*, i.e. the ongoing process of equipping a language with the structural and lexical means to render the previously ineffable.
3. According to lecturers at the Institute for German as a Foreign Language in Munich, German ministries have a somewhat narrow view of the foreign market they want to target. In their view, the foreign market does not consist of the large number of students from Eastern European, Middle Eastern or Asian countries, many of whom have very good German. Their 'foreign market' consists of *American* students for whom monolingualism is an obvious reason not to study in Germany, even though there are no fees.
4. I use this term loosely, i.e. in appreciation of the fundamental tenet of ecological linguistics that language-external factors play an important role in language change (cf. Mühlhäusler 2000). I do, however, believe in a fundamental ontological difference between societal and natural entities, i.e. between purpose-driven and constraint-driven systems. The ecological metaphor, if taken to the extreme, results in an ontological categorisation of language as 'organism' — where 'rules of language' originate from 'laws of nature' (Finke 1996, 42f). Should such a radical view prevail, linguistic diversity will eventually be dealt with in the terms of natural history — 'survival of the fittest', 'ecological niche' etc. This would lead to a relapse into linguistic Darwinism that — even though ecologically enlightened — would provide decision makers in language policy with exactly the kind of theory they have always craved: a theory that allows them to dress a striving for political and economical dominance as the result of some natural process. As for the scientific varieties of European languages, they are the result of entirely purpose-driven linguistic expansion (cf. Thielmann 1999), and their current neglect is due to an — equally purpose-driven — half-baked and ill-reflected

attempt at leaping to the perceived linguistic forefront of the global scientific enterprise.

5. Benveniste (1971) demonstrates at length how Aristotle derived his logical categories from ordinary language.

References

Benveniste, E 1971, *Problems in general linguistics*, University of Miami Press, Coral Gables.

Ehlich, K 1995, 'Die Lehre der deutschen Wissenschaftssprache: sprachliche Strukturen, didaktische Desiderate', in HL Kretzenbacher and H Weinrich, (eds.) *Linguistik der Wissenschaftssprache* (= Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Forschungsbericht 10), pp 325–352, de Gruyter, Berlin.

Ehlich, K and Rehbein, J 1986, *Muster und Institution. Untersuchungen zur schulischen Kommunikation*, Narr, Tübingen.

Finke, P 1996, 'Sprache als *missing link* zwischen natürlichen und kulturellen Ökosystemen. Überlegungen zur Weiterentwicklung der Sprachökologie', in A Fill (ed.) *Sprachökologie und Ökolinguistik.* pp 27–48, Stauffenburg, Tübingen.

Kuenkamp, A 1995, 'Psychoanalyse ohne Seele? Zur englischen Übersetzung der psychoanalytischen Terminologie Sigmund Freuds', in HL Kretzenbacher and H Weinrich, (eds.) *Linguistik der Wissenschaftssprache* (= Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Forschungsbericht 10), pp 121–154, de Gruyter, Berlin.

Mühlhäusler, P (2000) 'Language Planning and Language Ecology' *Current Issues in Language Planning* 1:3, pp 306–367.

Ricken, U 1995, 'Zum Thema Christian Wolff und die Wissenschaftssprache der deutschen Aufklärung', in HL Kretzenbacher and H Weinrich, (eds.) *Linguistik der Wissenschaftssprache* (= Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Forschungsbericht 10), pp 41–90, de Gruyter, Berlin.

Skudlik, S 1990, *Sprachen in den Wissenschaften. Deutsch und Englisch in der internationalen Kommunikation,* Narr, Tübingen.

Thielmann, W 1999a, *Fachsprache der Physik — exemplarische Untersuchungen zur Funktionalität naturwissenschaftlicher Begrifflichkeit bei der Wissensgewinnung und -strukturierung im Rahmen der experimentellen Befragung von Natur* (= Arbeiten zur Sprachanalyse, 34). Lang, Frankfurt am Main.

Thielmann, W 1999b, *Begründungen* versus *advance organizers* — Zur Problematik des Englischen als *lingua franca* der Wissenschaft in *Deutsche Sprache* Vol 4, pp 370–378.

Thielmann, W 1999c ''Justification' — the importance of linguistic action patterns for the success of intercultural communication', in J Lo Bianco, AJ Liddicoat and C Crozet, (eds.) *Striving for the third place: intercultural competence through language education*, pp 167–179, Language Australia, Melbourne.

Ventola, E 1995, 'Englisch als *lingua franca* der schriftlichen Wissenschaftskommunikation in Finnland und in Deutschland' in HL Kretzenbacher and H Weinrich, (eds) *Linguistik der Wissenschaftssprache* (= Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Forschungsbericht 10), pp 353–386, de Gruyter, Berlin.

Viehweger, D 1991, 'Lexical knowledge and text tnterpretation', in H Schröder (ed.) *Subject oriented texts. languages for special purposes and text theory*, pp 254–266, de Gruyter Berlin.

Wolff, C 1713/1978, *Vernünfftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauch in Erkenntniß der Wahrheit (Deutsche Logik)*. Olms, Hildesheim.

Wolff, C 1733/1973, *Ausführliche Nachricht von seinen eigenen Schrifften, die er in deutscher Sprache heraus gegeben* (= Facsimile of the edition from 1733; Gesammelte Werke 1. Abt. Bd.9). Olms Hildesheim.

Croatia's independence and the language politics of the 1990s

Maja Mikula

University of Technology Sydney

Introduction

The political climate in Croatia in the early 1990s, at the time of the country's secession from former socialist Yugoslavia and the ensuing war on its territory, was marked by an overwhelming desire to purge the new state as thoroughly as possible of any 'Yugoslav' content. The new regime needed a new set of symbols on which to base its own legitimacy, in opposition to the one operating under the previous system. Power is always vested in symbolic order, but the logic of nationalism requires the ordinary citizen to accept this order at the face value, as something primordial, natural, and by implication, unquestionable.

The developments in the language arena of the newly independent former Yugoslav states have been interpreted as a form of 'nominal language death', or 'political dismantling of a language' (Greenberg 1999, p 141). It is, however, important to see both the 'birth' of Serbo-Croatian in the 19th century and its recent assumed 'death' as sociolinguistic, rather than purely linguistic phenomena. The legitimacy of 'Serbo-Croatian' as a 'twin language' went hand in hand with the legitimacy of South-Slav co-habitation in a unified state. Throughout the 20th century, both were disputed by different segments of what was Yugoslav society. While state involvement in language matters varied significantly in scope and nature during that period, co-habitation itself, with the associated people mobility and private and public ties across the republican borders, further erased the differences between the closely related idioms. In the early 1990s, the new political borders were reinforced through 'linguistic cleansing' (Langston 1999, pp 179–201), under slogans emphasising the close relationship between language and nation. During the war on Croatia's territory, words were like soldiers: 'The loss of a single Croatian word is the same as the loss of a Croatian soldier. By the same token, the rescue of a single Croatian word is equal to the rescue of a Croatian soldier'[1] (Babić 1999, p 6).

Undoubtedly, language can be used as a powerful instrument for 'mobilizing large numbers of people around symbols and values with a high emotional potential.' (Brass 1991, p 303) The notion of intimate correlation between language and nation is commonly seen as a product of the Romantic era in general, or of German Romanticism in particular. For Herder, Fichte, Humboldt and other Romantics, the German language was the spirit of what was German. Thus, national identity was regarded as dependent on the purity of the nation's language. Although nation itself is a modern phenomenon, related ideas can be traced as far back as the Old Testament. The original harmony among Adam's descendants before their arrival in the valley of Shinar was essentially of a linguistic nature (*Genesis* 11:1). By the same token, the dispersal of peoples, which followed the presumptuous construction of the tower of Babel, was achieved through a curse of multiplication of mutually unintelligible languages, so that 'they may not understand one another's speech' (*Genesis* 11:7).

Language autonomy: one language or two?

There is no doubt that native speakers of Croatian and Serbian do not need interpreters to understand each other, but, nevertheless, most of them would nowadays probably claim to speak two distinct languages. Asserting the autonomy of the Croatian language was considered one of the vital objectives of the Croatian language politics[2] in the 1990s. It has been argued that Croatian's claim to linguistic autonomy is not supported by either of the two conventional criteria for language autonomy, *Abstand* (intrinsic linguistic difference from other language varieties) or *Ausbau* (conscious efforts to shape an autonomous language):

> the Croatian and Serbian standard languages are extremely similar not only because they developed out of the same general dialectal base, but also because they reflect processes of standardization which from the 19th century on were ultimately directed towards the creation of a unified Serbo-Croatian norm (Langston 1967, p 181).[3]

While the Universal Decimal Classification[4] of languages, originally maintained by the *Federation Internationale pour l'Information et la Documentation* in the Hague, assigns Croatian and Serbian two separate codes, 808.62 and 808.61 respectively (Loknar 1995, pp 19–20), this fact in itself does not reflect the complexities of the matter. The Serbo-Croatian language is a 'language of agreement'. If we limit ourselves to observing its communicative possibilities, we will come to a conclusion that there is only one language, with a number of variants. At the same time, historically, culturally, and symbolically, Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian (with Montenegrin as an additional possibility) are autonomous languages. Antun Šoljan, a renowned literary author, has compared this inherent contradiction of Serbo-Croatian language to the two towers of Zagreb Cathedral:

> … when you are looking at them from, say *Kaptolska klet* [a restaurant almost directly opposite to the Cathedral], you will see two; when you are observing them from *Gradska kavana* [a cafe on Zagreb main square], you can see only one. Therefore, from a scientific perspective, Croatian and Serbian are one language because they belong to the same diasystem, but from a literary, historical and cultural perspective, they are two languages, each having its own past and identity (Loknar 1995, pp 18).[5]

Although the complex history of autonomy debate in nineteenth and twentieth century Croatia falls beyond the scope of this paper, a brief outline of major developments in this area is necessary for a better understanding of the issues at stake. At the time of the Illyrian movement — a Croatian cultural revival from under Habsburg yoke — Croats were speaking three different dialects: Štokavian,[6] Kajkavian and Čakavian. Each of these dialects also had a distinct popular and literary tradition and thus a capacity to be standardised in its own right. The Illyrians — most of them Kajkavian — were nevertheless inclined to adopt the Štokavian dialect as the literary standard. They believed that the Štokavian variant had two significant advantages: on the one hand, it had been used by the Dubrovnik Renaissance and Baroque writers; on the other, it was closely related to the literary language Serbian that philologist and language reformer, Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, had promoted as standard in nearby Serbia.

In 1850, a group of prominent Croatian and Serbian intellectuals[7] met in Vienna to discuss the possibility of adopting a unified language. They declared that the 'Serbs and Croats were one people, and, therefore, should have a single literature, which also requires a common literary language.' (Wachtel 1998, p 28) This common language was to be based on the Ijekavian variant of the Štokavian dialect, spoken in Eastern Herzegovina, parts of the Adriatic coast, Bosnia, Montenegro and Western Serbia. To many Croatians it comes as a great surprise that Karadžić used the 'Ijekavian' variant of the 'Štokavian' dialect and sought to promote that variant in his reforms. At the same time, Ljudevit Gaj wrote the so-called 'horned e', 'ĕ' in syllables deriving from the proto-Slavonic *yat*. The Vienna Agreement had little immediate or practical impact in Croatia, where the Štokavian norm had been standardised by the Illyrians in the first half of the century. The Illyrian norm differed somewhat from the one promoted by Karadžić: in addition to disagreements involving plural case endings, the Illyrians preferred a morphologically based orthography[8] over Karadžić's 'phonetic' solution of 'write as you speak'.

By the time Karadžić's norm asserted itself in Croatia through publication of three authoritative normative texts — Ivan Broz's *Croatian Orthography* (1892), a *Dictionary of the Croatian Language* started by Broz and completed by Franjo Iveković (1901), and Tomo Maretić's grammar (1899) — Serbia had discarded Karadžić's Ijekavian norm and adopted the Ekavian variant. Throughout the twentieth century, the Croatian and the Serbian norms co-existed and cross-fertilised each other, naturally or by design, as the 'western' and the 'eastern' variant of a diasystem undergoing never ending name changes. Older Croats are understandably bemused by this dynamic: for example, it is reported that, looking at her school certificates from 1926 to 1937, a woman found four different names for essentially the same school subject: language of education (1926), Serbo-Croatian language (1927–29), Croatian or Serbian language (1930) and Serbocroatoslovene (1931–37) (Loknar 1995, pp 13).

The period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918–41) was characterised by continuous efforts to erase the differences between the two norms. It is not widely known that, in the 1920s, even some prominent Croatian writers — such as Tin Ujević, Dobriša Cesarić and Miroslav Krleža — began writing in the 'eastern', Ekavian variant, following the mainstream unitarist impulses (Anić 1998, p 29). Their enthusiasm waned after the assassination of Stjepan Radić (1928) and the writers returned to their previous practices.

In the early 1940s, during Ante Pavelić's ill-famed Independent Croatian State (Nezavisna država Hrvatska, NDH, 1941–45), purist tendencies in language politics loomed large on the agenda of state authorities. As any traces of pre-war unitarism were systematically eradicated, interventions related to the lexical level of language were the most pervasive. In addition to the introduction of newly coined words and 'rehabilitation' of archaic ones, swearwords were prohibited; toponyms were 'Croatised' and non-Croatian names for children discouraged. More importantly, Vuk's 'phonetic' spelling system was replaced by etymological, or morphological orthography (*korijenski pravopis*). *A Legal Regulation on the Croatian Language, its Purity and Spelling* (1941) proclaimed that 'the Croatian official and literary language was the jEkavian or iEkavian variant of the stokavian dialect', and that 'the etymological orthography should be used instead of "phonetic" spelling' (Moguš 1995, p 216).

As World War II was drawing to a close, the Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) announced its own views on the language question in a future Yugoslav state. At its first meeting in January 1944, the council proclaimed that all decisions and announcements of the Council had to be published officially in Serbian, Croatian, Slovene and Macedonian languages, since 'all these languages have equal rights on the entire territory of Yugoslavia' (Loknar 1995, p 4). Indeed, in the early post-war years, all important state documents were written in all four languages.

After this initial status quo, a project undertaken by the Serbian publisher, *Matica srpska* of Novi Sad, breathed new life into the seemingly dormant unitarist idea. The result was the Novi Sad Agreement (1954) which declared that the 'national language of Serbs, Croats and Montenegrins is one language. Hence the literary language, which had developed on its basis around two main centres, Belgrade and Zagreb, is a single language with two pronunciations — Ijekavian and Ekavian.' (Moguš 1995, p 201)[9] It also stated that the Serbs and Croats used two official variants of the same language, 'Serbo-Croatian' and 'Croato-Serbian' respectively. Within this formula, Serbo-Croatian was seen as a pluricentric and pluriethnic language, with (at least) two centres determining norms for correct usage.

In 1960, the agreement was followed by the simultaneous publication of a Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian orthographic manual in Novi Sad (in Ekavian and the Cyrillic script) and Zagreb (in Ijekavian and the Latin script) (*Pravopis* 1960). Another project informed by the spirit of the Novi Sad Agreement — a joint dictionary, was published seven years later (Jonke and Stevanović 1967). In the late 1950s, Croatian linguists were increasingly feeling that the 'marriage' brought about by the Agreement was not between two equal partners, i.e. that it enabled Serbian words to penetrate more forcefully into the Croatian usage. The frustration was exacerbated by the fact that some Croatian media — namely, Zagreb Radio — introduced main daily news programs in the Ekavian variant (1955–56).

The members of the Zagreb Linguistic Circle articulated their aggravation with this situation in a document entitled *Declaration on the Name and Situation of the Croatian Literary Language* (1967). The declaration discarded the name 'Croato-Serbian' and demanded the right for Croats to have their own literary language. It pointed at the ambiguity of the constitutional rule about 'Serbocroatian or Croatoserbian language', which in practice privileged the Serbian language, prevalent in the state media, the central news agency Tanjug, the joint programs of Yugoslav Radio and Television, federal post, railways, state and party administration, legislature, diplomacy and, above all, the army.[10]

Tito called the declaration a 'stab in the back' to the principle of brotherhood and unity (Loknar 1995, p 121). It was repudiated by the members of Serbian minority in Croatia unwilling to call their language 'Croatian' and pushing for the introduction of new school curricula which would respect the Eastern variant of the diasystem (Loknar 1995, p 32). Publicly condemned in Tito's Yugoslavia, the declaration was hailed by the authorities in the independent Croatia of the 1990s as a document of crucial importance and a symbol of resistance to linguistic unitarism.

The 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia states that the official language in the Republic is Croatian and the official script Latin. While internally there may be no doubt now of what the official language in the Republic of Croatia is called, problems arise internationally, where Serbo-Croatian has established itself as a standard denomination in university departments of Slavic languages, commonly used language textbooks, and the media. Some of these institutions acted promptly in accepting the nominal death of the Serbo-Croatian language,[11] but others were slower to react, since this radical policy shift entails allocation of significant additional resources that many were unable to afford.

Molding an autonomous language for an independent state

Among the Croatian linguists of the 1990s, we can identify three distinct trends reflecting radically different views on the language question. The first current, holding on to the tradition of rapprochement, was the least popular and even considered politically suspect in the first years of Croatia's independence. When confronted with the existence of two or more linguistic renditions fulfilling essentially the same function within the system, the linguists identifying with the first current would tend to adopt the rendition existing in both the Croatian and the Serbian variant as the norm. The adherents of the second current — most of whom had been among the original signatories of the 'Declaration on the Name and Situation of the Croatian Literary Language'. and enjoyed full support of the party in power throughout the 1990s, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) — largely endorsed the appellation 'Croatian Literary Language' and considered the Croatian language as a separate political, functional and socio-cultural entity, but saw it linguistically as a variant of the Croato-Serbian diasystem. In determining normative solutions, they claimed to be guided by the internal linguistic logic displayed in the Croatian literary corpus.[12] The third and most attention-grabbing current, which saw the Croatian language as a separate entity which had been progressively 'contaminated' by Serbian elements over the last 150 years, produced the most vocal purists, innovators and would-be reformers of the standard idiom. The most well-known among these linguists is certainly Bulcsú László, a vocal advocate of the etymological spelling system and author of hundreds of neologisms designed to replace international, mostly English words commonly used in military and scientific jargon (László 1993). Like Humpty Dumpty in *Through the Looking Glass*, uncritical reformers saw themselves as 'masters of words', entitled and, indeed, called to introduce new words and define their meaning and usage, more or less as they liked.

In practice, these radical reformers were pursuing essentially the same objective embraced by the government, which was to mold a Croatian language as autonomous as possible.[13] Even the strategies they most commonly employed — coinage of neologisms and revival of archaisms — were essentially the same. However, the party in power — with well-known linguists such as Dalibor Brozović and Stjepan Babić among its ranks — demonstrated considerable awareness of the dangers of uncritical butchering of the language. Many 'proscribed' words and syntactic choices figured prominently in the classics of Croatian literature, and their exile meant simultaneously a denial of the nation's precious literary tradition. The linguists fully sympathetic to the nationalist regime and actually taking part in the higher echelons of the political hierarchy, could not but express concerns that over-zealous 'purification' might have disastrous effects on language's polyfunctionality and vitality. Appeals for moderation and repeated entreaties to would-be reformers, from all walks of life, to leave language planning to professional linguists were formulated in politically flavoured metaphorical warnings that 'we might accidentally throw out the baby with the bath water'.[14]

However, mainstream linguists themselves also embraced the method of re-introducing long-forgotten lexical forms from nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century dictionaries, published in periods of weakened unitary tendencies, including the pro-Nazi Independent Croatian State (NDH). They were motivated by a conviction that these words did not die a 'natural death', but were forcibly removed from the system by the regimes of the two Yugoslav states Croatia was part of. Neologisms with no record in Croatian literature were also considered acceptable, and indeed sometimes desirable replacements for 'suspect' words. Prominent linguists were employed by the state-run papers to write columns designated to educate the speakers as to which words can be considered as Croatian proper, and which are marked as 'foreign', usually 'Serbian'.

Moreover, lexical differences between Serbian and Croatian were the subject matter of the rather popular genre of the Croatian normative literature of the 1990s, the so-called *razlikovni rječnici* (differential dictionaries). The most comprehensive and widely used among them is Vladimir Brodnjak's *Razlikovni rječnik srpskog i hrvatskog jezika* (1991).[15] The 30,000 entries in this dictionary include those words which are common in Serbian, but also appear 'legitimately' in the Croatian language, with a slightly different meaning, as well as those which appear in it as variants of style. However, in the political climate of the early 1990s, Brodnjak's book was the Bible for all language enthusiasts identifying with the national cause, with or without linguistic sensibility or education. Among them, those more interested in the national revival than in the vitality and polyfunctionality of language, were rushing to interpret all words in the left column as 'Serbian' and, therefore, unacceptable. These impatient interpreters of the book may have been unaware of the fact that they were thus implicitly denying a large part of the Croatian literary corpus, in which those words appear. Also, some of the banished words had morphosyntactic advantages over those proposed as their replacements.[16]

Throughout the early 1990s, the efforts by *bona fide* language planners and their self-authorised cohorts were focussing on establishing the autonomy of the Croatian language by shaping a language as distinct as possible from Serbian. These initiatives were largely supported by the greater part of the population, struggling to self-discipline their language practices, and thus distinguish themselves from their war adversary, the Serbs. However, Croatian purism of the 1990s was not limited to de-Serbianisation. Like its German and French antecedents, it was by definition also apprehensive of international, mostly English words in its lexical lore. The resistance to English was foreshadowed by the late president Tudman, who — among other remarks carrying essentially the same message — noted on one occasion that 'American words nowadays colonise the Croatian space.' (*Vjesnik*, 27 March 1993, p 26) A publication reflecting more general purist concerns is Mate Šimundić's rather excessive *Dictionary of unnecessary foreign words in the Croatian language* (1994), which offers a number or archaisms, neologisms and, semantically, only marginally related Croatian translations as alternatives for widely used words of foreign origin.

Croatian is sometimes regarded as a language resisting loan words because of the nation's long experience with foreign, primarily Austrian domination, characterised by aggressive Germanisation. This is in fact seen as an additional difference between Croatian and Serbian, since the latter is believed to be highly accommodating to foreign words, as a result of Serbia's cultural ties and religious affinities with Russia (Babić 1995, pp 18–21). Thus, while Serbian tends to adopt foreign words and adapt them to its own 'phonetic' system, which is then reflected in spelling, Croatian — like German — tends to replace foreign words with indigenous forms. This phenomenon explains the relatively high incidence of calques or literal, part-for-part translations of foreign words.

In addition to Serbian influence, Communist internationalist ideology was also blamed for the widespread use of loan words during former socialist Yugoslavia. A number of words were proscribed in the 1990s because of their omnipresence and the political resonances they acquired during the five decades of communism. Words like *partija* 'party', *sekretar* 'secretary', *centralni komitet* 'central committee', etc., were among the most obvious examples of the words overloaded with political connotations.[17]

Resistance to English influences was evident in widespread attempts to design Croatian equivalents for commonly used loan words pertaining to terminologies related to state administration, military and scholarly disciplines. Traditionally, the Croatian language purists have been active innovators, particularly in this area, ever since Bogoslav Šulek's (1874–75) well-known *Hrvatsko-njemačko-talijanski rječnik znanstvenog nazivlja.* Some of Šulek's neologisms — for example, *kolodvor* 'railway station' or 'bus depot', a calque or part-for-part translation of the German word *Bahnhof;* or his *zrakoplov* 'airplane' from the German *Luftschiff* — demonstrated unusual resilience, and have remained standard in the Croatian language to the present day. Adoption of newly coined words was considered a matter of urgency, as synonymy — or temporary acceptance of both the 'old' and the 'new' norm — was seen as detrimental and likely to produce confusion. However, lack of coordination among language innovators, instead of reducing uncertainty, produced more of it. Even the speakers with highly developed national consciousness and a strong desire to safeguard their language from foreign influences were perplexed with multiple translations of commonly used loan words such as 'helicopter' (*vrtložnjak* or *zrakomlat*), 'bypass' (*mimovod, premosnik, premosnica, obilaznica*) (Babić 1995, p 12), 'hardware' (*očvrsje, sklopovlje, strojevina, sklopnjak*), 'software' (*napudbina, napudba, programska podrška*), or 'printer' (*pisač, pisaljka, tiskaljka*). To the average speaker, comfortably familiar with these words in their original English form, most of the proposed new words sounded ridiculous and, consequently, they did not have a lasting effect on the linguistic practices of Croatians.

To add to the confusion, some international loan words were considered more acceptable than others. A notorious example of this is the word *šport*, privileged by some over *sport* because of its prevalent appearance in that form, under German influence, in the first half of the twentieth century, i.e. prior to post-WWII socialist Yugoslavia. Also, the insertion of the vowel 'a' in the consonant clusters *–kt*, *-nt*, *-rt* and *-pt* at the end of loan words such as *projekt*, *agent*, *koncert* or *recept* (*projekat, agenat, koncerat, recepat*) was deemed characteristic of Serbian usage, but the discredited practice was still considered acceptable and, indeed, as contributing to the prosodic appeal of the language.

We have seen that Croatian language purists were hostile to loan words in general and Serbian words in particular, sometimes to the detriment of the vitality and communicative capacity of the Croatian language. Although purist tendencies elsewhere commonly exhibit a similar aversion to non-standard dialects of the language,[18] Croatian purists of the 1990s were more lenient towards Croatian dialects, and may have even secretly bemoaned the fact that štokavian — the only dialect shared by the Serbs — had been accepted as standard in the nineteenth century, rather than, for example, kajkavian, the dialect commonly spoken at that time by Zagreb intelligentsia. Tomislav Ladan's recently published dictionary *Words — Their Meanings, Use and Origins* (2000), for example, includes words commonly used in urban spoken idiom, particularly that of Zagreb and its surroundings. The author sees kajkavian and čakavian dialects as valuable sources of lexical wealth for a Croatian *koiné* yet to be developed, 'as a synthesis of our rich linguistic tradition and the contemporary scientific achievements' (Loknar 1995, p 54).

Although lexical recommendations informed a great deal of the Croatian language politics of the 1990s, this was only a part of more extensive endeavours, which were just as concerned with other aspects of language, such as syntax and orthography, or spelling practices. In particular, certain syntactic choices were regarded as bearing the ideological stigma of the old regime. For example, the sequence involving a noun followed by a possessive genitive instead of a noun preceded by a possessive adjective was seen as a residue of Yugoslav unitarism (e.g., 'writers of Croatia' *pisci Hrvatske* versus 'Croatian writers' *hrvatski pisci*). The former solution was indeed rather consistently enforced by the Yugoslav regime in one particular context, that is, in referring to Croatian nationality, since it was considered that the adjective 'Croatian' *hrvatski* would discriminate against the Serbian minority in the republic.

Another controversial example involves the Croatian usage of the infinitive, rather than *da* + conjugated present tense of the verb, in constructions involving verb complements, for example, *želim jesti* 'I want to eat', (as opposed to Serbian *želim da jedem* 'I want that I eat'). While the use of the infinitive in these constructions is more properly Croatian, there are instances when the construction '*da* + present' is equally acceptable, or even the only possible solution. One such instance occurs when the two verbs have different subjects, for example, *želim da ona jede* 'I want her to eat'. Despite the fact that *da* + present is a common construction in Croatian usage, evidenced extensively in literature, language planners of the 1990s had a strong preference for the infinitive form in all instances, even when this would, strictly speaking, be considered incorrect usage (Langston 1999, p 192).

Polemics about the correct writing practices in the Croatian language have animated Croatian literary and linguistic circles ever since the earliest attempts at standardisation in the seventeenth century (Moguš 1995, pp 119–25). The secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia in 1991 has reintroduced attempts to replace the prevalent 'phonetic' spelling practices, reflecting phonemic variants occurring in pronunciation due to the surrounding sounds, with etymological or morphonological spelling (*korijenski pravopis*), which privileges maximum transparency of the original form of the constitutive morphemes. Since both alternatives have a tradition in the Croatian literary practice, privileging one over the other has always been grounded in politics.

The polemic reached its peak in 2000 and early 2001, when two orthographic textbooks, the first one written by Stjepan Babić, Božidar Finka and Milan Moguš (BFM)(2000) and the second by Vladimir Anić and Josip Silić (AS) (2001) were published in the space of less than two months. Both textbooks essentially advocate 'phonetic' spelling, but they notably differ in three aspects: writing of the reflex of *yat* after the so-called 'covered *r*' as *e* and *je* respectively (e.g., AS *pogreška* versus BFM *pogrješka* 'mistake'); writing of the negation of the short form of the auxiliary verb *htjeti* 'will' as one word versus two words (AS *neću* versus BFM *ne ću*); and the omission versus preservation of consonants *d* and *i* in front of *c* (*otac* 'father', genitive AS *oca* versus BFM *otca*). Since the solutions proposed by Babić, Finka and Moguš display considerable affinity to etymological spelling, and since they had not been commonly used since at least 1960,[19] these authors have been accused of wanting to return to the spelling practices implemented in Pavelić's Independent Croatian State, while Anić and Silić have been considered guilty of yugo-nostalgia.

Originally, the textbook written by Babić, Finka and Moguš had been prepared for publication in 1971, but was repressed in the aftermath of the Croatian Spring. Subsequently, it saw two publications and one reprint in London, which is why it is now popularly called *Londonac*. Since 1994, the second edition of *Londonac* has been accepted as the norm. In the past, 'phonetic' and etymological approaches to Croatian orthography were never entirely consistent. To varying degrees, they always allowed 'exceptions', i.e. graphemic strings more characteristic of the rival approach than of their own established rules. While the earlier editions of the *Londonac* in these controversial cases offered two solutions, the latest edition — while still largely based on 'phonetic' principles — dismissed the alternatives which respected the rule of 'write-as-you-speak' in favour of those rendering word origins more transparent.

The suggestion that the graphemic sequence *ije*, deriving from long *yat* (treated as two syllables, in words like *lijep* 'good-looking', *bijel* 'white', *uvijek* 'always') be replaced by *ie* (treated as a diphthong: *liep, biel, uviek*) was equally controversial, primarily because linguists themselves could not reach a consensus as to whether the Croatian language in principle accommodates diphthongs or not. The opponents to this solution were stressing that this innovation might confuse the uneducated Croats, unable to distinguish between *ije* deriving from long *yat* and the same sequence arising from phonemic adaptation of loan words (e.g., *higijena* 'hygiene'), or from morphological and morpho-syntactic considerations (e.g., *smijem se* 'I laugh', from *smijati se* 'to laugh') (Samardžija 2000, p 87).

Conclusion: language and power

It is commonplace that political persuasion often dictates the linguistic choices we make. Political correctness is reflected in language: by replacing 'mankind' with 'humanity' or 'disabled' with 'physically challenged', we declare ourselves as proponents of a certain worldview. In Croatia of the 1990s, the medium was indeed the message. Those unwilling to accept purist arguments were likely to be regarded as opponents to the regime, traitors to the national cause. This fusion of language and power became most obvious in April 1995, when a parliamentary deputy from the ruling Croatian Democratic Community proposed two highly controversial draft bills on language matters.[20] The first proposal involved a drastic mutation of the standard language, focussing mainly on lexical 'purity' and orthographic practices. According to an article by Daria Šito-Sučić, around 30,000 words were to be banned as 'non-Croatian' (Šito-Sučić 1996). The other proposition intended to establish a Government Office for the Croatian Language, which would monitor linguistic practices and provide the means for penalisation of 'transgressors', with pecuniary fines or even imprisonment of up to six months. Both proposals were foreshadowed in late president Tudman's Christmas address to the nation five months earlier. On that occasion, Tudman deplored the high presence, in his view, of 'foreign words' in the Croatian language, and remarked that the problem had to be tended not only by the parliament and the government, but also by local and municipal councils. He also made comments about the necessity of establishing a government office for language matters (Vujnović 1995). Despite this authoritative forewarning, the parliament rejected both draft bills, which had been previously ridiculed by the independent media. The incident gave rise to critical comments by a number of prominent linguists, who maintained that the desired change in linguistic practices could not be achieved overnight, but had to be developed gradually, through consistent education (Samardžija 2000, p 85).

Indeed, one of the results of the Croatian language politics of the 1990s was the creation of the frightened, self-conscious speaker. Marko Samardžija, author of several publications on the language politics in the Independent Croatian State, comments on this state of affairs:

> I feel embarassed when I see a person who has used a 'wrong' word and then realised that a shadow of disquieting doubt has been cast on his Croatian credentials and his loyalty as a citizen. People halt in the middle of a word, then they go back to the beginning, they rewind their sentences looking for a different, better word. That entails frustration and insecurity in speech and writing. There is no spontaneous communication when the speaker is inhibited, frustrated (Samardžija 2000: 57).[21]

Significantly, not even the most prominent standard-bearers of language purity could help occasional 'slips of the tongue'. Thus, it has been reported that even the late president Tudman 'accidentally used the 'Serbian' word for 'happy', *srećan*, instead of the 'Croatian' *sretan*, during a live speech. His error was edited out of later broadcasts on state television, but the opposition press had a field day.' (Woodard 1996, p 18)

Purist tendencies in Croatian language politics have a long tradition. In the near future, it is likely that they will continue to develop along the familiar path of 'double resistance': against Serbian words and other foreign words, mostly English.

In their desire to join the European Union, the Croats at the beginning of the twenty-first century, are opting for supranational integration, which will introduce new issues of concern for those interested in molding the language into what they see as its 'primordial' form. The present day European Union of fifteen has eleven official languages, and legislative and policy issues should, in theory, always be communicated in all of them. However, English is already the original language of 55% of official documents, compared with 42% drafted in French, and 3% in German. Some fear that English may gradually impose itself, notably in the context of enlargement (Europe Information Service 2001, 102 and Phillipson 1999, p 98).

In the context of a future enlarged European Union, an unlikely question may impose itself on the speculative observer: if the Habsburg domination resulted in South-Slavic political, cultural and linguistic rapprochement in the 19th century, can we imagine a similar strategic development in an enlarged Europe dominated, politically, by its richer countries and, linguistically, by English? Probably not in the foreseeable future, at least not until the wounds heal.

Notes

1. *Gubitak jedne hrvatske riječi isto je što i gubitak jednog hrvatskog vojnika. Odnosno spas jedne hrvatske riječi isto je što i spas jednoga hrvatskog vojnika.*
2. I use the broad term of 'language politics' to signify all principles, beliefs and decisions reflecting the attitude of a particular society or social group towards the verbal repertory at its disposal. This definition, which takes into account the early work of Joshua A. Fishman, was offered by Bugarski (1986, p 72).
3. The terms *Abstand* and *Ausbau* were originally introduced by Kloss (1967, p 29–41).
4. The Universal Decimal Classification (UDC) — a project based on enlightenment ideas and developed at the end of the 19th century by two Belgian bibliographers — is an indexing and retrieval language for the 'whole of recorded knowledge', which uses a classification system based on arabic numerals.
5. *Razgovor o jeziku mene osobno uvijek podsjeti na Zagrebačku katedralu: kada je gledate recimo iz Kaptolske kleti, onda se vide dva zvonika, kada je gledate iz Gradske kavane, vidi se samo jedan. Dakle, po znanstvenom kriteriju hrvatski i srpski su jedan jezik jer pripadaju istom dijasistemu, ali po književnom, povijesnom, zbljskom kriteriju, kulturološkom kriteriju, to su dva jezika, svaki sa svojom prošlošću i identitetom.*

6. Unlike the other two dialects, which were reasonably unified, the Štokavian dialect had three distinct variants — Ijekavian, Ekavian and Ikavian –- reflecting different renditions of the Church Slavonic vowel *yat* as *(i)je*, *e* or *-i* respectively (see also Dragosavljevic in this volume).

7. The group, which included Croatian writers such as Dimitrije Demetar, Ivan Kukuljević and Ivan Mažuranić; Serbian philologists Đura Daničić and Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, was joined by the Slovene Slavist France Miklošič.

8. Morphological orthography (also called morphonological, etymological, or root orthography) tends to preserve individual morphemes within a word in their original form, not taking into account the consonant changes occurring in pronunciation (e.g., *bolestnik* 'sick person', rather than *bolesnik*; *jedanput*, 'once' rather than *jedamput*). Also, the diphthong deriving from *ě* (*yat*) is spelled as *ie* in long syllables (e.g., *sviet* 'world', where it is considered a one-syllabic diphthong. In short syllables, it is spelled as *je* (e.g., *svjetski* 'worldly').

9. *Narodni jezik Srba, Hrvata, i Crnogoraca jedan je jezik. Stoga je i književni jezik, koji se razvio na njegovoj osnovi oko dva glavna središta, Beograda i Zagreba, jedinstven, sa dva izgovora, ijekavskim i ekavskim.*

10. The full text of the Declaration can be found in Loknar (1995, pp 118–120).

11. The International Program of BBC in London, for example, did this as early as September 1991, when two separate language programs — for the Croatian and the Serbian language — replaced a common Serbo-Croatian program.

12. See for example, Dalibor Brozović's 'Ten Theses of the Croatian Standard Language,' originally published in 1971: 'The rights of the Croatian standard language are determined by the functions it performs for the Croatian nation, and not by the degree of similarity or dissimilarity it may have with other languages. The fact that, after being adopted by the Croatians, the Neo-Štokavian dialect ... was adopted as the basis for a standard language also by other nations that speak the dialects of the Croat-Serbian diasystem, does not permit us to speak, not even from the strictly linguistic point of view, of a concrete Croato-Serbian standard language. Not only because the choices were made independently and at different times, and not only because their dialectal bases are not identical, but because for every standard language as such the culturolinguistic superstructure is of essential importance' (Brozović 1975, p 209).

13. In practice, this meant 'as different from Serbian as possible'.

14. Some of the words threatened to be exiled from the language, although they clearly contributed to its lexical corpus as legitimate and enriching stylistic variants and their presence could be verified in both the literary tradition and everyday usage were: *hljeb* 'bread', *lampa* 'lamp', *hiljada* 'thousand', *veče* 'evening', *kičma* 'spine', etc.

15. Brodnjak's dictionary is not the first of its kind in the history of Croatian language standardisation. It's well-known precedent was Petar Guberina's and Kruno Krstić's (1940) *Razlike između hrvatskoga i srpskoga književnog jezika.*

16. For example, the maligned noun *izvještaj* (report) can assume a number of suffixes in morphosyntactic combinations such as *izvještajni* 'reporting (Adj)', *izvještajnistvo* 'reporting (Noun)', etc, while the 'politically correct' *izvješće* 'report' allows no such possibilities (Babić 1995, p 90).

17. The Croatian equivalents of these words are *stranka, tajnik, središnji odbor.*

18. Thus, for example, the NDH's *Legislative Order on the Croatian Language, its Purity and Orthography*, declared on 14 August 1941, stipulated that all texts written in dialect had to bear a clear statement of that fact (Samardžija 2000, p 51).

19. The year of joint publication of *Pravopis hrvatskosrpskog književnog jezika* and *Pravopis srpskohrvatskog književnog jezika* by Zagreb, Matica hrvatska and Novi Sad, Matica srpska.

20. This initiative had a precedent in Pavelić's Independent Croatian State, which also stipulated penalties for ignoring language regulations, i.e. the prohibition of swearwords and other words considered inappropriate by the authorities. About the language policy in NDH, see Samardžija 1993a and 1993b.

21. Nelagodno mi je kada vidim čovjeka koji je upotrijebio 'pogrešnu' riječ i osjetio da pada neugodna sjena sumnje na njegovo hrvatstvo ili njegovu građansku lojalnost. Ljudi zastaju u pola riječi pa se vraćaju na početak, 'vrte rečenicu unatrag tražeći drugu, bolju riječ. To za sobom povlači frustracije, nesigurnost, u govoru i u pisanju. Spontane komunikacije nema kad govornik ima bilo kakvu inhibiciju, bilo kakvu frustraciju.

References

Anić, V 1998, *Jezik i sloboda*, Matica hrvatska, Zagreb.

Anić, V and j. Silić 2001, *Pravopis hrvatskoga jezika*, 4th edition, Novi Liber and Školska knjiga, Zagreb.

Babić, S 1995, *Hrvatski jučer i danas*, Školske novine, Zagreb.

Babić, S Finka, B and Moguš, M 2000, *Hrvatski pravopis*, 5th edn, Školska knjiga, Zagreb.

Brass, P 1991, *Ethnicity and nationalism*, Sage, Newbury Park, CA.

Brodnjak, V 1991, *Razlikovni rječnik srpskog i hrvatskog jezika* Školske novine, Zagreb.

Broz, I 1892, *Hrvatski pravopis*, Zagreb.

Broz, I and Iveković, F 1901, *Rječnik hrvatskoga jezika*, Zagreb.

Brozović, D 1975, Deset teza o hrvatskom jeziku, *Hrvatska revija*, vol. 2, no. 25, p 209.

Bugarski, R 1986, 'Pogled na jezičku politiku i jezičko planiranje u Jugoslaviji', *Kulturni radnik,* vol.1, pp 72–82.

Europe Information Service 2001, 'European Union: European institutions mull language reform', *European Report*, 5 September, p.102.

Fishman, JA 1997, *In praise of the beloved language: a comparative view of positive ethnolinguistic consciousness*, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin.

Fishman, JA 1989, *Language and ethnicity in minority sociolinguistic perspective*, Multilingual Matters, Clevedon.

Fishman, JA 1996, 'Language and nationalism' in Stuart Woolf (ed.) *Nationalism in Europe, 1815 to the present*, pp 155–170, Routledge, London.

Fishman, JA 1971, 'The sociology of language: an interdisciplinary social science approach to language in society', *Advances in the sociology of language*, vol. 1, pp 217–404, Mouton, The Hague.

Greenberg, RD 1999, 'In the aftermath of Yugoslavia's collapse: the politics of language death and language birth', *International Politics*, vol. 36 no. 2, pp 141–58.

Guberina, P and Krstić, K 1940, *Razlike između hrvatskoga i srpskoga književnog jezika*, Matica hrvatska, Zagreb.

Jonke, L and Stevanović, M 1967, *Rječnik hrvatskosrpskog književnog jezika/Rečnik srpskohrvatskog književnog jezika*, 2 vols, Matica hrvatska and Matica srpska, Zagreb and Novi Sad.

Kloss, H 1967, 'Abstand languages and Ausbau languages', *Anthropological Linguistics*, vol. 9, no. 7, pp 29–41.

Ladan, T 2000, *Riječi — značenje, uporaba, podrijetlo*, ABC Naklada, Zagreb.

Langston, K 1999, 'Linguistic cleansing: Language purism in Croatia after the Yugoslav break-up', *International Politics*, vol. 36, no. 2, pp 179–201.

László, B 1993, 'Pabirci redničkoga i obavjestničkoga pojmovlja oko razumnih sustava', *Radovi Zavoda za informacijske studije Filozofskog fakulteta u Zagrebu*, vol. 5, pp 11–73.

Loknar, V 1995, *Rekli su o hrvatskom jeziku*, Medicinska naklada, Zagreb.

Maretić, T 1899, *Gramatika i stilistika hrvatskoga ili srpskoga književnog jezika*, Zagreb.

Moguš, M 1995, *Povijest hrvatskoga književnoga jezika*, Globus, Zagreb.

Phillipson, R 1999, 'Political science', in J.A. Fishman (ed.), *Handbook of language and ethnic identity*, pp 94–108, Oxford University Press, New York.

Pravopis hrvatskosrpskog književnog jezika, Pravopis srpskohrvatskog književnog jezika 1960, Matica hrvatska and Matica srpska, Zagreb and Novi Sad.

Samardžija, M 2000, *Jezikoslovni razgovori*, Riječ, Osijek.

Samardžija, M 1993, *Hrvatski jezik u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj*, Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, Zagreb.

Samardžija, M 1993, *Jezični purizam u NDH*, Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, Zagreb.

Šimundić, M 1994, *Rječnik suvišnih tuđica u hrvatskomu jeziku*, Barka, Zagreb.

Šito-Sučić, D 1996, 'The fragmentation of Serbo-Croatian into three new languages', *Transition,* vol. 2, no. 24, <http://www.cla.wayne.edu/polisci/krause/Easteurope/sources/sucic.htm>.

Šulek, B 1874-75, *Hrvatsko-njemačko-talijanski rječnik znanstvenog nazivlja*, Zagreb.

Vujnović, B 1995, Jezik za 'dobre Hrvate', at *Aimpress*, <http://www.aimpress.org/dyn/pubs/archive/data/199506/50613-001-pubs-zag.htm>.

Wachtel, Andrew Baruch 1998, *Making a nation, breaking a nation: literature and cultural politics in Yugoslavia*, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto.

Woodard, Collin 1996, 'Slips of the tongue can incite lashing by locals in former Yugoslavia', *Christian Science Monitor*, August 13, p 18, Boston.

Doing it our way: language politics in the clash between Istrian regionalism and Croatian nationalism

Dean Vuletić

Yale University

> Strange things have happened. Serbs have never been greater Serbs than in the last five years. Croats have never been greater Croats than in the last five years. Slovenes have never been greater Slovenes than in the last five years. And Istrians have never been greater Istrians than in the last five years. What, if I wanted to, I could easily arouse people so that they would go completely mad. At concerts I sing 'Istria' twice and I raise my arms…That arouses people. Just like elsewhere.[1] (Edi Maružin, lead singer of the Istrian rock band Gustafi, in an interview in the Slovenian weekly magazine *Mladina*, 11 July 1995.)

This statement by the lead singer of one of Istria's[2] — and Croatia's — most popular rock bands epitomises the revival of both national and regional identities in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The Herderian effect of the word 'Istria' demonstrates how the force of regional identities could be mobilised in the cultural sphere, whence it could be translated into the political. In the history of Croatia in the last decade, the political situation in the Istrian region was understandably overshadowed by the war between Croats and Serbs in Croatia and Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, a significant clash between Istrian regionalism and Croatian nationalism has been occurring in the Croatian political arena since 1990. The chief combatants in this political conflict have been the *Istarski demokratski sabor* (IDS, Istrian Democratic Assembly),[3] which advocates a multiethnic, multilingual, autonomist and regionalist program for the Istrian region within Croatia, and the *Hrvatska demokratska zajednica* (HDZ, Croatian Democratic Union), the nationalist party that governed the state from 1990 to 2000. While the clash between the IDS's regionalism and the HDZ's nationalism did not escalate into military conflict, it was manifested in the cultural, economic, political and social spheres. Language politics also functioned as a battleground of the regionalist-nationalist clash, which is not surprising considering that language — in the form of multilingualism — is a principal definer of Istrian regional identity, or Istrianism.

Although Istria was geographically and politically marginalised from the theatres of war in Croatia in the 1990s — situated as it is not on Croatia's frontier with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, but rather on the western borderland with Slovenia and Italy — the citizens of the heart-shaped Istrian peninsula have played a distinct and important role in the Croatian body politic. Indeed, while *Istarska županija* (Istria County) encompasses only

4.3 % of Croatia's population of 4.7 million, and 5.0 % of its territory of 56,538 km^2, such crude statistics do not take into account the political significance of Istria for Croatia. As a prime example, the platform of the IDS recognises, respects and promotes equal language rights for all of the three historically autochthonous nationalities in Istria — Croats, Italians and Slovenes. This policy of multilingualism is further complemented by a concerted effort to maintain the Istrian dialects of these languages. This multiethnic and multilingual program made Istria an admirable liberal democratic model for Croatia, when other parts of the country were divided along ethnic and national lines, and controlled by nationalist parties, particularly the HDZ. The latter's language policy emphasised the predominance of a Croatian national standard, and was less accommodating to the languages of minorities.

This essay will explore the language policies of the IDS and HDZ as an aspect of the political discord between them, from the establishment of the Republic of Croatia in 1991, until the present. The first part of the essay will provide a historical and linguistic introduction to Istria, and in doing so, will demonstrate the connection between multilingualism and Istrianism. The second part will focus on the political expression of Istrianism in the 1991 Yugoslav census and in the electoral success of the IDS. This will be followed by a discussion of the IDS's multilingual language policy, which will be contrasted with the nationalist one of the HDZ. The parties' attitudes towards national and regional languages and dialects were manifested in their promotional campaigns in Istria County, and examples of their campaign posters and television spots will be referred to. Finally, this essay will discuss the status of the IDS's language policy in Istrian County since the death of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in December 2000 and the defeat of his HDZ in the national elections of January 2000. It will be shown that parties in the new Croatian coalition government — which includes the IDS — still do not support the IDS's attempts to institutionalise multilingualism in Istria County.

Istria in three parts: historical and linguistic introduction

As is common for border regions in Central Europe — such as the Banat, Burgenland, Silesia and the Tyrol — the Istrian peninsula in the last century has been divided between and/or governed by six different states. In the first half of the twentieth century all of Istria was a part of Austria-Hungary (until 1918), then Italy (1918 to 1943), and Germany (1943-1945). After the Second World War it was divided between Yugoslavia and Italy, and following the dissolution of the former in 1991, it is now shared between Croatia, Slovenia and Italy. It is necessary to emphasise that this essay focuses on Croatian Istria, a focus that is justified by the fact that the bulk of the historical Istrian region is today contained within Croatia's Istria County. This county encompasses 65.6 % (2,820 km^2) of the territory of the historical Istrian region (4,302 km^2) and 60.3 % (or 245,934 persons) of the current population (338,734 persons) of this region.[4] Any resolution of Istrian regional issues thus largely depends on decisions and initiatives emanating from the Croatian political sphere.

The territorial division of Istria has historically been mirrored by efforts of the Croatian, Italian and Slovenian national movements to advance their interests and rights in the region. Competition between these national groups variously resulted in the domination of some over others. In Austria-Hungary, for example, Italians controlled the economic and political elite, and Italian was the official language, although there were Croatian and Slovenian cultural and educational institutions (Jahn 1999). Under fascist Italy, Mussolini's policy of an *Istria italianissima* ('most Italian Istria') resulted in the total linguistic Italianisation of Istria: Croatian and Slovenian associations and schools were shut down, and many Croats and Slovenes fled the region (see Trumpić 1993; Dukovski 1998). However, it must be noted that there was cooperation between the three national groups in the antifascist movement of the Second World War, and it is this historical tradition that the IDS draws upon when defining a common Istrian identity. After the Second World War the incorporation of Istria into Yugoslavia saw another exodus, this time of Italians and some Croats and Slovenes who did not want to live under Yugoslav communism (see Molinari 1996; Cattaruzza 1999). In Yugoslavia, however, cultural associations, newspapers and schools for the Italian minority were maintained (Zanini 1991), but the official languages were Croatian in Croatian Istria and Slovenian in the Slovenian part.

The three national languages — Croatian, Italian and Slovenian — today function as standard varieties in the parts of the Istrian region that lie in the respective states. Italian is also a second official language in the coastal region of Slovenia and in some Croatian municipalities in Istria County; in Croatia, this is in accordance with Article 12 of the Constitution, which permits the official use of another language alongside Croatian in municipalities where a national minority constitutes over 8 % of the population.[5] Alongside the national languages, there exist nine groups of dialects — six South Slavic and three Romance. The groups of Croatian dialects are Istrian Northwest Čakavian, Central Čakavian and Southeast Čakavian (Kalsbeeck 1998), and the Slovenian ones are Brkinski Slovenian and Šavrinski Slovenian (Logar 1996). The sixth South Slavic dialect group is Zeta-Lovćen Štokavian, or Istro-Montenegrene, which is the dialect of the inhabitants of the village of Peroj in west Istria, whose descendants migrated there from Montenegro in 1657 (Kalsbeeck 1998). The groups of Romance dialects are Istrioto, or Istro-Romance, and Venetian Italian. There also exists Istro-Romanian, whose speakers are the descendants of Vlachs who migrated to Istria in the middle ages (Kalsbeeck 1998). Apart from these autochthonous languages and dialects, Albanian, Macedonian, Serbian and other linguistic communities also exist, largely as the result of migrations that took place during the Yugoslav period.

It is the interaction, intermingling and mutual influence of the dialects and languages in Istria that produces the particular cultural character of Istrianism. As Ivan Jakovčić, the current president of the IDS, puts it, multiculturalism and multilingualism in Istria is reflected 'in the mentality, in everyday communication between people, in music, even in popular music, and in culture generally.' (Jakovčić, Radin and Debeljuh 1995, 11). The Croatian writer Slavenka Drakulić conveys this quality of Istria in her book *Café Europa*, in which she writes that '[t]his mixture of languages and the ease with which the people slip from one into the other is characteristic of life here' (Drakulić 1997, 163). Referring to the role that mixed marriages have also played in fostering this multilingual environment, she cites her friend Igor, whose 'parents talk to him in a Croatian language and to his wife in Italian' (Drakulić 1997, 163). One can also appreciate this multilingual aspect of Istrianism in the writings of Vladimir Nazor, Mate Balota and Fulvio Tomizza; Nazor's two-volume *Istarske teme* (Istrian Themes), for example, includes works composed in Croatian, a Croatian Istrian dialect and Italian (Nazor 1984). As a further example, there is the contemporary music of the groups Gustafi, KUD Idijoti and the singer Alen Vitasović, all of whose songs are in Croatian and Istrian dialects of Croatian, and are popular not only in Istria, but in other parts of Croatia and Slovenia as well.

Istria's linguistic diversity is also related to the economic development of the region, and the IDS'ss program places a high importance on the value of the economic aspect to Istrianism (Istarski demokratski sabor n.d.). Istria County is one of the most developed regions in Croatia, with a per capita gross domestic product higher than the Croatian average and a proportionately greater contribution to the country's domestic and foreign trade.[6] In the post-Second World War period, Istria also experienced a greater level of growth than the Croatian average,[7] which is particularly due to the development of its tourist industry and its resulting emergence in the 1980s as the most popular tourist destination in Yugoslavia (Janko 1997). Furthermore, Istria's economic position in Croatia was exaggerated in the 1990s when it was one of the regions whose economic infrastructure was physically least affected by the war. The region's economic development in the last fifty years has made it an area of immigration, and the arrival of Albanians, Macedonians, Serbs and others has increased its linguistic heterogeneity. Many citizens from Istria County also work in Italian and Slovenian Istria due to the higher incomes they receive there (Jahn 1996), and for them, multilingualism is not only a cultural characteristic of Istrianism, but also an economic necessity.

Istria rediviva: the emergence of the IDS

The results of the 1991 Yugoslav census were an early indication of the political force of the multicultural, multiethnic and multilingual Istrian regional identity. In the census, 18.1 % of the population of today's Istria County declared their nationality in terms of regional affiliation; in the 1981 census, when the Yugoslav authorities first permitted citizens to declare their nationality in regional terms, only 1.9 % of Istria's citizens did so (Table 1). In no other municipality of Croatia was the declaration of regional identity anywhere near as high; indeed, it was below 1 % in all other municipalities (Crkvenčić-Bojić 1992). This forecast that the political character of Istria in the Republic of Croatia would be different to that of the rest of the state. It was particularly Istrian Croats who chose to declare their regional affiliation over their Croatian nationality, for the increase in the number of Istrians in the 1991 census was paralleled by a decrease in the number of those who declared themselves as Croats (Žuljić 1994, 104). A reason for their embrace of regional identity lies in its oppositional nature against the nationalism espoused by the HDZ that promoted centralism, subjugated regional identities and excluded national minorities, all of which were of a particular threat to Istrianism. As Petar Janko, an Istrian economist and former IDS member of the Istria County Assembly, puts it,

> the main reason for this [the increase in the number of Istrians in the census] lies in some of the pre-election speeches of HDZ officials in Istria and about Istria (but not only them), and in some of the equally pragmatic actions of state and political officials after 1990. (Janko 1997, 3)

Tudjman himself stated that the declaration of Istrian identity in the census was the 'culmination of anti-Croatian indoctrination,' and that 'many have got the impression that

Zagreb, and everything on the other side of the Učka [the mountain range that separates the Istrian peninsula from the rest of Croatia, D.V.], has a stepmother-type relationship towards Istria' (Tudman, 1995, 274-5). Echoing these nationalist views, the Croatian demographer Stanko Žuljić believes that the declaration of nationality in a census should be *exclusive* of regional identity, on the grounds that the latter harms the integrity of the national corpus (Žuljić 1994, 50). Indeed, Žuljić relies on the mother tongue of respondents to determine the national identity of those who declared themselves as Istrians; on this basis, 87.4 % of them were Croats and 10.0 % Italians, while the remainder declared their mother tongue as Croato-Serbian or Serbo-Croatian. Žuljić's method, then, deliberately ignores the multilingual character of Istrians and their instrumental and emotional attitudes to language use.

Nationality	**1991**		**1981**	
	Number	**Percentage**	**Number**	**Percentage**
Croat	111 596	54.6	134 892	71.6
Regional	36 997	18.1	3 619	1.9
Italian	15 306	7.5	7 726	4.1
Serb	9 754	4.8	7 802	4.1
Yugoslav	7 301	3.6	21 800	1.6
Muslim	6 224	3.0	2 965	1.6
Not declared	6 014	2.9	915	0.5
Slovene	2 808	1.4	2 475	1.3
Others (including Albanians,Hungarians, Macedonians, Montenegrins)	8 346	4.1	6 138	3.3
Total	**204 346**	**100**	**188 332**	**100**

Table 1. The population of Istrian County by nationality according to the 1981 and 1991Yugoslav censuses. Statistics adapted from Crkvenčić-Bojić (1992, 30-35).

In any case, such arguments over the interpretation and significance of the census data become superfluous when examining the popularity of a regionalist political program in Istria, for election results show that support for the IDS has far exceeded the percentage of citizens declaring themselves as Istrians. As Loredana Bogliun-Debeljuh (1994) — a former IDS deputy prefect of Istrian County — argues, the census did not take into account declarations of nationality qualified with regional identity (i.e. Croatian Istrian, Italian Istrian, Slovenian Istrian), which is one reason why it did not predict the extent of support for the IDS. That a large number of Istrian citizens have favoured a regionalist political program is demonstrated by the fact that the IDS has overwhelmingly won municipal, county and national elections in Istria since it first stood in them in August 1992.[8] At that time, the IDS won 51 % of votes in Istria County in elections for the *Sabor* (Croatian Parliament) (Markotich 1994). In the county elections of February 1993, the IDS won 72 % of votes, taking political control of Istria County away from the *Socijaldemokratska partija* (SDP, Social Democratic Party). As Stan Markotich points out, this victory resulted in the IDS's 'virtual monopoly on government offices in Istria' (Markotich 1994, 14). Since then, the IDS has continued to reassert itself in national, county and local elections as the predominant force in Istrian politics HIDRA (n.d.b). Indeed, Istria County is the only Croatian county that has never been governed by the HDZ, although the HDZ was the second party in Istria between 1992 and 2000, and won some of the Istrian seats in the Sabor.

The IDS and HDZ lock horns: the language policies of the IDS and HDZ

The regionalist-nationalist clash between the IDS and HDZ was epitomised in their language policies by the former's embrace of multilingualism and the latter's prioritisation of the Croatian national standard. The program of the IDS has emphasised the cultural, economic, educational and social importance of multilingualism to the region's identity, and its policies have attempted to officially institute Croatian-Italian bilingualism at municipality and county levels. As the IDS's program puts it:

> Istria represents an integral trilingual region. It is necessary to define (sanction) the linguistic status of Istria and its three languages, Croatian, Italian and Slovenian, with a special regional statute that respects the sovereignty of the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia and the specific needs of particular Istrian municipalities where the Italian community lives and operates (Istarski demokratski sabor n.d.).

Apart from the promotion of the national languages, the IDS's program also pays particular attention to Istria's dialects:

> It is necessary to protect and defend local dialects that are tied to the values of local cultural traditions — and which are a symbol of a common self-consciousness — as an expression of the linguistic and cultural wealth of Istria. It is therefore necessary to include Istrian dialects in scholastic plans and programmes. The preservation of the dialectal wealth of Istria, through the cultivation of the Čakavian, Kajkavian, Čokavian, Šavrinski, Istrioto, Istro-Venetian and remaining dialects is indivisibly tied with the evaluation of specific markings of Istrian multiethnic autochthonism (Istarski demokratski sabor n.d.).

The references in the above excerpts to the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovenian language and its dialects require some clarification. The IDS is also a registered party in Slovenia, where it is known by its Slovenian name *Istrski demokratski zbor* (IDZ). While the IDS/IDZ supports the equality of the Croatian, Italian and Slovenian languages throughout the historical Istrian region, it only advocates official Croatian-Italian bilingualism for Istria

County, because the Slovenian minority there comprises only 1.4 % of the population (Table 1).

In order to more completely present the nationalistically charged context in which the clash between the IDS's and HDZ's language policies occurred, it is necessary to outline aspects of the HDZ's language policy. The Tudjman government's priority in this sphere was to differentiate the Croatian national standard as much as possible from Serbian (Okuka 1998). Seeing 'Serbo-Croatian' as a relic of a Yugoslavist ideology that had undermined Croatian national identity, the HDZ government sought to distinguish and purify Croatian from Serbian elements following Croatia's independence. The modifications made to the Croatian language included the rejection of morphological and syntactical constructions which 'sound' Serbian, (see Kačić 1997) and the replacement of words considered foreign — and especially 'Serbian' — with more 'Croatian' equivalents (be it a word revived from the Croatian linguistic heritage or the creation of a new one).[9] The new standard was enforced in education, media and politics, and resulted in the proliferation of new dictionaries and grammar guides (Okuka 1998). In a study on the impact of the HDZ's language policies on language attitudes and linguistic behaviour in Istria, the linguist Jens-Eberhard Jahn concludes that many inhabitants of the region identified 'the new Croatian standard with a centralist and nationalistic policy and its supporters, which they do not appreciate.' Consequently, they linguistically emphasised their regionalist tendencies by using Istrian dialects (Jahn 1999).

In the political sphere, the principle area of conflict between the language policies of the IDS and HDZ has concerned the official adoption of Croatian-Italian bilingualism in Istria County. The IDS first attempted to officially establish Istria County as bilingual in April 1994, when a new county statute was adopted. Although the statute was accepted by the Istria County Assembly, the national government in Zagreb suspended it, for it considered thirty-six of its articles to be unconstitutional (Marinković 1995). Among the articles that it opposed were those that concerned bilingualism, the equality of national languages, and the rights of the Italian minority. In February 1995, the Constitutional Court decided that eighteen of the controversial articles were unconstitutional, including those that concerned bilingualism. The Court's decision was based on its interpretation of Article 12 of the Constitution, which states that bilingualism is decided at the municipality — and not the county — level (Marinković 1995). In addition, the Court stated that Italians only have a right to bilingualism in those municipalities and towns where they comprise over 8 % of the population, and according to the 1991 census, they were only 7.5 % of the county's total population (Marinković 1995).

The IDS believed that the decision of the Constitutional Court was made under pressure from the HDZ, and it declared that it would seek international support for its position (Marinković 1995). Since its formation, the IDS has promoted its interests in European organisations, such as the Assembly of European Regions (AER), Council of Europe (CE), European Union (EU) and the European Parliament (EP). Indeed, the significance of the IDS's regionalism in the history and politics of Croatia lies not only in its challenge to the nationalist ideology of Tudjman, but concurrently and cooptively in its success in developing relations with West Europe at a time when the president's anti-regionalist and nationalist policies were isolating Croatia from the West. In March 1995, the Parliamentary

Assembly of the CE attacked the Croatian government's suspension of the Statute and the decision of the Constitutional Court. The assembly related the Istrian case to the war in Croatia at the time, adding that 'the political restrictions on the rights of national minorities and regional assemblies must be harmonised with the reintegration of the Serb minority in Croatia's occupied territories' (Marinković 1995:8). The CE's Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe (CLRE) also criticised the Croatian government's opposition towards bilingualism in Istria, and suggested that the CE ensure that the government change its position before admitting Croatia into its organisation (Council of Europe 1996). Significantly, the Italian government was also critical of the repeal of the statute (Gregorič 1997), but it was careful to present its position as supportive of the Italian minority rather than the IDS, for it regarded Istrian regionalism primarily as a domestic issue for Croatia (Greco 1997).

Together with the statute, another prime example of the clash between the language politics of the IDS and HDZ occurred in their policies towards schooling in minority languages. The IDS believes that bilingualism in public life needs to be promoted at all levels of education, and has advocated the study of the Italian language and of Istrian dialects in Istria's schools (Istarski demokratski sabor n.d.). However, the HDZ government attempted to restrict the bilingual education of students in May 1996, when the Minister of Education, Ljilja Vokić, introduced a bill for a new law on education in the languages of ethnic and national minorities. While most of the proposed law was not controversial, one aspect attracted particular criticism from the IDS, representatives of national minorities and the Italian government (Betti and Bonduri 1998). This was Vokić's proposal that those eligible to enrol in minority-language schools should be

> a person of Croatian citizenship, who considers themselves a member of an ethnic or national community or minority, with regards to their ancestry, mother or spoken tongue. Membership of an ethnic or national community or minority is declared before enrolment and is neither questioned nor proven (Vukić 1996).

The problem with this proposal was that not only are the children of Italian parents enrolled in Italian-language kindergartens, primary and secondary schools in Istria, but also children of Croatian or mixed marriage parentage (Vukić 1996). Vokić's proposal would thus have limited the multicultural and multilingual development of Istria's citizens by restricting their schooling according to their mother tongue (which echoes Žuljić's method of determining the nationality of Istrians according to their mother tongue). The bill was rejected by the Sabor, but it was not Vokić's last controversy concerning minority schools. In September 1997, she introduced minimum numbers required to hold classes, which had a particular impact on classes held in minority languages (Djilas 1995). In a compromise reached with the IDS prefect of Istria County, Stevo Žufić, and the Italian minority's representative in the Sabor, Furio Radin, she agreed to allow the county to finance smaller classes in the Italian language. However, the Ministry of Education then issued a decree ordering schools to reduce class time for the teaching of minority languages, and to increase the hours of teaching of the Croatian language (Djilas 1995).

In the aforementioned examples, the contrast between the IDS's multinational regionalism and the HDZ's exclusive nationalism is evident. However, while the IDS's policies are inclusive of Istrian Croats, Slovenes and Italians, its regionalism can also be exclusive of other groups who do not fit into its cultural and historical concept of Istrianism. For example, the presence of Albanians, Bosniacs, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs and other groups in Istria challenges the IDS's policy of prioritising the three main national groups. Indeed, there were more Serbs than Slovenes in Istria County in the 1991 census (Table 1), although it is likely that many of them left before and during the war in Croatia. However, that the community of Serbs in Istria remains numerous enough was suggested in 2000, when its representative organisation suggested that Istria should be trilingual, with the official languages being Croatian, Italian and Serbian. While recognising the right of Serbs and other groups to have their own schools and cultural organisations, Jakovčić responded that Serbian could not become one of the official languages in Istria as Serbs do not have the same cultural and historical tradition in Istria that the Croats, Italians and Slovenes have (Ljuština 2000).

One knows who we are: language in IDS and HDZ promotional campaigns

The continued popularity of the IDS did force the Istrian branch of the HDZ to modify its nationalist image by embracing aspects of Istrian identity, albeit only the Croatian ones. In this vein, Tudjman too declared in July 1993 that he recognised 'the special qualities of Istria', but stressed that he would not tolerate threats to a strong central administration and Croatia's territorial integrity (Markotich 1993, 24). The HDZ's attempts to improve its image in Istria were evidenced in the promotional posters and television spots that it created especially for the region. In these, the HDZ used both the Croatian national language and its Istrian Čakavian dialect in order to tie the national with the regional. For example, the HDZ adapted its official campaign slogan — '*Zna se*' ('One knows') — for the Istrian region by coupling it with a Čakavian phrase: '*Zna se ki smo, ča smo i kamo gremo*' ('One knows who we are, what we are and where we are going'). The slogan linguistically reflects the HDZ's rhetoric of recognising regional traits, but syntactically insists that regional peculiarities should be subordinate to the national identity. Among the television spots produced were three animated clips titled '*Na svome svoj*' ('Ours on our own land'), '*Zna se ki smo, ča smo i kamo gremo*' and '*Izaberimo svoju kozu*' ('Let's choose our own goat') — the goat being a symbol of the Istrian region. In these, the HDZ depicts Croatia as the 'liberator' and 'protector' of Istria against the historical 'oppressors' of Austria-Hungary, fascist Italy and communist Yugoslavia.[10] The desired effect of these clips was, then, to assert a Croatian national history and identity for Istria, in opposition to the multiethnic and multilingual one espoused by the IDS.

In contrast to the slogans and promotional campaigns of the HDZ, the IDS has avoided adopting Croatian national images and symbols, and instead uses regional and European ones. A poster from the IDS's campaign for the national elections of January 2000 provides another poignant insight into the use of language in political campaigns in Istria County. Titled '*Našim putem, con la nostra gente*' ('Our way, with our people'), it consists of a green expanse of land with a path traversing through it. Unlike the HDZ's slogan for Istria — '*Zna se ki smo, ča smo i kamo gremo*' — which combines the national language and its regional dialect, the slogan on the IDS poster captures the multiethnic and multilingual character of Istria. The Italian half of the caption — '*Con la nostra gente*' — emphasises Istrian regional solidarity, a common identity and a concept of community. Significantly, it uses the word *gente*, which in Italian refers to a collective group of persons rather than a 'people' in the ethnic or national sense of the term (which Italian translates as *popolo*). By using *gente*, the IDS is refuting accusations that it is promoting the concept of an Istrian nation, which the HDZ, other Croatian political parties and the nationalist media had attacked it as doing (Markotich 1993). Finally, the poster is marked with the official logo of the IDS: it comprises the party's Croatian and Italian initials, thereby emphasising the multiethnic and multilingual character of Istria and IDS policy; the regional symbol of the goat, there being three to represent the Croatian, Slovenian and Italian parts of Istria; and the stars of Europe, symbolising the Europeanist aspect of the IDS's program.

Change in Zagreb? The IDS in post-Tudjman Croatia

The death of Tudjman in December 1999 and the electoral defeat of the HDZ in January 2000 heralded the establishment of a new, more pro-European and less nationalist Croatian government. The elections of 3 January 2000 were a victory for the IDS in a national sense, for they resulted in it entering a six-party coalition government. The government is a coalition of coalitions, being made up of the '*četvorka*' ('Four') coalition, which includes the IDS, *Hrvatska narodna stranka* (Croatian People's Party, HNS), *Hrvatska seljačka stranka* (Croatian Peasants' Party, HSS), and *Liberalna stranka* (Liberla Party, LS), and the coalition between the SDP and the *Hrvatska socialno-liberalna stranka* (HSLS, Croatian Social Liberal Party). In addition, Stipe Mesić, the candidate of the Four, won the presidential elections in February 2000. All the parties in the new government support a degree of decentralisation and regional structure for Croatia, and amendments made to the Croatian constitution in October 2000 reduced the power vested in the Croatian presidency and paved the way for more extensive laws on regional self-government (HINA 2000; Vukić 2000).

The new Croatian government's recognition of the significance of Croatian regions, especially Istria, in Croatia's European integration efforts was demonstrated when the IDS was awarded the Ministry of European Integration (MEI), with Jakovčić becoming minister. That the IDS's policies are recognised as a positive model for Croatia's relations with Europe is also evident in developments made in bilingual schooling throughout Croatia. In February 2001, the Ministry of Education declared that, from autumn 2001, it would re-introduce bilingual Croatian-English, Croatian-German and Croatian-French classes into all schools, in order to prepare Croatian youth for entry into the EU (Vijesti Hrvatske radiotelevizije 2001a). Such classes were suspended by the Vokić ministry, but Croatian-Italian bilingual classes were maintained by Istria County throughout the 1990s, and the Ministry of Education's new project is inspired by the success of the Istrian model (Vijesti Hrvatske radiotelevizije 2001a).

However, the extent to which Istria County could be a model for Croatia's national language policy has caused concern among the IDS's coalition partners. This has been demonstrated in the recent controversy surrounding the adoption of a new statute for Istria County. On 9 April 2001, the County Assembly adopted a statute that again attempts to introduce official bilingualism (Istarski demokratski sabor 2001). Although the IDS's coalition partners supported the Statute of 1994 — including the articles on bilingualism that were opposed by the HDZ — in the current case all coalition partners except one (the

LS) have opposed the new move as unconstitutional. The speaker of the Sabor, the HSS leader Zlatko Tomčić, called on the IDS to withdraw the statute or leave the coalition government (Rašeta 2001a). The Croatian Premier and leader of the SDP, Ivica Račan, made the following statement regarding the statute:

> To politically equalise Croatian and Italian where Italians are a national minority means opening a 'Pandora's box,' not only in Istria County but in the whole of Croatia too. If all the counties have equal laws, then there is no reason why it should not be demanded on that basis that the Serbian language is equal with Croatian, or that in Osijek-Baranja County Serbian and Hungarian are equal (Vijesti Hrvatske radiotelevizije 2001b).

On 23 April the Minister of Justice, Stjepan Ivanišević, of the SDP, declared that his ministry had decided to suspend ten of the articles of the new statute and have their constitutionality decided by the Constitutional Court (Vijesti Hrvatske radiotelevizije 2001a). The political atmosphere surrounding the debate was characterised by an increasing competition between the IDS, SDP and the HSLS for the Istrian electorate, particularly as they prepared for local elections that took place on May 20. The SDP and HSLS both criticised the IDS's push for the new Statute and its attempts to legally sanction bilingualism in Istria County as a pre-election tactic designed to attract the regionalist vote (Rašeta 2001b). In the local elections of May 20, the IDS achieved another strong electoral success when it won 51.8 % of votes for the county assembly, giving it 28 out of 41 seats.

IDS leaders said that they would rather withdraw from the government than rescind the statute (Vukić 2001a), and such statements began to bring into question the stability of the national coalition. In a press conference in the regional centre of Pazin on 2 June 2001, Jakovčić declared that, 'considering the political situation in Croatia, and especially the mutual relations within the governing coalition', the presidium of the IDS had decided to leave the coalition government, and he his ministerial post (Urošević, 2001a). The following day, Jakovčić said that some of the coalition partners had belittled and ignored all of the IDS's achievements in Istria County, and had devalued Istria in every way, ranging from the crisis faced by the regional bank, *Istarska banka* (Istrian Bank) in March 2000, to the new county statute (Urošević, 2001b). In this way, the opposition of some of the governing parties to the articles on bilingualism in the IDS's new statute for Istria County was one of the factors that influenced the IDS's departure from the coalition. The changing of the six-party coalition into a five-party one marked the first major crisis that the Croatian government experienced since its landslide victory against the HDZ in January 2000.

Conclusion

In the 1990s, the political discord between the IDS and the HDZ was evident in their different language policies. The IDS pursued official bilingualism at the county level and in schooling, and the HDZ used its control of the national government to hamper such measures. The clash between the language policies of the two parties was due to their different views on how a person's ethnic or national identity should be conceived. For the IDS, the common history of Istrian citizens, their multiculturalism and multilingualism all define a particular regional identity, or Istrianism. By embracing Istrianism as the major definer of its program, the IDS was *ipso facto* obligated to bring issues concerning the region's multilingualism into the Croatian political discourse. The conceptualisation of an identity that was inherently multicultural, multiethnic and multilingual did not concord with the nationalism of the HDZ, which regarded the Croatian language as a chief — and historically vulnerable — marker of national identity. For Tudjman's party, the Republic of Croatia was the nation-state of the Croatian people, and its linguistic integrity could not be compromised by any attempts to restrict the predominance of the Croatian national standard in official usage.

The language aspect of the clash between the IDS and Zagreb took on a new dimension following the election of a new Croatian government in January 2000. The current Croatian government is more actively pro-European than its predecessor, and it recognised the importance of aspects of the IDS's program to Croatia's European integration efforts by awarding the MEI to the IDS. It has also re-instituted a bilingual program in schools, which is justified by broader, Europeanist objectives. Advances made in improving Croatia's relations with the EU, together with democratisation reforms that have weakened the centralist structure inherited from the Tudjman era, are contributing to the realisation of some of the IDS's objectives.

However, the new political status quo in Croatia has provided no quick solutions to many Istrian regionalist issues. The recent controversy surrounding the adoption of a new statute for Istria County and the departure of the IDS from the coalition government demonstrates that tension between the IDS and Zagreb remains. The IDS has shown that its priorities lie on its regional policies and responsibilities, rather than national ones, not only in the sphere of language policy but in all other areas as well. The favourable results of the IDS in the May 2000 local elections also indicate that Istrian voters are continuing to politically affirm the importance that they place on the issue of multilingualism in Istria County and, *ipso facto*, the importance that they accord it as a marker of Istrianism. The Croatian government — in accordance with the decisions of the Constitutional Court — will now have to determine the extent to which it is willing to allow counties to pursue their own language policies free of Zagreb's interference. At a time when Croatia is experiencing some devolution of power to the counties after the centralism of the HDZ period, the nature of regional-national power relations is in flux. However, the resolution of the constitutionality of the articles on bilingualism in the new statute will partly determine the extent to which regional and national language policies can co-exist in Croatia.

Notes

1. All translations in this paper are my own.
2. When reference is made in this essay to Istria or Istrians, this will mean, for the sake of simplicity, Istria County and its citizens. When the intention is otherwise, these nouns will be qualified with appropriate adjectives. For example, 'the historical Istrian region' refers to Istria as defined by the region's borders during the Austro-Hungarian period.

3. Names of Istrian places, political parties and otherwise in Croatia are mentioned in this essay in their Croatian forms. This is again intended for simplicity, and should not be interpreted as detracting from or rejecting the multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual nature of Istria and Istrian organisations.

4. Slovenian Istria comprises 13.9 % (596 km^2) of the territory of the historical Istrian region and 21.7 % (69,991 persons) of its population; the figures for Italian Istria are 1.5 % (63 km^2) and 5.7 % (19,209 persons) respectively. Istria County itself does not include the entire historical region of Istria that today falls within Croatia, including the town of Opatija and the islands of Cres and Lošinj. When these are included, Croatian Istria comprises 84.7 % (3,643 km^2) of the territory of the historical Istrian region and or 72.6 % (245,934 persons) of its current population. These figures are derived from those cited in Janko (1997, p 93).

5. Article 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia reads: 'In the Republic of Croatia, the Croatian language and Latin alphabet is in official use. In certain local constituencies, a second language or the Cyrillic or other alphabet can be introduced into official use alongside the Croatian language and Latin alphabet, in accordance with the regulations of the law.' <http://www.vlada.hr/ustav .html>.

6. In 1991, Istria County accounted for 8.1 % of Croatia's exports and 6.6 % of its imports (Jakovčić, Radin, Debeljuh 1995, p 21). In 1990, Istria's per capita GDP was 29.6 % higher than the Croatian average. (Turčić 1995, p 238).

7. The average annual growth of Istria's GDP between 1962 and 1990 was 4.8 %, while the figure for Croatia as a whole was 3.7 %. (Padjen 1995, p 221).

8. Although the IDS was established in February 1990 — making it among the first parties to be formed in Croatia following the abandonment of the one-party Yugoslav communist system — it was unprepared for the 1990 elections (Istarski demokratski sabor 1990, HIDRA n.d.a).

9. For a list of such words, see Okuka (1998, p 142).

10. In *Izaberimo svoju kozu*, a group of goats is clustered around a window inside a typical Istrian stone house. A wolf appears three times, first wearing the hat of an Italian fascist and then one of a Yugoslav Partisan. The wolf tries to scare the goats, but the goats are not afraid and poke out their tongues and laugh. On its third attempt, the wolf appears wearing the head of a goat, but after a moment of hesitation the goats react in the same way as before. The goat's head worn by the wolf is a reference to the IDS and the HDZ's belief that its policies threaten Istria's position within the Croatia nation. Finally, a goat larger than the ones in the house clubs the wolf on the head. The other goats embrace and dance around the larger goat, which represents Croatia, and then drive away together on a tractor that bears the initials of the HDZ. A speaker then declares: '*Izaberimo svoju kozu — HDZ!*' ('Let's choose our own goat — the HDZ!').

References

Betti, L and Bonduri, GL 1998, 'Rome and Zagreb: necessarily partners?', in *Italy and the Balkans*, Center for International and Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C.

Bogliun-Debeljuh, L 1991, 'Come faremo la nostra euroregione Istria' *Limes* No. 1, pp 263–70.

Cattaruzza, M 1999, 'Istrijský exodus', in D Brandes, E Ivaničkova, J Pešek (eds), *Vynútený rozchod: vyhanie a vysídlenie z Československa 1938-1947 v porovaní s Pol'skom, Mad'arskom a Juhosláviou*, Veda, Bratislava.

Council of Europe 1996, 'Local and regional democracy in Croatia', *Congress Newsletter — Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe* No. 4. <http://www.coe.fr/cplre/ bulletin/e%2896%294.htm>.

Crkvenčić-Bojić, J 1992, 'Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava, stanova i poljoprivrednih gospodarstava, 31. ožujak 1991.: stanovništvo prema narodnosti po naseljima', in J Crkvenčić-Bojić (ed.) Republički zavod za statistiku, Zagreb.

Djilas, M 1995, Ministrica i dalje jaše, in *AIM*, 20 February 1995. <http://www.aimpress.org/ dyn/pubs/archive/data/ 199709/70925-014-pubs-zag.htm>.

Drakulić, S 1997, *Café Europa*, Norton, New York.

Dukovski, D 1998, *Fašizam u Istri*, CASH, Pula.

Greco, E 1997, 'L'evoluzione delle relazioni politiche dell'Italia con la Slovenia e la Croazia dopo la dissoluzione della Jugoslavia', in T Favaretto, and E Greco (eds), *Il confine riscoperto: Beni degli esuli, minoranze e cooperazione economica nei rapporti dell'Italia con Slovenia e Croazia*, FrancoAngeli, Milano.

Gregorič, M 1997, *Politični ciklon nad Istro*, Lipa, Koper.

HIDRA (=Hrvatska informacijsko-dokumentacijska referalna agencija), n.d.a, *Istarski demokratski sabor*, <http://www.hidra.hr/STR/s000007h.htm>.

HIDRA (=Hrvatska informacijsko-dokumentacijska referalna agencija), n.d.b, *Kronologija osnivanja političkih stranaka u Republici Hrvatskoj*. <http://www.hidra.hr/ STR/501int5.htm>.

HINA 2000, *Jakovčić: Ustavne promjene pomažu europeizaciji Hrvatske*, news wire, 9 October 2000.

Istarski demokratski sabor n.d *Programska deklaracija*. <http://www.ids-ddi.com/cro/programska. htm>.

Istarski demokratski sabor 1990, Povijest. <http://www.ids-ddi.com/cro/oidsu.htm>.

Istarski demokratski sabor 2001, *Statut Istarske županije*. <http://www.ids-ddi.com/statut.htm>.

Istarski demokratski sabor n.d. *Programska deklaracija*, <http://www.ids-ddi.com/cro/programska. htm>.

Jahn, J.-E 1996, 'Istrien im Spannungsfeld zwischen Regionalismus und Nationalismus: vom mitteleuropäischen Kronland zur umstrittenen Grenzregion' *Halbjahresschrift für südosteuropäische Gecshichte*, vol. 8, no. 1, pp 40–54.

Jahn, J.-E 1999, 'New Croatian language planning and its consequence for language attitudes and linguistic behaviour — the Istrian case' *Language and Communication*, vol. 19, no. 4, pp 329–54.

Jakovčić, I., Radin, F and Debeljuh, D 'Istra', *Erasmus*, no. 11, pp 11–26.

Janko, PP 1997, *O Istri i istrijanstvu je riječ*, CASH, Pula.

Kačić, M 1997, *Croatian and Serbian: delusions and distortions*. (Trans. L. Sočanac), Novi Most, Zagreb.

Ljuština, B 2000, 'Neopravdani zahtjevi Srba' in *Slobodna Dalmacija*, 31 May 2000.

Logar, T 1996, *Dialektološke in jezikovnozgodovinske razprave*, Inštitut za slovenski jezik Frana Ramovša, Ljubljana.

Marinković, G 1995, Zagreb: Pula 18:18, in *AIM* 20 February 1995 <http://www.aimpress.org/dyn/pubs/archive/ data/199502/50220-001-pubs-zag.htm>.

Markotich, S 1993, 'Croatia's Istrian Democratic Alliance' in *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 33, pp 14-9.

Markotich, S. 1993, 'Istria Seeks Autonomy', *RFE/RL Research Report* Vol. 2, no. 36, pp 22-6.

Molinari, F 1996, *Istria contesa: la guerra, le foibe, l'esodo*, Mursio, Milan.

Nazor, V 1984, *Istarske teme (Knjiga prva, knjiga druga)* Čakavski sabor, et al., Pula.

Okuka, M 1998, *Eine Sprache — viele Erben: Sprachpolitik als Nationalisierungsintsrument in Ex-Jugoslawien*, Wieser, Klagenfurt.

Padjen, J 1995, 'Istra, njezin razvitak i položaj u Hrvatskoj' in J Padjen, D Vojnić and Z Baletić (eds) *Prilozi regionalnoj ekonomici u Hrvatskoj: Istra*. Ekonomski institut, Zagreb.

Rašeta, B 2001a, 'Damir Kajin, potpredsjednik IDS-a: Vlast damo, statut ne damo', *Feral Tribune*, 21 April 2001.

Rašeta, B 2001b, 'Očekujem da mi se kolege iz koalicije ispričaju', *Feral Tribune*, 14 April 2001.

Trumpić, D 1993, *Hrvatska Istra*, Alinea, Zagreb.

Tuđman, F 1995, *S vjerom u samostalnu Hrvatsku*, Narodne novine, Zagreb.

Turčić, I 1995, 'Makroekonomski razvitak Istre u Republici Hrvatskoj za posljednja tri desteljeća' in J. Padjen, D. Vojnić and Z. Baletić (eds), *Prilozi regionalnoj ekonomici u Hrvatskoj: Istra*. Ekonomski institut, Zagreb.

Urošević, M 2001a, 'IDS napušta vladajuću koaliciju, a Jakovčić Vladu!', *Vjesnik* 3 June 2001.

Urošević, M 2001b, 'IDS postaje oporba, a Jakovčić saborski zastupni' in *Vjesnik* 4 June 2001.

Vijesti Hrvatske radiotelevizije 2001a, *Ministarstvo pravosuđa obustavilo 10 odredbi istarskog Statuta*, news wire, 23 April 2001. <http://www.hrt.hr/vijesti/arhiv/2001/04/23/>.

Vijesti Hrvatske radiotelevizije 2001b, *U hrvatske škole uvodi se dvojezična nastava*, news wire, 14 February 2001. <http://www. hrt.hr/vijesti/arhiv/2001/02/14/>.

Vukić, I 1996, 'Škole za manjine' in *AIM* 28 May 1996. <http://www.aimpress.org/dyn/pubs/ archive/data/199605/ 60528-001-pubs-zag.htm>.

Vukić, I 2000, 'Jakovčić: U Hrvatskoj počeo process decentralizacije', *Glas Istre* 14 November 2000.

Vukić, I 2001, 'Jakovčić i Kajin o izjavi predsjednika HSS-a Zlatka Tomčića', *Glas Istre* 13 April 2001.

Zanini, B 1991, 'La scuola del gruppo nazionale italiano: problemi e prospettive', in G. Padoan and U. Bernardi (eds), *Il gruppo nazionale italiano in Istria e a Fiume oggi: Una cultura per l'Europa*, Longo, Ravenna.

Žuljić, S 1994 *Hrvatska Istra: Suvremene narodnosne prilike*, Nakladni zavod Globus, Zagreb/.

Language and politics in the Republika Srpska

Andjelija Dragosavljević

Australian National University

Introduction

At the end of the twentieth century the political scene in the former Yugoslavia was dominated by issues of nationalism, and nationalism has affected virtually all aspects of life in the region, including the linguistic sphere. Language has become an instrument of nationalist change in the region, and through language planning, governments in the region have attempted to change the linguistic reality to accommodate nationalist aims and to reflect political and ethnic identities (Dragosavljević 1998, 2000, also see Mikula this volume).

This nationalist approach to language planning was particularly evident, when in 1993, during the Bosnian conflict, the Bosnian Serb government introduced legislation which declared the Ekavian variety to be the only official standard pronunciation on its territories and, in so doing, removed Ijekavian as a standard pronunciation, although it had hitherto equally been a part of the standard language in the former Yugoslav territories. This change was implemented despite the fact that Ekavian was not spoken in the Republika Srpska (as the Bosnian Serb-held territories became known after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995), and that Ijekavian had been the normal standard for Bosnian Serbs. The officialisation of Ekavian attempted to change not only orthographic rules in the Republika Srpska, but also the way in which people pronounced certain commonplace words. This policy affected all areas where the language was used in an official context (government, media, education). This paper will concentrate on the implications of the policy on the education sector in the Republika Srpska, and the reasons for its failure.

The linguistic situation in Yugoslavia

The nationalist issue in Bosnian Serb language planning stemmed from a feature of the standard pronunciation and orthography of the officialised Serbo-Croatian language of the former Yugoslavia. The standard language consisted of two officially standardised variants. The Eastern variant, with the Ekavian standard pronunciation and the Cyrillic script, was used in Serbia, while the Western variant, with the Ijekavian standard pronunciation and the Latin script, was used in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Ijekavian and Cyrillic script was used in Montenegro. Thus, the Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs all shared the same standardised variant — Ijekavian. The Serbs from Serbia, however, used a different standardised variant — Ekavian. It is this *geographical distribution* of the standardised variants of the Serbo-Croatian language which the Bosnian Serb authorities attempted to change through language planning.

The Ijekavian/Ekavian dichotomy extended to a few hundred words in the language which once contained the Proto-Slavonic phoneme /ě/, or 'jat' as it is known. Over time, this phoneme developed into two distinct forms — 'e', which became the basis of the Ekavian standard pronunciation, and '(i)je', forming the basis of the Ijekavian standard pronunciation. Although this difference extends to only a few hundred words in the Serbo-Croatian language, they include such common words as 'girl' (*devojka/djevojka*), 'news' (*vest/vijest*), 'body' (*telo/tijelo*), 'milk' (*mleko/mlijeko*) and 'white' (*belo/bijelo*).

The significant role which language may play in the development of a national consciousness and ethnic politics influenced the formulation of language policies in the former, communist Yugoslavia. As L Holmes (1986, p 332) explains, the Communist Party was not 'unaware of the problems of national, religious and linguistic antagonisms, and the Yugoslav authorities (were) consistently among the most sensitive in the communist world'. The Communist authorities recognised fourteen official languages in the Yugoslav state, of which Serbo-Croatian was one. Both Ekavian and Ijekavian were granted official status as the two standard pronunciations of Serbo-Croatian. They were accorded official status in the republics in which they were spoken. Thus, Ijekavian was accorded official status in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, while Ekavian had official status in Serbia.

Nevertheless, under the former Yugoslav educational planning bodies, the republics in which Serbo-Croatian was spoken introduced students to both standard pronunciations and both scripts in the education sector. Each student acquired a working knowledge of Ijekavian and Ekavian. Although students were expected to recognise both Ijekavian and Ekavian through the receptive skills of reading and listening, they were only expected to produce their own native variant. In the Socialist Federal Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, teachers were, however, expected to teach in the Ijekavian standard pronunciation. An Agreement Symposium on Linguistic Tolerance, which was held in 1970, declared that:

> lessons in schools will be carried out in the Ijekavian literary pronunciation. All junior and senior primary school teachers and teachers of the Serbo-Croatian language in colleges should use the Ijekavian pronunciation. Also, all textbooks which are published in the republic should be published in this variant. (Šipka 1975, pp 63–4)

Through the education system, students in Bosnia-Herzegovina were officially exposed to the standard pronunciation which was unofficially spoken outside the official sphere, such as in family and social contexts. Bosnian Serb students, therefore, developed active literacy in their first language variant, and receptive skills in the other variant. Under the new policy, this situation would be reversed.

Nationalism and language: the Republika Srpska experience

To many nationalists, language is an integral criterion of their membership of a national group (Blommaert and Verschueren, 1995), and language is often intimately linked with the concept of 'nation'. Yet, as Hobsbawm (1994) maintains, the emphasis on language as a criterion for nation did not become dominant until the middle of the nineteenth century. It achieved this ascendancy due to assertions by the German and Italian nation building movements of the time that language was the criterion for the existence of a nation. Language played a much larger role in the development of a national consciousness and a nation-state for Germany and Italy than it had in the development of older European nation-states, and language was one central consideration in determining which territories should ideally be included in the emerging Germany and Italy. As Hobsbawm states, language was the only thing that made the peoples of these new nations Germans or Italians. Accordingly, language was a clearer 'badge' of nationhood for these two nations than it had been for the French or English nations. Language has not always been seen as a necessary criterion for national identity. For example, Pfaff (1993, pp 51–2) argues that language is not held to be central to the concept of the multilingual Swiss or Belgian nations. In these nation-states, factors other than language, such as the idea of a common shared history, are deemed to be more important than language in the determination of the respective national identities. However, nationalist movements within these states use language among other factors as a symbolic marker of their differences.

In the past, language did not play a large part in defining the Serbian nation in relation to neighbouring Slavonic groups, and the distinctions between the Serbian, Croatian and Muslim groups were founded on religious differences and separate historical experiences. Indeed, in the nineteenth century, language was seen to be a unifying factor among the various groups of South Slavs in the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires. During this period, Serb and Croat intellectuals struggled to free their respective nations from these empires under the banner of the Illyrian movement, which emphasised the unity of the South Slavs. This unity was in part linguistic, and the Illyrian movement advanced the idea that all Slavs were a single people who spoke four dialects, of which Illyrian was the dialect of the South Slavs (Singleton 1985, p 74). Serb and Croat intellectuals and linguists who promoted the idea of a South Slav nation saw a common language as a tool by which a merger of the national interests of the Serbs and Croats could be achieved.

This idea of language as a unifying factor for the South Slavs was replaced by an idea of language as a dividing factor between the various groups during the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, and attempts were made following the break-up of Yugoslavia to strengthen linguistic divisions between the various groups (for example, see Mikula this volume). The primary difficulty for the transformation of language into a criterion for national identity in the former Yugoslavia was that the language which was spoken by the Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Serbs was essentially the same language, with minor lexical, morphosyntactic and accentual differences. Moreover, these differences were based on geographical demarcations rather than on ethnicity. A Serb from Serbia proper will speak one dialect, while a Serb from Bosnia will speak another, and the latter individual has, *linguistically*, more in common with a Bosnian Muslim and a Bosnian Croat than a Serb from Serbia proper. However, the imperatives of Serbian nationalism during the Bosnian conflicts required a maximisation of difference between Bosnian Serbs and other Bosnians, and an assertion of similarities between Bosnian Serbs and other Serbs. Therefore, in order to show their affinity with the Serbs from Serbia proper and emphasise the differences between the three ethnic groups in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serb government implemented laws which changed the status of the standard pronunciations from a Bosnian norm to a Belgrade norm.

The policy stirred debate in both Belgrade and the Republika Srpska (Dragosavljević 1998, 2000). It had widespread academic support in Belgrade, where many linguists and other academics saw it as an opportunity to create a unitary Serbian language with one script and one standard pronunciation. To them, the Ijekavian/Ekavian dichotomy was symptomatic of a deeper malaise in Serbian national consciousness: the division of Serbs into two distinct groups based on their perceived lack of a unitary standard language. The Bosnian Serb Minister for Culture in 1993, Đoko Stojičević, argues that the historical opportunity for Serbian unity had presented itself, and that 'one of the most important bonds of a nation's existence was a *standard language*' (Stojičević1993). This was to become a *motif* in the pro-Ekavian argument. A new myth was created. This was that the Serbian people had two 'languages' — the Ijekavian and Ekavian dichotomy — and that in the interests of national unity one of these 'languages' had to be relinquished (Dragosavljević 2000). The variety to be abandoned was Ijekavian, which separated the Bosnians Serbs from Serbia and linked them to Bosnian Croats and Muslims.

The argument was strongly supported by historian Milorad Ekmečić. He wrote in a 1993 article that the 'Serbs are a rare people in the world who still have two standard languages' (Ekmečić 1993), a claim that Banja Luka academic Miloš Kovačević dismisses:

> '[Ekmečić makes the Ijekavian/Ekavian dichotomy] a criterion of differentiation of the Serbian standard language into two standard languages (both of which cannot obviously be Serbian!)' (Kovačević 1997).

According to the pro-Ekavian activists, Ijekavian could not be accorded official status as it was spoken by other groups in addition to the Serbs. In the same article, Ekmečić asserts that the Bosnian Serbs were 'in a hurry to rid themselves of the characteristics of other people' (Ekmečić 1993). This statement is indicative of the core issue which pro-Ekavian activists had with the Ijekavian standard pronunciation. It was necessary to relinquish the Ijekavian standard pronunciation because of the closeness it offered to the other ethnic groups in Bosnia — groups with which the Bosnian Serbs were engaged in conflict at the time.

An interesting facet of the debate is that the majority of the pro-Ekavian activists were located in Belgrade, while the Bosnian Serbs who favoured maintaining Ijekavian were primarily located in Banja Luka. This is not surprising, as the Bosnian Serb academics were defending the right to use their native speech (Ijekavian) in official circles. The pro-Ekavian activists could be seen as trying to impose a form of the language on the Bosnian Serbs which was seen as more prestigious in Serbia itself. Kasagić (1997) acknowledges that Ekavian was perceived by many in Serbia to be the language of the elite. Writing from Belgrade in the height of the conflict, Ekmečić claims that Ijekavian, the standard pronunciation spoken by more than a million Serbs, as well as Croatians, Bosnian Muslims and Montenegrins, is the speech of 'hillbillies' (Ekmečić 1993). The use of this term reveals Ekmečić's primary concern: that of the perceptions of the Serbs from Serbia proper about their compatriots over the border. Popular attitudes in Serbia are revealed in

Ekmečić's article. If the Ijekavian standard pronunciation is not 'Serbian' in the eyes of the Serbs in Serbia, the people who use this standard pronunciation are, by association, also not Serbian (Ekmečić 1993). This argument was an emotive one, given that the Bosnian Serbs were fighting for the aim of political unity with Serbia proper. Nevertheless, in a series of articles published in Belgrade, leading academics such as Pavle Ivić and Slobodan Remetić argued that in the interests of national unity Ijekavian had to be relinquished (see Dragosavljević 2000 for details of the debate).

For many academics, the pro-Ekavian policy was unacceptable for both practical and nationalist reasons. Ranko Bugarski, one of Yugoslavia's foremost sociolinguists, argues that the 'move would render students of the new linguistic culture 'semiliterate' (Bugarski 1993). He feared a collapse of the dialectal borders would occur with the introduction of the legislation, and that mixing between the two standard pronunciations would take place. Mixing the standard pronunciations has long been seen as a sign of illiteracy. Such attitudes meant that the linguistic border between the standard pronunciations remained firm, even after the rise of mass media and telecommunications made Ekavian programs and magazines available in Ijekavian-speaking and reading regions. Bugarski's concerns about mixing were in fact well founded (Dragosavljević 1998).

Bosnian Serb academics were almost unanimously opposed to the legislation. Even though the legislation was a Bosnian Serb government initiative, the Banja Luka academic community saw it as having been partly instigated by the Belgrade academic and political elite. Bosnian Serb academics saw the legislation as intrusive and offensive for its implications that Bosnian Serbs were 'less Serbian' because they spoke the same standard pronunciation as the Croats and Bosnian Muslims. They defended the use of the Ijekavian standard pronunciation on nationalist grounds (Dragosavljević 2000). One of the greatest fears of the pro-Ijekavian activists was that if the Bosnian Serbs 'abandoned' the use of the Ijekavian standard pronunciation, the Croats and Bosnian Muslims would claim Ijekavian for their own, along with works of literature written in this pronunciation and the territories on which Ijekavian was spoken (Kasagić 1997).

The 'ownership' of Ijekavian by the Bosnian Serbs was tied in, therefore, to the acquisition of territory in the conflict. Kasagić (1997) argues that Ijekavian should be maintained as the official standard pronunciation because 'everybody must know from where our enemies acquired the Serbian Ijekavian speech'. To Kasagić and Predrag Lazarević the debate was essentially nationalist. However, for them, the nationalist issue was a question of ownership of Ijekavian. If the Bosnian Serbs were successful in banishing Ijekavian, the fear expressed by these academics was that the Croats and Muslims would claim the speech, and by association the people who spoke Ijekavian and territories on which Ijekavian was spoken. As the Bosnian conflict was primarily a territorial one, with all three sides in the conflict aiming to consolidate as much territory as possible, such nationalist concerns about the impact of the legislation are not surprising. It also showed that language was becoming a criterion of membership of the Serbian nation. The primary issue for Kasagić and Lazarević was that, if Ijekavian was officially banished, it would lead to a national identity crisis for the Bosnian Serbs who spoke Ijekavian. Few defenders, however, stated that Ijekavian should retain its official status simply because the majority of Bosnian Serbs spoke it. Kovačević maintains that:

> (the) withdrawal of official status for the Ijekavian standard pronunciation requires a special linguistic 're-education' of the entire language collective. The re-education is connected to the basic psycholinguistic problems of language identity, particularly among children in the lower-primary school level' (Kovačević 1997, p.100).

As the majority of Bosnian Serbs spoke Ijekavian, in order to ensure that positive attitudes were maintained towards Ijekavian and that future psycholinguistic difficulties were avoided, official language status for Ijekavian was essential.

Language planning in the Republika Srpska: the education perspective

The 1996 'Official Use of Language and Script Act' of the Republika Srpska, which had first been introduced in draft form in 1993, was quite specific in its instructions for the use of language in education: Ekavian was to be used as the medium of instruction. The Act was, however, in conflict with the Constitution of the Republika Srpska, which stated that:

> In the Republic the Serbian language of the Ijekavian and Ekavian pronunciations and the Cyrillic script are in official usage…

The Constitution, therefore, continued the dual system of the former Yugoslavia, but with a single script, Cyrillic. Although the Constitution could have been amended to accommodate the new legislation, there were no attempts to do so, as there was a backlash occurring among ordinary Bosnian Serbs. In 1998 the Act was revoked by the relatively moderate government of then-Prime Minister Milorad Dodik. It was deemed to be unconstitutional.

The sole use of the Cyrillic script in the Republika Srpska, unlike the status change for the Ijekavian standard pronunciation, was successfully implemented. On one level it was easier to implement, given that written work and orthographic rules may be more closely monitored than changes in pronunciation. However, on a more important level, the script change was successful for the very reason that the Ekavian policy was eventually to fail. Cyrillic was seen by the Serbian population both in the current Yugoslavia and in the Republika Srpska as an exclusively Orthodox and therefore Serbian script, as opposed to the Roman script, with its clear Catholic and therefore Croatian links. As Sučić (1996, p 3) explains, the Cyrillic script was a significant symbol of Serbian nationalism, while the Roman script fulfilled the same function for Croatian nationalism. The Ijekavian/Ekavian dichotomy could not evoke the same clear association with the Serbian nation in the minds of the general population of the Republika Srpska. Therefore, this population accepted the features of the decree on language use which pertained to the use of the Cyrillic script, but rejected those features which pertained to the use of Ekavian.

Initially, Bosnian Serb teachers were advised to allow their students to use both standard pronunciations as long as there was consistency in the text. In other words, if the student began writing a text by using the Ekavian word *vera* (faith) instead of the Ijekavian word *vjera*, the student must continue to use Ekavian. If, however, the word which was chosen was *vjera*, the subsequent text must be written in Ijekavian. This directive was made for the sake of consistency, and conforms to the existing conceptions of literate language use.

However, the 1996 Language Use Act demoted the status of the Ijekavian standard pronunciation in all areas of official life, including education, and Ijekavian was no longer allowed to be used in any official context in schools across the republic. The implications of this were considerable and affected most students and teachers in the Republika Srpska. According to Article 2 of the legislation, teachers in preschools and the lower and upper levels of primary schools had to perform their pedagogical duties in the Ekavian standard pronunciation. However, the legislation did not extend to secondary schools, colleges, universities and academies for the arts, where academics, teachers and students were able to continue using both standard pronunciations.

The Act provided details of fines for an infringement of the legal guidelines by schools and teachers, through the inclusion of Article Eleven. Violations of the law by an educational institution would result in a fine ranging from 2000 to 10000 dinars, with a fine ranging from 200 to 1200 dinars for the individual responsible for the infringement. These fines were heavy when compared with the average earnings of the teaching profession. At one stage in the aftermath of the 1992–5 conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the average teaching wage was 40 dinars a month. Thus, very few teachers could afford to risk having these fines imposed on them. The schools and academic institutions themselves were also struggling with financial difficulties, as the state economic infrastructure had been severely damaged by the 1992–5 conflict, and equally could not afford to contravene these language requirements.

The practical implications of the law in the education sector

In practical terms, the legal requirements were that all teachers in lower and upper level primary schools had to use Ekavian in all forms of academic discourse. They were required to speak and write Ekavian while instructing their students. The students were expected to respond in kind in their work. Thus, the onus was very much on the teacher to maintain the Ekavian standard pronunciation while speaking to the class, and the pupils were expected to follow the example presented to them by the teacher. Implicitly, the children were being taught that Ekavian was the proper form of the language, and that any other form was incorrect. There was a complete devaluing of the child's native standard Ijekavian pronunciation, which was now effectively a non-standard pronunciation. The child who attended primary school in the Republika Srpska under the decree was, therefore, learning, through implication, that Ijekavian was not as 'good' or as 'Serbian' as the standard Ekavian pronunciation which was taught in school.

There was, however, a fundamental difficulty with the implementation of the law in the education sector, and indeed in other sections of Bosnian Serb public life. This core complication involved a difference between reception and production of language skills and their relationship to the Ekavian/Ijekavian dichotomy. Under the auspices of the education authorities in the Socialist Federal Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, students who had attended schools in the Republic were expected to recognise both the Ijekavian and Ekavian standard pronunciations in the form of the receptive skills of reading and listening. However, they were required to *produce* work in their native Ijekavian standard pronunciation only, in the form of the productive language skills of writing and speaking.

The legislation on official language use in the Republika Srpska from 1993 to 1998 changed the expectations of students' performances in the language education forum. Students were still exposed to both standard pronunciations in reading, in the form of literature. However, they were required to recognise only one standard pronunciation from their teachers in the classroom in the receptive skills of reading and listening. Teachers were themselves expected to lead students' language use by producing written and oral work in the Ekavian standard pronunciation. However, the primary shift for students occurred in the area of the productive skills: writing and speaking. Under the legal requirements students were now expected to produce in a standard pronunciation *not native to them*. This was the fundamental difference in learning under the two systems, and it was this difference which resulted in confusion for students.

For secondary schools, colleges, universities and other educational institutions, the law varied considerably. In these institutions there was a continuation of the former policy which allowed teaching staff and students to use both standard pronunciations. The possible justification for this was that this age group has already progressed through the primary educational system using the Ijekavian standard pronunciation. To require students of this age group and educational level to modify the speech and writing patterns which they have used since the start of their education was perhaps seen as futile. The government appeared to acknowledge this difficulty through its distinction of the application of the law between the age groups of those students.

There were considerable implications for those students who were legally required to use Ekavian. Results from a series of tests formulated as part of a case study (Dragosavljević 1998) established that Ranko Bugarksi's (1993) fears regarding a merging of the standard pronunciations has been, to some degree, fulfilled. Students no longer perceive that there is any error in using both standard pronunciations in a single text, an error which in an earlier period of time would have been rectified by the teacher, if it occurred at all. Students would have used their native Ijekavian pronunciation, and thus would have written the words as they pronounced them. During the period of official use of Ekavian in the Republika Srpska, one standard pronunciation only was granted official status. However, because this pronunciation was not native for the learners, and because the substitution of *e* for *(i)je* was not a simple replacement of all instances of *e*, but was rather determined by the etymology of the word, the end result was confusion. This confusion involved not only the unsystematic maintenance of Ijekavian forms, but also hypercorrection of *e* forms which are not covered by the Ekavian/Ijekavian dichotomy, such as the writing of *subjekat* 'subject' and *objekat* 'object' as *subekat* and *obekat* (Dragosavljević 1998).

Further compounding the problem, some lower primary school level teachers actively encouraged children and students to use Ekavian while the legislation existed. Thus, the belief that it was now necessary to use Ekavian in written work became ingrained in the students. The core difficulty was that, while some teachers demanded this, others did not. The majority of teachers opposed the move, and as such, did not penalise students for mixing the two standard pronunciations. Such mixing, they felt, was inevitable when students were asked to produce work in a standard pronunciation which was not their native one. They, therefore, turned a blind eye to the mixing of the standard pronunciations.

Dragosavljević (1998) also showed that teachers were not changing their own speech behaviour to accommodate the policy. Rather than leading by example, they merely repeated the instruction 'Use Ekavian when writing' and continued to use Ijekavian in teaching. When asked why they did not use Ekavian in teaching their students, the answer was invariably 'It's a short-sighted policy which will be removed soon'. There may also have been an uncertainty among teachers in their ability to use the Ekavian standard pronunciation, and the methods in which to use it as part of a pedagogical methodology. There were no programs established for the implementation of the law. Fundamentally, the government devised the law, but did not approach the issue of its implementation at all beyond introducing penalties it could not enforce. The lack of implementation efforts by the government meant that existing attitudes could not be changed. At the same time, the policy was resisted by teachers. The Serbian language teachers in the sample study viewed the policy as impractical and saw its objective as a total devaluation of their students' native standard pronunciation (Dragosavljević 1998). This is an example of top-down language planning, introduced to meet the nationalist agenda of an elite group, but which did not have mass sympathy or commitment, and which could not be enforced through institutional control, nor even through adequate supplies of educational materials in the language concerned (Dragosavljević 1998).

It appears that the policy created a literacy problem in the Republika Srpska which could take many years to rectify. There was a merging of the dialects in students' written work, in which mixing occurred at an alarming rate. As the standard pronunciations are similar, with the differentiating factor being the current treatment of the Proto-Slavonic 'jat', students could believe that such a merging is unimportant or trivial. As today's students are tomorrow's teachers, journalists and writers, it remains to be seen whether the policy will have a lasting impact on the Serbian language in the Republika Srpska. All in all, the language plan became yet another problem which teachers and students had to contend with in what was already a difficult learning environment. In the end, the teachers' perceptions about the impermanency of the policy proved to be correct, and the law was repealed in 1998.

Why did the policy fail?

Officially the policy failed because the 1996 law was deemed to be unconstitutional. However, its ultimate annulment by the Constitutional Court of the Republika Srpska was a practical application of 'bottom-up' language planning, in that, had the *people* accepted the policy and used Ekavian *en masse*, the Constitution itself would have been amended. The rejection of the 1996 'Official Use of Language and Script Act' with regards to the Ekavian standard pronunciation on an official level reflected its rejection on a public level.

The Republika Srpska was in socio-political turmoil at the time of the Ekavian promotion and this turmoil must be seen as central to the decision-making process. The Bosnian conflict was at its height at the time of the drafting of the legislation which substantially downgraded the official use of Ijekavian. The territories in which the policy was to be legalised had not even been clarified. Thus, the mechanisms for the successful implementation of the policies did not exist. In the education sector, for example, there was little attempt by the authorities to regulate the use of language in such key areas as textbooks and continuing professional education for teachers. These were key areas which should have been addressed if the language policy was to have any chance of success.

The pro-Ekavian language policy was founded on myths — the myth of language as indicator of nation, the myth of the existence of a Serbian language which could only be based on the Ekavian standard pronunciation, the myth that Ijekavian was the speech of the enemy. Such myths were not reflected in the attitudes of those who were most affected by the policy. The Bosnian Serb population in general did not accept the myths promoted by their political leaders. The pro-Ekavian movement in the Republika Srpska was politically motivated, as opposed to linguistically motivated, and the status of Ijekavian as an official Serbian pronunciation was revoked, despite the linguistic realities of the Republika Srpska. That the movement failed is a testament to the belief that, for the Serbs of Bosnia, language was not an indicator of their concepts of 'nation' and ethnic identity.

The attempted introduction of Ekavian into the Republika Srpska through the decree which made it the sole official standard pronunciation ultimately proved unsuccessful for a number of reasons. Legally, it was declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it went against Article 7 of the Constitution which affirmed that both standard pronunciations were equal in official status. However, the legal revocation of the law was, importantly, a *reflection* of the popular attitudes towards it. As J Holmes (1992, p 129) points out, '...ultimately it is the patterns of linguistic behaviour of individual language users that determine whether a national policy will succeed or not'. Had popular attitudes accepted the law, had the population of the Republika Srpska used Ekavian in speech in order to mark themselves as different from their Croat and Muslim neighbours, politicians, whose electoral chances rest with listening to the opinions of their constituencies, would have endeavoured to change the constitution to accommodate the law. Such an attempt was either not made or was unsuccessful.

The policy ultimately failed because it did not succeed in changing the criteria of belonging to the Serbian nation to include 'language'. As Tajfel (1974) writes:

> '(t)he battle for legitimacy ... is a battle for the *acceptance by others of new forms of intergroup comparison*. As long as these are not consensually accepted, the new characteristics ... cannot be fully adequate for building a new social identity' (Tajfel 1974, p 86, emphasis added).

The Bosnian Serbs refused to accept a new form of intergroup comparison: language as indicator of national identity. They felt they were able to claim that they were Serbs because they shared a common history, culture and religion. The fact that they spoke the same standard pronunciation as the Bosnian Muslims and Croats did not matter to them, because they knew that they were different as a result of the above criteria. This sense of self-assurance explains the nationalist rhetoric used by many of the writers who defended Ijekavian in the Republika Srpska.

Conclusion

The attempt to officially introduce the Ekavian standard pronunciation into the Republika Srpska has provided an insight into the manner in which a minute linguistic difference in a language, such as the treatment of one phonemic sequence in a few hundred words, can have a lasting impact on a population's attitudes towards the language and its speakers.

In the end, the promotion of Ekavian as Serbian threatened to undermine rather than promote the Serbian identity of Bosnian Serbs. If a dichotomy between Ekavian as Serbian and Ijekavian as non-Serbian was maintained, the Serbian credentials of Ijekavian-speaking Bosnian Serbs were under question. The imposition of the Serbian versus non-Serbian dichotomy on the Ekavian versus Ijekavian dichotomy undermined the historical continuity of Serbian identity in Bosnia, by replacing traditional distinctions of religion, culture and shared history, which had served as identity markers, with an artificial marker in the form of language, which effectively gave the Serbs of Serbia greater claims to Serbian identity than the Serbs of Bosnia.

References

Blommaert, J and Verschueren, J 1995, 'The role of language in European nationalist ideologies', in C Schäffner and AL Wenden (eds) *Language and peace* Aldershot, Dartmouth.

Bugarski, R 1993, 'Etničko čišćenje jezika', *Književna Reč*, vol. 22, no. 424, p 3.

Dragosavljević, A 1998, *A tongue divided? The politics of language in Republika Srpska 1993–1998* Unpublished Master of Arts thesis: Australian National University.

Dragosavljević, A 2000, 'Language policies and academic responses: the Ekavian debate in the Republika Srpska', *Australian Slavonic and East European Studies*, vol. 14, Nos 1–2., 2000.

Ekmečić, M 1993, 'Jedan jezik', *Pobjeda: Narodni front Crne Gore*, 6 November 1993.

Hobsbawm, EJ 1994, 'The rise of ethno-linguistic nationalisms', in J Hutchinson and AD Smith (eds) *Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Holmes, J 1992, *An introduction to sociolinguistics*, Longman, London.

Holmes, L 1986, *Politics in the communist world,* Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Kasagić, B 1997, *Ijekavsko ne ekavici: Duša srba je ijekavska*, Gradiška, Gorazd.

Kellas, JG 1991, *The politics of nationalism and ethnicity*, St Martin's Press, New York.

Kovačević, M 1997, *U Odbranu Jezika Srpskoga,* Trebnik, Belgrade.

Pfaff, W 1993, *The wrath of nations: civilisation and the furies of nationalism*, Simon and Schuster, New York.

Singleton, F 1985, *A short history of the Yugoslav peoples*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Šipka, M 1975, *Jezički savjetnik.* Svjetlost, Sarajevo.

Stojičević, Đ 1993, 'Sada je na redu bosna (Republika Srpska) i njen Karadžić', *Književna Reč.*, vol. 22, no. 424, p 3.

Sučić, DS 1996, 'The fragmentation of Serbo-Croatian into three different languages', *Transition*, vol. 2, no.24 <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Transition/Features/Feature.Vo2N24.html>.

Tajfel, H 1974, 'Social identity and intergroup behaviour', *Social Science Information*, vol. 13, no.2, pp 65–93.

PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPE

language issues and language planning in Europe

Edited by Anthony J. Liddicoat and Karis Muller

Issues of language have always been important in Europe, but never more than today. As Europe seeks to develop a supranational political structure, issues of language learning, multilingualism and the roles of various European languages within and across nations, have become central to European language planning and policy.

Perspectives on Europe: language issues and language planning in Europe examines some of the emerging language issues in Europe at the close of the 2001 European Year of Languages, as seen from the perspective of Australian scholars working on the languages of Europe. The papers in this volume span a range of language issues, both regional and national, and examine how these factors are played out in language planning and language policy, raising questions that are of equal importance to both Europe and Australia. Questions like, should we insist on compulsory learning of foreign languages at school? What criteria should dictate the choice of languages taught? Should resources be devoted to regional or minority languages rather than to dominant languages? Can concepts or arguments be successfully translated? What are the communicative consequences of different writing conventions and different codes of politeness? What sort of society are we or do we wish to become?

Both the European Union and Australia are diverse and multicultural communities, and the European experience of language provides a useful perspective for Australia, and Australian language policy. This book offers invaluable insight into the ongoing language debate.

Published by

LANGUAGE AUSTRALIA

Partially funded by

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

U.S. Department of Education
Office of Educational Research and Improvement (OERI)
National Library of Education (NLE)
Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC)

NOTICE

Reproduction Basis

☒ This document is covered by a signed "Reproduction Release (Blanket)" form (on file within the ERIC system), encompassing all or classes of documents from its source organization and, therefore, does not require a "Specific Document" Release form.

☐ This document is Federally-funded, or carries its own permission to reproduce, or is otherwise in the public domain and, therefore, may be reproduced by ERIC without a signed Reproduction Release form (either "Specific Document" or "Blanket").

EFF-089 (1/2003)